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The build-up of Greenhouse Gases in the atmosphere and consequential Global 
warming possesses a real threat to human society. Science alerted us to this problem 
and at the same time provides technologies capable of emission reductions, yet it is 
behavioural change that is urgently needed. This thesis investigates how we are to 
understand Qantas and its Marginal Abatement Cost Curve (MACC) in a late-
capitalist, ecological crisis context. Firstly, it explores the political and economic 
interrelations between Qantas, the Australia Government and Australians also in 
regard to the introduction of the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme (AU ETS) 
and the role Qantas’ MACC can play in relation to behavioural change.  
Accounting literature identifies an urgent need for accounting researchers to engage 
in theories and world-views other than mainstream positivist accounting research to 
shed light on the relationship of accounting and the macroeconomic and political 
context which it shapes and through which it is shaped (Sikka, et al., 1995; Arnold, 
1990; Arnold, 2009a). In the context of global warming the MACC will be 
introduced as ‘new accounting’ (Gray, 2002) to assist companies and governments to 
reduce CO2. The MACC supports questions of the State and companies about 
accountability for abatement options. 
Laughlin’s (1995) middle range thinking provides the freedom to flesh out a 
theoretical lens empirically. This research draws on Habermas’ (1973) ‘legitimation 
crisis’ and Beck’s (Beck, 1996; 2006; 2008c; 2008b; 2008a; 2010b; 2010a) work on 
the ‘ecological crisis’ to be applied to the case study of Qantas. These theories 
explain the relation between the economic, state and social realms’ interactions in the 
context of global warming and Australian climate actions. These lenses also 
accommodate the introduction of the MACC as part of a solution to climate change. 
To achieve the objectives of this study requires qualitative and quantitative multiple 
data sources from and about Qantas. Firstly, it draws on publicly available data from 
Qantas’ annual reports, SEA-reports and other disclosures presented on Qantas 
webpage, Government Reports and Hansard, industry reports, public media and 
existing academic literature that partially deals with Qantas’ relation to the 
government. In order to model the MACC for Qantas this thesis relies on publicly 




by Kar et al. (2010) and Farries and Eyers (2008) about CO2-e indicate abatement 
opportunities. Qantas’ individual specification of fleet, processes, and deployed 
technology as well as key determinants set by the Australian Government and 
aviation market are identified from Qantas’ annual reports, government reports or 
other publicly available sources.  
The findings illustrate the subjectively created and experiential nature of Qantas’ 
economic crisis. Accounting discourse is actively used to create and emphasise 
crises. There is a deep involvement of the Australia Government in Qantas’ 
production process. Accounting and neoliberal-informed rhetoric assists the 
Government to provide rationality for its actions to fill market gaps and produce 
financial and other supports to curb the economic crisis within Qantas. Accounting 
concepts provide means to keep latent the prioritisation of individual capitalist 
interests’, such as Qantas’, even in the wake of global warming. Finally, accounting 
rhetoric has contributed to the diminishing support of the Australian electorate and a 
motivational crisis to withdraw support for climate actions. The MACC in this 
context can be mobilizer to show potential CO2 abatement opportunities, reduce the 
impact of Qantas’ economic crisis, provide rationality to Government’s use of 
income redistribution and be part of a solution to curb global warming. The MACC 
modelled for Qantas reveals process, technology, biofuel and aircraft-replacement 
related abatement opportunities. The analysis of these abatement options reveals 
opportunities to achieve behavioural change and hurdles for their implementation.  
This study fills a theoretical gap, enhancing Habermas’ legitimation crisis with 
contemporary literature updates and combining it with the work of Beck’s ecological 
crisis. These crisis theories are applied to an Australian context of a significant 
economic player within Australia, Qantas, enhances our understanding of the 
political economy and the very role of accounting to create, curb or hide 
circumstances which could lead to crises. It provides a new lens to consider SEAR in 
the wake of global warming. The MACC, this being the first time introduced into 
accounting research, provides means to act on the macro level to signal ways to 
engage with solutions to the ecological crisis. For Qantas it provides a useful tool to 
create visibility of CO2, to abate CO2, and to finally trigger behavioural change. 
Limitations to this study are with the case study approach, allowing only limited 




triangulation was applied data limitations could be a limitation to the reliability of 
some analysis. Modelling of the MACC required the author to make several 
assumptions about the future. Even though a sensitivity analysis to interest rate 
changes was conducted, the figures might vary if the calculation could draw on 
Qantas internal data. The implementation within a company could overcome this 
limitation and could reveal more details about the process necessary for the MACC 
to unfold its ‘true’ potential for decision making. Other future research could expand 
on the theoretical lens and on stakeholder engagement to strive towards a ‘new 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (an addition to 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer) is an example of a 
successful attempt on the part of the global community to curb an ecological crisis. It 
was signed on 16 September 1987 by the first 24 nations1 that brought about change. 
Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), said, ‘perhaps 
the single most successful international agreement to date has been the Montreal 
Protocol’ (Welch, 2014). This treaty, designed to protect the ozone layer by 
abolishing the production of numerous substances that are responsible for ozone 
depletion, was the first treaty in the UN to be ratified by all its members, 196 states 
and the European Union (EU) (Molina, et al., 2009; Murdoch and Sandler, 1997).  
The top 20 emitters, including the EU, make up 71% of global carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions (see Table 1-1). If these states were to join together and foster behavioural 
change, significant reductions in greenhouse gases (GHG) could be achieved.  
Science and technology play a significant role in relation to the build-up of GHGs in 
the atmosphere; science has identified the problem and the solution lies in 
developing and sharing alternative technologies (Diesendorf, 2007; The Allen 
Consulting Group Pty Ltd, 2006). But a key requirement is behavioural change, as 
people and businesses will have to change their energy sources from those currently 
dominated by carbon fuels to alternative ‘green energy’ sources over time, and this 





                                                 
1 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Italy, 
Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of 




Table 1-1 World’s 20 largest emitters 
The countries included within the ‘European Union’ entry are 
not counted in the ‘Total’ to avoid double counting. 




China 8,286,892 26.43% 
United States 4,433,057 14.14% 
European Union 3,688,880 13.33% 
India 2,008,823 6.41% 
Russia 1,740,776 5.55% 
Japan 1,170,715 3.73% 
Germany 745,384 2.38% 
Iran 571,612 1.82% 
South Korea 567,567 1.81% 
Canada 499,137 1.59% 
United Kingdom 493,505 1.57% 
Saudi Arabia 464,481 1.48% 
South Africa 460,124 1.47% 
Mexico 443,674 1.42% 
Indonesia 433,989 1.38% 
Brazil 419,754 1.34% 
Italy 406,307 1.30% 
Australia 373,081 1.19% 
France  361,273 1.15% 
Poland 317,254 1.01% 
Total 23,712,843 71.35% 
Source: Adapted from UNFCCC (2013). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol marked a point of change on the international policy stage with 
many countries committing to GHG emissions reductions. In order to meet their 
emissions targets and to encourage behavioural change in business, the Australian 
government introduced the Australia Emissions Trading Scheme (AU ETS) in July 
2012 to put a price on GHG emissions. The aviation sector faced policy measured to 
reduce carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) in different jurisdictions, also under the 
AU ETS. 
1.1.1 Kyoto Protocol 
On 11 December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement to combat 
global warming was adopted. This international environmental treaty, as mentioned 
 
20 
in Article 2 of the Convention, aims to stabilise the concentration of GHG2 emissions 
in the atmosphere, ‘within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change’ (UNFCCC, 2011a). When Russia joined the Kyoto 
Protocol the treaty covered 61.6% of the total emissions of developed nations; it 
came into force on 16 February 2005 (AAP, 2007b).  
Thirty-seven industrialised countries and the European Community (EC)3 agreed on 
binding targets to reduce GHG emissions by, on average, 5% over the period 2008 to 
2012 compared to the 1990 level (UNFCCC, 2011b). The Kyoto Protocol requires 
nations to meet their standards through national efforts and also introduced three 
market mechanisms: 1) emissions trading; 2) the clean development mechanism 
(CDM); and 3) joint implementation (JI). Now 192 countries have signed and ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol, including Australia.  
1.1.2 Regulatory Framework within the International Aviation Sector  
Domestic GHG emissions from the aviation industry are included in the national 
GHG inventories of Annex 1 countries4 covered under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Emissions from international air traffic, however, are not included in the respective 
national emissions targets (Gössling and Upham, 2009). The responsibility for 
reducing aviation emissions in Annex 1 countries was deferred to the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 1997), which rejected the idea of a global ETS 
during their annual assembly in 2004, but “endorsed the inclusion of aviation in 
existing national/regional ETS as more cost-effective measure than fuel taxes” 
(Gössling and Upham, 2009, p.9). Despite its position, the ICAO decided that 
airlines should not be included in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) (Environment News Service, 2007; Vieira, 2007), a response to the EU 
Parliament’s November 2007 reading, which identified the need for a 10% emissions 
reduction based on 2004–2006 average airline emissions to commence in 2011 (EU 
Parliament, 2007). 
                                                 
2 Under the Protocol GHGs refer to carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
3 For the role of the EC in introducing and advancing the Kyoto Protocol see, for example, Wettestad 
(2005), Convery (2009), Hovi and Holtsmark (2006), Hovi et al. (2003), Voss (2007) and Ellerman 
and Buchner (2007).  




In Europe, from the beginning of 2012, all international and regional flights have 
been subjected to the EU ETS. For the calendar year 2012, the emissions cap for 
each airline was set at 97% and will decrease to 95% for the 2013–2020 trading 
period compared to their historical 2004–2005 CO2 emissions levels. Fifteen percent 
of the allowances are auctioned (Euractive, 2012).  
There are two legal decisions that could impact on North American airlines’ CO2 
emissions. First, the US Senate Committee of Environment and Public Works gave 
approval to the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Bill in 2007 and forwarded it to 
the US Senate to be considered. The Bill aimed to create a nationwide ETS for the 
aviation industry in the US similar to the one that exists in the EU; however, in mid-
2008, under pressure from the Republicans, it was abandoned. Second, there are 
already five Canadian provinces and eight US states that have set targets of 10% to 
30% emissions reductions for 2020 below a 1990 baseline. An additional two 
Canadian provinces and six US states have set a target of a 75% to 80% emissions 
reduction for 2050 below a 1990 baseline (Gössling, et al., 2008). These measures 
could be extended to also include the aviation sector. 
In addition, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, realised in 2010, states that ETS is a key 
measure to cope with climate change in general and reduce carbon emissions in 
particular. In 2011, the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) planned that seven provinces and cities in China would introduce carbon 
trading pilots. In 2012, the CPC made specifications for the pilot schemes, which 
started in 2013 and 2014 , while the introduction of a nationwide ETS is proposed for 
introduction by 2015–16 (Hannon, et al., 2011)5. However, it is yet to be determined 
if and when the Chinese aviation industry will be subject to a price on carbon. 
1.1.3 Australia’s Emissions Trading 
Prior to Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 1999, a series of discussion 
papers was released by the Australian Greenhouse Office on the design of an AU 
ETS. In 2006, a task force created by the Australian states released a paper on the 
design that an AU ETS could take. In 2007, a group of leading business 
representatives and senior officials represented in the Howard government’s Prime 
                                                 
5 Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Tianjin started in 2013; Chongqing and Hubei started 
early 2014.  
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Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading recommended the adoption of an ETS 
to the government (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011b). As one of his first official 
acts as prime minister, Kevin Rudd signed the Kyoto Protocol on 3 December 2007. 
(AAP, 2007a). The Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) Green Paper was 
released by the government on 16 July 2008, reflecting the government’s position on 
issues relating to the CPRS. A White Paper named CPRS: Australia’s Low Pollution 
Future was released on 15 December 2008 and was the basis of the CPRS legislative 
packages. Three packages of legislation to implement the CPRS were introduced by 
the government in 2009 and 2010, but were not passed by Parliament 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011b). 
Modelling undertaken by Treasury highlights the benefits of adopting an ETS 
immediately: lower costs and the retention of or even increase in international 
competitiveness (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011c).  
On 10 July 2011 the new Australian government released its (new) climate change 
plan: Securing a Clean Energy Future (Ernst & Young, 2011) and on 28 July 2011 
the exposure draft of the Clean Energy Bill 2011, related exposure drafts of bills6 and 
their commentary were released (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011a) and were 
agreed upon in November 2012 (Australian Government, 2011b). 
The emissions covered by the carbon pricing scheme consist of four out of six of the 
GHGs mentioned under the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide 
and perfluorocarbons from aluminium smelting (or CO2-e). Emissions from the 
following areas are covered by the pricing mechanism: stationary energy; industrial 
processes; fugitive emissions (other than from decommissioned coal mines); and 
emissions from non-legacy waste. For business transport emissions an equivalent 
carbon price will be applied through separate legislation to non-transport use of 
liquid and gaseous fuels and synthetic GHGs. 
                                                 
6 Clean Energy (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2011; Clean Energy Regulator Bill 2011; Climate 
Change Authority Bill 2011; Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge – General) Bill 2011; Clean 
Energy (Unit Issue Charge – General) Bill 2011; Clean Energy (Charges – Excise) Bill 2011; Clean 
Energy (International Unit Surrender Charge) Bill 2011; Ozone Protection and Synthetic 
Greenhouse Gas (Manufacture Levy) Amendment Bill 2011; Ozone Protection and Synthetic 
Greenhouse Gas (Import Levy) Amendment Bill 2011; Fuel Tax Legislation Amendment (Clean 
Energy) Bill 2011; Excise Tariff Legislation Amendment (Clean Energy) Bill 2011; and Customs 
Tariff Amendment (Clean Energy) Bill 2011.  
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The price for carbon permits during the fixed price period, introduced in July 2012, 
will be $23 per CO2-e, and will increase by 4% over the next two years up to $25.4 
in 2014/2015. Facilities that emit more than 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e as defined under 
the National Greenhouse Emissions and Reporting Act 2007 are subject to the 
pricing mechanism. These facilities have to acquire a permit at the prevailing price 
for each tonne of CO2-e emitted. During the first phase of the flexible price period 
(July 2015 to July 2019) a pricing floor will be set at $15 and it will increase 
annually by 4%. The price ceiling will be set at $20 above the expected international 
price for 2015/2016 and this will increase by 5% in real terms each year (KPMG, 
2011; Commonwealth of Australia, 2011a; PwC, 2011; Ernst & Young, 2011).  
Figure 1-1: Carbon price development 
 
1.2 MOTIVATIONs AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This study is motivated by existing accounting literature and the threat of global 
warming to humanity. Of particular interest is the role of accounting in helping to 
understand the economic, state and social systems in the wake of the ecological 
crisis. 
The accounting literature identifies an urgent need for accounting researchers to 
engage in theories and world views other than mainstream positivist accounting 
research to shed light on the relationship between accounting and the macroeconomic 
and political context which it shapes and through which it is shaped (Sikka, et al., 
1995; Arnold, 1990; Arnold, 2009a). The political and social dimension of 
accounting in the distribution of income (Cooper, 1995; Tinker and Neimark, 1987) 
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and the allocation of resources (Cooper, 1980; Sikka, et al., 1995) in the context of 
global warming has not been subject to investigation yet. This research will be the 
first to consider in an Australian context the threat of climate change and the actions 
taken in the macro-economic and political context in which accounting operates. 
This research aims to form a theoretical understanding about the interplay of the 
economic, administrative and social realms in the context of an ecological crisis. 
Habermas’ legitimation crisis (1975) and Beck’s work on the ecological crisis (1996; 
2006; 2008c; 2008b; 2008a; 2010b; 2010a) will be drawn on to extend the array of 
theoretical lenses available to social and environmental accounting reporting (SEAR) 
research.  
Finally, the MACC will be introduced as ‘new accounting’ to analyse its potential to 
assist companies, governments and citizens to curb global warming. The MACC has 
been widely used in other academic literature in the fields of economics and 
management, as well as in non-academic literature. This will also allow questions to 
be asked about accountability for abatement options for the state and companies. 
The main objective of this research is to investigate Qantas in a late capitalist, 
ecological crisis context, in particular after the introduction of the Australian Carbon 
Pricing Scheme and the role of Qantas’ MACC. To approach this objective, the 
following questions are proposed: 
1. The Australian government appears to provide a range of subsidies that will 
help to prevent Qantas from failing. Is there any financial or other 
accountability for these subsidies? And what has the Australian government 
done to support Qantas as Australia’s national carrier and to prevent an 
economic or financial failure by Qantas while attempting to resolve the 
ecological crisis? 
2. Which economic crises has Qantas faced? And how can the MACC be used 
to illustrate the economic prudence of investment decisions (to prevent 
economic crises) in relation to the introduction of the Australian Carbon 
Pricing Scheme? 
3. What are the contributions of the MACC to social and environmental 




1.3 RESEARCH CONTENT 
In line with the motivation and objectives of this study a qualitative case study 
approach was considered most suitable. Scapens (1990) suggests an exploratory case 
study to find explanations for the specific context of a case which is in the same vein 
of previous studies into role of accounting in political economy (Puxty, 1997; 
Rahaman, et al., 2004). This is a holistic approach towards case study (Yin, 2009; 
Creswell, 2013), which also fits the methodological stance of middle range thinking 
(MRT) (Laughlin, 1995, 2004). This stance provides the flexibility to investigate the 
interplay among state, economic and social systems in the context of global warming, 
and to develop the MACC in order to guide abatement investment decisions to 
ultimately achieve behavioural change. 
1.4 THEORETICAL LENSES 
The current accounting literature contains a wide range of studies guided by (neo-) 
Marxism, German Critical Theory (encompassing Habermas and Beck), French 
Critical Theory and critical thoughts on Neoliberalism (Harvey, 2007, and others) to 
explain accounting’s role in its wider social, political and economic contexts. The 
combination of both Habermas’ and Beck’s theories and their advancement brings 
together the interplay of social and system integration to analyse the unique context 
of Qantas in context of late capitalism and climate change. It provides a unique lens 
to understand the macro and micro level discourses in the light of urgently needed 
climate change actions and the attempt to protect Qantas' financial viability. 
This study draws on Habermas’ ‘legitimation crisis’ (1975) and Beck’s ‘ecological 
crisis’ (1996; 2006; 2008c; 2008b; 2008a; 2010b; 2010a). Juergen Habermas’ theory 
provides a sociological analysis of the relationship between the economic, 
administrative (state) and social systems. He outlines the characteristics of late 
capitalist societies and then explains crises tendencies. His work draws on Marx and 
Offe (Offe, 1972), combining perspectives of social and system integration to explain 
how crises come about.  
The role of the state (administrative system) is vital for preventing economic crisis 
because the state fills gaps in the market and compensates for the adverse effects of 
capitalist production. Through state consumption further investment opportunities are 
created to allow capitalists to employ excess capital. Consequently, the state is able 
to keep economic crises latent. 
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However, the state faces the challenge of collecting taxes and using them in a 
‘rational’ way. Preventing economic crises is one expectation the electorate (social 
system) has on its government. Habermas notes the ability of the state to keep 
rationality crises latent when it manages to keep the prioritisation of individual 
capitalists’ interests over the general interest through the state uncovered. 
Motivational crisis occurs when the government is not able to replace ‘value’ with 
‘Sinn’ (meaning). As a result the electorate is not willing to follow the state and a 
legitimation crisis occurs. This thesis provides updates on Habermas’ theory, 
combining it with aspects of neoliberalism and Beck’s ecological crisis.  
Ecological crisis can be a mobiliser for action against climate change across nations 
and for action groups to prevent the worst climate catastrophes. Beck calls for a 
cosmopolitan approach that overcomes nations’ boarder functions of watershed, 
which currently foster social and environmental inequality. One main task of 
sociology ought to be bringing the ‘future-future’ of climate change into the ‘present-
future’ in order to trigger a solution to climate change and to prevent potential 
barbarisation.  
The MACC is considered as an accounting tool with the potential to assist corporate 
decision-making, triggering behavioural change and encouraging a dialogue among 
those stakeholders interested in actions against climate change.  
1.5 RESEARCH METHODS 
Previous studies into political economy (Puxty, 1997; Rahaman, et al., 2004) that 
drew on Habermas’ legitimation crisis relied on annual reports and SEAR. This study 
goes beyond these data sources to include other disclosures presented on Qantas’ 
webpage; government and Hansard reports; publicly accessible industry reports; 
public media; data envelop analysis to assess the environmental and cost efficiency 
of Qantas in comparison to major global airlines; and existing academic literature 
that partially deals with Qantas’ relationship with the government. In order to draw 
on Habermas’ and Beck’s theory, data sources are grouped by theme and double-
checked against one another to triangulate.  
Qantas’ MACC will be modelled according to a bottom-up approach widely 
established in existing academic literature (Almihoub, et al., 2013; Delarue, et al., 
2010; Klepper and Peterson, 2006; Moran, et al., 2011; Vijay, et al., 2010; Wächter, 
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2013). Abatement opportunities will be identified and assessed according to their 
respective abatable CO2-e amount and costs. Qantas’ individual specification of fleet, 
processes and deployed technology, as well as key determinates set by the Australian 
government and aviation market will shape the MACC. This information is derived 
from publicly available sources in the same vein as other previous studies which 
have established a MACC (Turner, et al., 2010; Almihoub, et al., 2013; Baker, et al., 
2008; Bauman, et al., 2008; Criqui, et al., 1999; De Cara and Jayet, 2011; Delarue, et 
al., 2010; Kiuila and Rutherford, 2011; Kuik, et al., 2009; Murphy and Jaccard, 
2011; Nordrum, et al., 2011; Park and Lim, 2009; Vijay, et al., 2010; Nauclér and 
Enkvist, 2009). All suggested abatement opportunities are readily available. The 
abatement amount of CO2-e will be calculated as the difference between ‘old 
technology’ (Qantas Group’s current emissions) and respectively newer more 
efficient or alternative technology with less CO2-e output as a replacement for the 
older technology. Net present value (NPV) calculations for the MACC will be 
computed in Microsoft Excel (See Appendix A1) and a sensitivity analysis will be 
conducted for various interest rates (7%, 10%, 15%, 20%) following Qantas’ (2013c) 
assumptions for its modelling of the economic viability of biofuel within Australia. 
1.6 QANTAS – CASE STUDY 
Qantas (Queensland and Northern Territory Aerial Services) was chosen as the case 
site for this study for several reasons.  
First, Qantas was founded in 1920 in Queensland and grew from a regional carrier to 
one of the world’s largest carriers. Its fleet comprises 130 aircraft and Qantas serves 
40 national and international destinations. The Qantas Group includes a range of 
subsidiaries,7 which are divided into five business segments: Qantas International, 
Qantas Domestic, Jetstar Group, Qantas Loyalty and Qantas Freight. These business 
segments serve 65% of Australia’s domestic aviation market and transport 18.7% of 
all the passengers arriving or departing in Australia by plane. To provide these 
services, Qantas employs 33,265 staff (2013), which makes it one of the largest 
employers within Australia. Annual revenue for 2013 totalled $15.9 billion and this 
puts Qantas amongst the largest Australian companies, ranked 16 (BRW, 2014).  
                                                 
7 QantasLink, Jetstar Airways, Jetconnect, Network Aviation, Qantas Freight, Australian Air Express, 
Qantas Defence Services, Qantas Holidays, Express Ground Handling, Qantas Ground Services, 
Q Catering and Snap Fresh. 
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Second, Qantas emitted almost four million tonnes of CO2-e (tCO2-e) in 2009/2010 
(Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2011) placing it among the 
25 largest GHG emitters in Australia, and among the 10 largest emitting Australian 





Table 1-2 Australian 25 largest CO2-e emitters 
This Table provides the Rank, name of the registered company and direct CO2-e emissions 
in million tonne. Companies are ranked according to their direct CO2-e emission, scope 2 
emissions are not taken into consideration.  
Rank Company Name Million 
t CO2-e 
1. Macquarie Generation  23.4 
2. Delta Electricity  20.5 
3. Great Energy Alliance Corporation Pty Ltd  19.8 
4. International Power (Australia) Holdings Pty Ltd 17.2 
5. C S Energy Limited  16.8 
6 TRUenergy Holdings Pty Ltd  15.6 
7. Eraring Energy  12.1 
8. BlueScope Steel Limited  10.8 
9. Loy Yang Holdings Pty Ltd  10.2 
10. OzGen Holdings Australia Pty Ltd  10.2 
11. Electricity Generation Corporation T/A Verve Energy  8.4 
12. Woodside Petroleum Ltd.  8.4 
13. Tarong Energy Corporation Limited  8.2 
14. Alinta Energy Limited  7.9 
15. Rio Tinto Limited  7.7 
16. Stanwell Corporation Limited  7.4 
17. NRG Victoria 1 Pty Ltd  7.0 
18. Alcoa Australian Holdings Pty Ltd1  6.8 
19. AZSA Holdings Pty Limited  6.1 
20. BHP Billiton Limited  5.2 
21. Anglo American Australia Limited  4.1 
22. Qantas Airways Limited  4.0 
23. Santos Ltd  3.6 
24. Queensland Alumina Limited  3.6 
25. Adelaide Brighton Ltd  3.1 
Source: National Greenhouse Energy Reporting (NGER) Act 2007 report as 
of 2009/2010 (Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency, 2011). 
 
Third, apart from its economic importance, the interconnections between Qantas and 
the cultural and societal realm make it a unique case study. Qantas, the national 
carrier, is an Australian icon, and its identification as the ‘Spirit of Australia’ and the 






Figure 1-2: Qantas logo 
 
Source: Qantas (2010). 
Qantas’ advertising campaigns, including Peter Allen’s ‘I Still Call Australia Home’ 
and its support for several sporting8 events root Qantas deeply in the Australian 
culture and raise public awareness about Qantas’ contributions to Australian social 
life (Sullivan, 2013).  
Fourth, in order for Qantas to remain Australian-owned the Qantas Sale Act 1992 
provides tighter requirements than the existing Air Navigation Act 1920. That is, 
Qantas’ foreign ownership is limited to a maximum of 49%, there are restrictions 
regarding the makeup of its board of directors, and compliance and enforcement 
measures relating to the following mandatory requirements exist: the use of the name 
Qantas, the location of the head office, the place of incorporation and principle place 
of business. Several discussions that have taken place in the Australian upper and 
lower houses provide rich discourse. Parliamentary enquiries also produce reports 
and there are substantial Hansard records which address Qantas related issues.  
Fifth, Qantas attracts wide media coverage. Its poor financial performance, its 
capacity war with Virgin Australia, the removal of the Qantas Sale Act, the 
redundancy or outsourcing of Qantas staff and the grounding of its fleet as the result 
of a labour dispute are just some examples of some of the public attention Qantas has 
received.  
Finally, fuel expenses and thus CO2-e emissions are one of, or arguably the biggest 
cost item on Qantas’ income statement. As such, it would be desirable to pursue 
abatement opportunities. For this purpose Qantas introduced an efficiency program 
to encourage employees to identify fuel-saving measures. The implementation of 
Sydney airport’s trigeneration plant adds to Qantas’ attempts to reduce its carbon 
                                                 
8 ‘Qantas Wallabies’, the Australian Rugby Union team, the Socceroos, Australia’s national 
association football team, the Formula One Australian Grand Prix and the Australian cricket team. 
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footprint. Yet there are no available commercial alternatives to combustion engines 
that could achieve a CO2-e emissions neutral aviation business. These constraints put 
even greater pressure on Qantas to optimise its operations, employ the latest 
technology and generally make use of abatement opportunities.  
1.7 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study will contribute to our understanding of the interaction between the 
economy, the state and the social system in the context of global warming and 
climate change actions. As a potential solution to climate change and a trigger for 
behavioural change, the MACC, will be introduced. This study will make following 
contributions: 
1. Habermas’ legitimation crisis (1975) will be used to conflate Beck’s work on 
the ecological crisis (1996, 2008, 2010). This contributes to the set of theories 
available to understand SEAR in the wider context of political economy and 
the ecological crisis. 
2. The Australian context and the case of Qantas will be used to flesh out prior 
developments of Habermas’ and Beck’s theoretical lenses. 
3. The MACC will be introduced and conceptually evaluated as a new 
accounting and decision-making tool. The prerequisites for an organisation to 
establish the MACC and the possibility for behavioural change will be 
highlighted. 
4. The MACC will be developed for Qantas to illustrate potential abatement 
opportunities and potential obstacles to their implementation.  
5. The synthesis of the MACC and the theoretical lenses provides an 
understanding of how the socio-political context impacts on the adaptation of 
potential abatement options available to Qantas.  
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1 provides an outline of the study. It describes the motivations and 
objectives, the theory chosen, the method of enquiry and the expected contributions. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review and conceptual analysis to locate the MACC 
within existing management accounting literature and its potential impact on 
management information systems (MIS), management practices and behavioural 
change within the company. The literature review sheds light on the fit of the MACC 
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with existing financial accounting, disclosure practices and accountability relations. 
Chapter 3 introduces the global, regional and Australian aviation context to situate 
Qantas in its historical, political and economic context. Chapter 4 provides a 
description and synthesis of Habermas’ legitimation crisis and Beck’s ecological 
crisis as well as an update on Habermas’ work. Chapter 5 outlines the 
methodological assumptions of this study and introduces MRT as a suitable research 
position upon which to draw. This chapter also introduces the case study 
methodology and Qantas as the site for this study. Chapter 6 provides an explanation 
of the Australian aviation industry and especially Qantas through the theoretical lens 
outlined in Chapter 4. It will also touch on the role of the MACC in this context. 
Chapter 7 develops the MACC for Qantas, and describes the implications of those 
abatement options in regard to behavioural change. These findings are also 
considered by drawing on the theory provided in Chapter 4. The final chapter, 
Chapter 8, provides a summary and concludes the study. Limitations of the research 
and possibilities for future research are also outlined.  
1.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the motivation and objectives of this study and the ‘tools’ that 
will be used to arrive at a conclusion. To gain an understanding of the relation 
between the economic, social and state system in the context of an emerging 
ecological crisis with the MACC as a potential tool, this study will rely on critical 
theory from Juergen Habermas and Ulrich Beck. Whilst Habermas provides a lens to 
understand the interrelations and actions to prevent the occurrences of crises, Beck 
adds the ecological crisis. Qantas as case study provides a unique setting to draw on 
these theories while MRT allows the methodological freedom to employ qualitative 
and quantitative methods to strive for (behavioural) change. The expected findings 
will shed light on the interrelation of Qantas and its MACC as part of the economic 
system with the state and social system in the context of the ecological crisis. This 
will contribute to existing accounting theories, literature on accounting in a political 




2 LITERATURE REVIEW:MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST 
CURVE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) outline the scientific basis of global 
climate change, which has been acknowledged as an urgent issue (IPCC, 2007). 
Policy instruments such as emissions trading that target the reduction of greenhouse 
gases will impact or have already impacted many parties including companies 
(Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008).  
Internal decision-making based on traditional management accounting has generally 
failed to take emissions into consideration (Gibson and Martin, 2004; Savage et al., 
2001; White and Savage, 1995). However, the internalisation of emissions costs is 
crucial to investment decisions that impact on future emissions and cost structures. 
We are in a position where science has alerted us to the problem of global warming, 
which is caused by the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that may 
threaten our civilisation, and there are engineering solutions to the problem if we are 
prepared to move away from the burning of fossil fuels. But the hardest issue is the 
need for corporations and individuals to change their behaviour. For corporations to 
adapt might require an appropriate MIS and a management approach focused on 
organisational change. The MACC, as means to facilitate the least cost emission-
oriented investment decisions will be introduced within a discussion of internal 
accounting to illustrate its compatibility with existing management approaches, 
challenges to MISs, contributions to management and initiation of organisational 
change. The application of the MACC to external reporting and the discharge of 
companies’ accountability in a broader stakeholder dialogue will also be discussed in 
a response to Gray’s (2002) call for ‘new accountings’.  
The MACC is a graphic illustration of options available to an economy (Turner et 
al., 2010), region (Choate et al., 2005), single company (McKitrick, 1999) or 
technological innovation (Bauman et al., 2008) to achieve increasing levels of 
emissions reductions at minimal cost. The earliest carbon abatement cost curves were 
estimated in the 1990s (Jackson, 1991; Kesicki and Ekins, 2011; Mills et al., 1991; 
Sitnicki et al., 1991). The MACC depicts on the abscissa (x axis) the amount of CO2-
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e in tonnes that can be saved per annum for each project. Thus, the wider the bar of a 
project the more CO2-e can be abated. The ordinate (y axis) shows net costs/benefits 
of investments per tonne of CO2-e per annum. That is, if net costs of a particular 
project are below zero (below the abscissa) then this project provides net cost 
reduction benefits to the company, and vice versa. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, 
variances and the carbon price set by either policy or the carbon permit market can 
be illustrated in order to show the threshold above which it would be ‘cheaper’ to 
buy emissions permits rather than entering into a project.  
Figure 2-1: Hypothetical MACC with variances and threshold for six projects 
 
The above example of a MACC depicts six projects with different costs per tCO2-e 
(depicted on the y-axis) and different abatement amounts depending on the width of 
each bar (x-axis). The projects are in ascending order respective to their cost per 
tCO2-e starting with the lowest cost on the left. Variances are depicted as boxes on 
top of each bar with arrows illustrating the upper and lower boundaries. The price of 
CO2-e permits is $23. As Projects 1–4 are below this figure it would be worthwhile 
them making the investment; Project 5’s upper boundary touches on this mark and 
would make an investment indifferent to the purchase of permits; and Project 6’s 
lower boundary would make an investment favourable while in considering its upper 




In their case study of the Humber Estuary in the United Kingdom (UK), Beaumont 
and Tinch (2004) found that the MACC applied to all the pollutants in the water of 
this region provided valuable information on future strategies for abatement and 
”also an insight to the barriers preventing this reduction” (p.213). Apart from that, 
more transparency was found in terms of investment decisions and the actual cost of 
a longer (10–20 years) time span. That is, the MACC revealed that abatement 
measures with high initial costs, but lower operating costs, can be more cost efficient 
in the long run than measures that appeared initially less costly.  
The MACC also enhances comparison of different abatement opportunities with the 
actual price of carbon permits (Kuik et al., 2009). Policy decision-makers can use the 
MACC to determine whether it is worth supporting a certain abatement technology 
rather than buying certificates from international markets, and can use information 
from the MACC to either set the level of regional emissions levels or determine the 
price for emissions (Blanchard et al., 2002). Thus, the MACC can provide 
recommendations for companies, consumers or politicians to undertake either 
abatement investments or to pay for their emissions. However, this investment 
decision instrument has not yet been introduced into the (managerial and/or 
financial) accounting, accountability and disclosure literature. This thesis aims to fill 
this gap by showing not only theoretical potentials but also some diverse threats to 
the adoption of the MACC.  
It is argued that the MACC can be used within the organisation as well as for 
communication with shareholders and other stakeholders. The remainder of this 
chapter discusses the internal company application of the MACC within management 
accounting, MISs, the management process, and achieving behavioural change. The 
external use of the MACC as a communication tool as part of companies’ financial 
disclosure will then be elaborated on, paying attention to lessons learned from 
IFRIC 3, sustainability accounting, inscriptions and images. The MACC as a means 
for companies to discharge their (environmental) accountability will then be 
considered. The final section provides implications, conclusions and limitations. 
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2.2 COMPANY – INTERNAL CONTEXT 
2.2.1 Management Accounting 
In this thesis, a combination of Loew’s (2003, p.43) and Schaltegger and Burritt’s 
(2000, p.107) Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) classifications 
determines the EMA approaches that can be examined regarding their adoptability 
and the provision of information required to establish a MACC. Even though the 
categories appear distinct from each other for the purpose of categorisation, the 
environmental investment appraisal category impacts on cost structure and future 
environmental performance, thus impacting other categories. The three categories 
and their link to a MACC will be explained in the following sections. 
2.2.1.1 Calculation of Environmental Protection Costs 
Environmental protection costs can be calculated separately from prevailing 
management accounting systems for past and present emissions (Orbach and Liedtke, 
1998; VDI, 1979). While this approach compares costs of various end-of-pipe 
technologies across industries9 it neglects integrated technologies (Schaltegger and 
Burritt, 2000) it shares similar an approach with Wagner and Janzen’s (1991) 
proposed separate environmental budgeting for potential or future environmental 
costs but it cannot overcome the partial focus on ‘end-of-pipe’ investments 
insufficient for the MACC.  
Full-cost accounting traces the direct costs of a product, product line, process, service 
or activity and allocates the indirect costs accordingly (see also Parker, 2000). 
However, it does not provide sufficient information about future abatement 
opportunities because future developments are impossible to predict and ‘present and 
past’ figures are not accurate enough with their focus on end-of-pipe technologies to 
establish a baseline for abatement options necessary to establish a MACC. In order to 
achieve a more forward-looking perspective, Neumann-Szyszka (1994) includes 
costs of environmental risks as future costs, such as litigation or liabilities arising 
from new laws. These can be incorporated into the MACC as opportunity costs, but 
                                                 
9 According to Parker (2000, p. 47), end-of-pipe costs ‘include those [costs] incurred after the 
completion of, and as a result of, production and other processes that produce negative 
environmental impacts. They may include regulator penalties, remediation costs, disposal, clean-up, 
site closure and decommissioning costs’. 
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information is flawed so that they focus on additional environmental protection 
activities rather than on an integrated approach (Schaltegger and Wagner, 2005). 
Under resource cost accounting the identification of potential cost savings is 
achieved through the utilisation of a company’s key managerial and technical data as 
well as allocation of costs to their actual cost drivers, with distinction of costs for 
rejected and waste quantities. Costs of wastage are then calculated for each stage in 
the production chain (Kunsleben and Tschesche, 2010). The MACC can be informed 
by resource cost accouting, which helps to establish the baseline of current and future 
(forecasted) cost of material loss. The MACC in this context can provide investment 
opportunities to reduce these losses and allow comparison between increased 
overheads from control mechanisms or changes in production processes and lower 
levels of waste.  
Activity Based Costing (ABC) allocates “the cost of environmentally related 
activities to products on the basis of each product’s demand for those activities” 
(Parker, 2000, p.48) by using a charging rate applied to each activity (Baxendale and 
Foster, 2010). Despite its critics, using ABC to allocate environmental cost appears 
to be a more reliable and accurate means of considering pollution cost and 
establishing a MACC. Also, ABC would be more accurate in allocating cost after 
abatement investments were undertaken, and this would prevent distortion in pricing 
and decision-making based on product cost figures. However, one drawback of ABC 
as a basis for developing a MACC is its focus on the present and past which neglects 
future development of costs/benefits important for MACC calculation (or 
estimation). 
Life cycle costing (LCC) identifies, tracks and accounts for the total cost of a 
product, activity or the whole life cycle of a process,10 and discounts them over its 
lifetime in order to assess the respective profitability (Korpi and Ala-Risku, 2008).11 
LCC might provide the most holistic view of environmental cost that a product has to 
                                                 
10 Parker (2000) argues that these costs can include operating cost, hidden regulation cost, pollution 
cost and recycling, disposal or retrieval costs. Spitzer et al. (1993) explicitly call for the inclusion of 
social costs, which, if not quantifiable, might be regarded in a qualitative way. However, for the 
purpose of this section, EMA’s scope is narrowed to internal costs.  
11 For different approaches towards LCC see Durairaj et al. (2002) and Asiedu (1998). For an in-depth 




carry and therefore is a good starting point for the MACC to build on in terms of 
baseline and future abatement opportunities.  
2.2.1.2 Materials and Energy Flow-oriented Cost Accounting 
Material flow cost accounting (MFCA) combines physical and cost-relevant 
information in order to reduce waste and increase efficiency (Staniskis and 
Stasiskiene, 2006; Wagner et al., 2010). Reduction of waste can lead either to 
decreases in inputs or increases in outputs (Wagner et al., 2010). MFCA can also 
initiate improvements in investment appraisal in plant and equipment additional to 
other improvements (Kokubu and Nakajima, 2004). Schaltegger and Burritt (2000) 
suggest ‘material flow-oriented and energy flow-oriented activity-based budgeting’, 
which is similar to activity-based MFCA except that future costs are represented, and 
assumptions about future energy and material flows are made. This information adds 
another layer of data to support the establishment, refinement and accuracy of the 
MACC.  
2.2.1.3 Environmental Investment Appraisal 
Investment appraisal, also called capital budgeting, is “the process by which projects 
are evaluated and approved” (Spitzer et al., 1993, p.7) with its political nature 
(Burchell et al., 1980). This subsection names and explains several “anthropocentric 
or human-centred value base[d]” (Milne, 1991, p.87) approaches for investment 
appraisal with an awareness that “[j]ust as there is no single method of evaluating 
investment opportunities, so can there be no single way of incorporating 
environmental considerations into investment decisions” (Gray et al., 1993, p.153).  
The use of the payback method emphasises the short term (Gray et al., 1993), and is 
therefore inadequate to evaluate environmental investments (Epstein and Roy, 1998). 
Furthermore, it ignores future cash flows once the payback time has been reached 
(Jasch, 2009) and therefore environmental investments with longer payback periods 
and benefits revealed many years in the future (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2000). 
Finally, there is no rational economic link between the goal of maximising 
shareholder value and the acceptance criterion (Parrino and Kidwell, 2009).  
The accounting rate of return shares many of the payback method’s advantages and 
disadvantages. Both the payback time and accounting rate of return could be 
assigned to abatement opportunities, which are depicted as part of the MACC. Their 
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usefulness, however, for environmentally sound investments has to be rejected due to 
long-term considerations that underpin those investments. Both methods do not 
consider the time value of money or the value of future (long-term) cash flows 
considered by the net present value (NPV).  
The NPV incorporates opportunity costs of capital and discounts future net cash 
flows; thus projects/investments with positive NPV are worth conducting. As for 
environmental investments, Portney and Weyant (1999) argue that discounting 
places a lower value on future generations; therefore it is unethical and discourages 
long-term investments with a life over 10 years (Elkington, 1991). Possible solutions 
include: lower social discount rates (Epstein and Roy, 1998); adjustments to the cost 
and benefit rather than discount rate to assess environmental risk (Epstein and Roy, 
1998); and a test of sensitivity of project evaluations’ outcome towards the variation 
of key parameters (Kula, 1992).  
The introduction of products should be treated as an investment and LCC’s focus, 
contrary to the previous section, is primarily on capital or fixed assets (Korpi and 
Ala-Risku, 2008). LCC helps us understand “the purchase price of the asset and also 
on determining how much it actually costs the organisation to use, maintain and 
dispose of that asset during its lifetime” (Ellram, 1995, p.5). The expected 
(operational and investment) costs of the product and or investment can be either 
added, with or without discounting. Similar to LCC for investments, the total cost 
assessment (TCA) method identifies potential savings and costs of pollution 
prevention projects within traditional costing analysis. The investment method 
proposed in this study is the MACC. The MACC as a graphical illustration of 
abatement options can be calculated following the McKinsey (2009) definition of 
abatement costs, which is the change in cost (net cost or benefit) compared to a 
reference year divided by the annual change in a particular pollutant, for example, 
CO2 emissions per annum compared to a reference year:  
Abatement cost =
(Annual cost)Abatement option − (Annual cost)Reference
(CO2/year)Reference− (CO2/year)Abatement option
 
Kesicki (2010) summarises the advantages of the MACC on a macro level as 
follows: the presentation of cost for any given reduction amount; the total cost 
occurring to abate a pre-set amount of carbon emissions; extensive technology 
details; adjustability of the MACC to the chosen perspective; and easy 
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comprehension of technology-specific MACCs. Disadvantages of the MACC 
include: the restriction to one point in time; no path dependency; uncertainty is not 
integrated; assumptions may not be made transparent; a lack of consideration of 
ancillary benefits; a lack of integration of behavioural factors; and problems of 
inconsistency in deriving the baseline and consideration of potential rebound effects 
(Greening et al., 2000). Kesicki and Ekins (2011) note the following further flaws of 
the MACC: the MACC misses out non-climate benefits (energy security), co-costs 
(negative distributional impacts) and synergies; and institutional barriers and 
transaction costs are not taken into consideration, which explains implementation 
options with negative costs (no regret options) (Bréchet and Jouvet, 2009). Vogt-
Schilb and Hallegatte (2011) and Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007) discuss the time 
at which abatement opportunities should be implemented. 
The above discussion about the MACC is mainly on a macro level; however, some 
issues also arise on a micro level. On a micro level, for example, in a single 
company, only one study by McKitrick (1999) was found that mentions that the 
actual abatement costs on a company level are the opportunity costs that an 
investment implies. On a company level, the MACC can be seen as undeveloped, 
though it is an important management accounting instrument to support decision-
making about future investments. 
Criticism of the MACC as being restricted to one point in time can be solved by 
constructing more than one MACC at different points in time. This might include 
variations in points of time when implementation of different abatement options 
would take place. However, too many depictions of MACCs and too many options 
bear the risk of reducing the simplicity and comprehensibility of the MACC. Also, 
the level for which the MACC might be established impacts on the inclusion of more 
or fewer factors. On a project or department level it could be easy and less 
destructive to include more options and produce several MACCs, whereas on a 
company level, which might be the aggregation of projects’ and departments’ 
MACCs, simplicity is sought. In order to integrate uncertainty, different discount 
rates can be chosen and/or the expected cash flows can be adjusted (e.g., upper-, 
middle- and low-boundary MACCs on an industry level (e.g., Russell and Amand, 
2011)) and the issue that the MACC lacks consideration of ancillary benefits, 
synergies, co-cost, non-climate benefits, institutional barriers and transaction costs 
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can be more easily solved on a company level by surveying the costs and benefits 
more thoroughly. In addition, to run a sensitivity analysis that varies the most 
sensitive factors (e.g., discount rate, life span of the project, major savings) for 
certain projects depends on the robustness of assumptions and it is essential to 
address the flaw that assumptions may not be made transparent (suggested by 
Kesicki and Ekins, (2011) (see also Lindholm and Suomala, 2007).  
Miller (1998) mentions that manufacturing and engineering added more to new 
calculative concepts and practices than existing methods of calculation. What he 
calls ‘margin of accounting’ are added to or expanded through problematisation 
(Rose and Miller, 1992) and a critique on prevailing practices. The identified 
problem, then, can be addressed by new forms of calculation and trigger change. The 
MACC as a part of the cost–benefit analysis, informed by engineering and other 
company-related departments, can expend the margin of (management) accounting, 
and add another perspective to the investment evaluation of organisations.  
2.2.2 Management Information Systems 
MISs are only one kind of information system that serve management’s needs for 
information to facilitate performance of activities, such as decision-making, 
reporting, planning and controlling (Leitch and Davis, 1992) or generally speaking 
assist “managers to run their departments” (Macintosh, 1985, p.21). 
The features of modern information systems select and “filter away significant 
amounts of relevant uncertainty, diversity, and change signals” (Hedberg and 
Jönsson, 1978, p.48). They have their own worldviews that first determine the 
relevance of information and second identify their user-groups; this might hinder 
companies in adapting to changed environments (Hedberg and Jönsson, 1978). 
Moreover, the introduction of ETSs and related instruments (CDM and JI) caused the 
need for specific environmental, carbon-related information in order to facilitate 
carbon management (Lohmann, 2009; Ratnatunga, 2007).  
Schaltegger and Burritt (2000) note that different managers have different 
information needs. To overcome this issue Burritt et al. (2002) following Schaltegger 
et al. (2000) suggest a framework that classifies the most important information 
properties to decision-makers of a corporation and show how these properties are 
related to the practices and workflows related to collecting and managing carbon 
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information. Such a framework provides the foundation for comparing the scope, 
range and potential variability of carbon accounting structures and processes in 
practice (Burritt et al., 2010, p.5). 
Monetary environmental management accounting (MEMA) as an accounting system 
provides information about things like the reduction cost of environmental impact, 
capital investment decisions into greener products or cleaner production. Generally 
speaking “[i]t supports strategic and operational planning, provides the main basis 
for decisions about how to achieve desired goals or targets, and acts as a control and 
accountability device” (Schaltegger et al., 2000, p.15).  
Physical environmental management accounting (PEMA) provides information for 
internal management decisions. In contrast to MEMA, a company’s ecological 
impact on its natural environment is shown in physical units such as joules, cubic 
metres or kilograms (Burritt et al., 2002). PEMA can be applied as an analytical tool 
to assess ecological strengths and weaknesses; a technique that supports decision-
making in highlighting the relative environmental quality; a measurement tool for 
other environmental measures, for example, eco-efficiency; a control tool for 
indirectly and directly tracing environmental consequences; and a communication 
tool for internal and external usage.  
The choice of a MIS has significant implications for the accuracy and availability of 
information necessary to calculate MACCs at their different levels within the 
organisation. An organisation has to ensure that information systems provide the 
information (amount of CO2-e and dollar value of investment opportunities) to 
managers to establish baselines and to evaluate their investment decisions. In 
addition, as discussed in subsection 2.1.3, the assumptions made in terms of interest 
rates, baseline and future investments have to be made transparent so that consistent 
MACCs across the organisation can be estimated. This might be achieved through 
the incorporation of a separate information system or by the enhancement of ERPS; 
either system has to be designed in such a way that suits the organisational context. 
The framework from Burritt et al. (2002) can guide organisations in establishing an 
information system or expanding its ERPS so that each field of the matrix (MEMA 
and PEMA each with a short- and long-term perspective, past and future and an ad 
hoc and routine perspective) is sufficiently covered in order to overcome the data 
flaws discovered by Schaltegger and Zvezdov (2011). The information needs can be 
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assessed by relying on a stakeholder engagement process as suggested by Yuthas and 
Dillard (2002) to ensure empowerment of all user groups and prevent unjust intra-
organisational power distribution through uneven information distribution. A MIS 
incorporating the MACC can establish a companywide language that emphasises 
environmental issues or risks and provides useful information for decision-makers to 
tackle these issues.  
2.2.3 Management  
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC)12 (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) integrates financial and 
non-financial performance indicators and allows the systematic implementation of 
strategies, while taking into account the causal relationship of financial and non-
financial factors (Schaltegger, 2011, p.342). As with the conventional BSC, the 
Sustainability BSC (SBSC) starts off operationalising and linking the cause-and-
effect strategic aspects of five perspectives to the business strategy. The fifth and 
additional non-market element of the SBSC refers to the strategic issues that are not 
covered by any (market) relationship to the company (Schaltegger and Dyllick, 2002; 
Schaltegger and Wagner, 2006).  
After its establishment, the SBSC can be used as a tool for strategic sustainability 
management and control. Once the environmental and social elements have been 
identified they are analysed from each of the SBSC’s perspectives, and then key 
performance indicators (KPIs) can be derived which then become either lagging or 
leading factors matched to business strategy for each perspective (Figge et al., 2002, 
2003).  
Management and management control for sustainability integrates management 
accounting techniques, which generate information, and a MIS delivers this 
information in a logical and systematic manner. The MACC can be a narrow part of 
the sustainability (environmental) consideration13 that connects abatement 
opportunities for a specific pollutant (environmental perspective) to their 
(investment) costs (financial/economic perspective).14 More concretely, the MACC 
                                                 
12 The BSC was criticised by Butler et al. (1997), Laitinen (2003) and Nørreklit (2000, 2003). Hoque 
(2012) provides a literature review on the BSC and further studies that criticise the BSC. 
13 For a discussion of the MACC within a sustainability context see Subsection 3.2. 
14 It is not in the scope of this research, however, to consider the MACC as a tool for guiding socially 
related investments. However, it seems to be theoretically feasible that the abatement unit on the 
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can be used as a leading KPI that sets the abatement amount to be achieved and at 
what cost. Depending on the abatement opportunity there will be reductions in the 
output of pollutants, which will reduce financial costs, either to prevent clean-up 
costs or to prevent charges for CO2 permits. For long-term planning in particular, the 
MACC will be a valuable tool to guide investments and the impact on the cost 
structure, for example, decreased variable versus increased fixed costs, or in a win–
win situation when reduction in either cost category takes place.  
2.2.4 Behavioural Change in Organisations 
Accounting and especially budgeting, planning as well as (internal) reporting can, as 
parts of a company’s control system articulate a ‘pattern of expectations’ and even 
influence “motivations, as the visibility which is created provides a basis for 
organisational rewards and sanctions” (Burchell et al., 1980, p.17). Potter (2005) 
claims that accounting provides a ‘financial’ lens to understand and observe 
organisational outcomes and individuals’ activities. Calculative practices such as 
accounting create visibility of phenomena which otherwise would remain hidden 
(see, e.g., Hines, 1988, 1991; Hopwood, 1987, 1992; Llewellyn, 1994, 1998; Miller, 
1992; Miller and Napier, 1993). Assigning financial figures to events, processes and 
activities makes it possible to compare and standardise individuals’ actions and 
achievements, which creates a means to direct, control and act upon these individuals 
(Miller, 1998).  
The MACC might encourage behavioural change within an organisation since it 
creates explicit visibility for CO2-e emissions abatement opportunities and their 
related costs. However, behavioural change depends on the implementation of the 
MACC within an organisation and whether it is accompanied by changes in 
management practice and incorporated into the management control systems (MCSs) 
as a part of a company’s performance indicators.  
The MACC provides information within a company and it can also be used for 
external communication with stakeholders through reporting in annual, 
environmental or sustainability reports. 
                                                                                                                                          
abscissa, rather than being related to environmental measures (t-CO2-e), could incorporate units of 
some social measure.  
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2.3 FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
This section describes the possible role the MACC could play in financial accounting 
and disclosure. The objective is not to locate the MACC within current financial 
accounting standards, but to focus on examples of private bodies that have either 
captured (as in the case of IFRS 6 ‘Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources’) the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or exercised 
power to make the IASB reverse IFRIC 3 ‘Emission Rights’, since those barriers 
would be faced by the attempt to get the MACC manifested in some form of 
financial standard. 
Maunders and Burritt (1991) explain the negative impact that accounting can have on 
practices and how it can therefore contribute to worsening the ecological issue. 
Accounting might not be the primary reason for the creation or prevention of 
ecological issues (this would be cultural and business factors), but “some of the 
attributes of conventional accounting information and its uses act to exacerbate or 
reinforce the effect of these primary [cultural] factors” (p.10). The mismatch between 
accounting and the ecological problem is illustrated by the basic concepts of “going 
concern, accrual (time period) concept, consistency concept and prudence concept” 
(p.11). The MACC cannot solve these problems, but it might help to expand 
boundaries of accounting (Llewellyn, 1994) as a forward-looking tool that also 
incorporates physical abatement measures of an externality that has to be 
internalised.  
2.3.1 Mandatory and/or Voluntary Disclosure  
According to Lovell and MacKenzie (2011), the process of launch15 (December 
2004) and withdrawal (June 2005) for IFRIC 3 shows “how there is likely to be 
conflict in these technical accounting discussions when corporations feel strongly 
about an issue, typically when it affects their profits” (p.726). This illustrates the 
successful attempt by private corporations and their representative (accounting) 
institutions (EFRAG16) to force the IASB’s withdrawal from its accounting for 
emission rights project and therefore allow companies to account for their emission 
rights the way they prefer. The choice of accounting method might be used to hide 
                                                 
15 Moore (2011) provides an account of the launch and withdrawal of IFRIC 3 and the role of 
participating institutions from a structuration theory perspective.  
16 For the list of members see http://www.efrag.org/Front/c1-262/EFRAG-Facts.aspx 
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the number of emission permits received and income generated from those permits. 
Cortese et al. (2010)17 explore the way in which the IASB was captured by its 
powerful constituents to develop a uniform accounting standard (IFRS 6) of 
accounting for expenditures in the pre-production phase, around the ‘full cost versus 
successful efforts controversy’, and Porter et al. (2006) claim that the IASB is 
dependent on corporate funding, which “help[s] them to foul the environment by 
bypassing environmental accounting regulation” (p.313). 
These two instances underpin the difficulties in arriving at a consensus that the 
MACC can be established in an accounting and reporting framework, especially 
when the main constituents are not in favour of such developments (see also Lovell 
and MacKenzie, 2011). The (financial) dependence of the IASB on its constituents 
makes it vulnerable to following their agenda. This might be a reason why the IASB 
has not made attempts to develop disclosure requirements for physical emission units 
(e.g., CO2-e) but rather has left it to other private organisations.18 Companies are in 
favour of voluntary disclosure, which allows them to regulate themselves in the 
‘public interest’. Voluntary initiatives allow companies to choose their participation 
and compliance, since there are no inspections, negative incentives for non-
compliance, requirements to install more environmentally friendly (less polluting, 
CO2-emitting) technologies and “[a]s soon as voluntary disclosure becomes 
burdensome, the commitment to disclose can be dropped” (Porter et al., 2006, 
p.313).  
Andrew and Cortese (2011, p.137) argue that attributes of financial accounting such 
as ”the requirement for information to be comparable, understandable, and reliable” 
have been ignored by the CDP and GHG protocol, so these voluntary reporting 
initiatives might fail in their aim to provide useful information to users for their 
decision-making. Nevertheless, these initiatives might impact on the future 
development of mandatory guidelines, since future discussion will be determined by 
their predominant logic. But there has to be recognition that those discussions can 
                                                 
17 For a historical account of a similar occurrence with the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) see Cortese (2011). 
18 For example, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB), Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), 
Ceres, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), World Resources Institute, World Economic Forum 
Global Greenhouse Gas Register, California Climate Action Registry, The Climate Group, 
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) and World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) (Ascui and Lovell, 2012).  
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serve particular interests and can be of a limited and partial nature, which implies 
that discussion might have less to do with climate change and abatement 
opportunities (Andrew and Cortese, 2011; Bebbington et al., 2007; Beder, 1997) and 
more to do with business. 
Voluntary initiatives that suggest the incorporation of the MACC have to face the 
above-mentioned issues. That is, companies will not be required to audit the MACC 
if it is attached to their annual report or undergo any form of assurance to underpin 
the accuracy of the MACC. The voluntary nature of these initiatives bears the risk 
that companies might not comply with the initiative after the requirement to provide 
a MACC to external stakeholders is initially incorporated in their accounts. However, 
a voluntary, rather than mandatory, approach to get companies to publish their 
MACC might be an easier option, as opposition to a standard-like implementation 
would be expected to be substantial owing to the fact that consensus has to be 
reached between many stakeholders, while voluntary approaches allow applicants to 
opt in to develop the MACC. The voluntary initiatives could set the scene for a 
mandatory approach to the MACC, but it has to be reinforced so that some 
stakeholder groups might follow their interests and make voluntary initiatives to 
support those interests while excluding or silencing other stakeholders. 
There are a range of reasons why companies choose to report on sustainability and 
especially environmental issues that are explained by accountability, legitimacy, 
stakeholder and political economy theory, and these are well discussed in the 
scholarly accounting literature (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2008; Deegan, 2002; Gray et 
al., 1995; Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2005; Roberts, 1991; Tinker et al., 1991). 
From these perspectives, the MACC might be used to legitimise organisational 
actions for their actors to remain within the social contract, offset bad disclosure, 
retain a good reputation or manipulate stakeholder perceptions. The MACC can be 
used to explain inertia, or the absence of investing in abatement opportunities by 
manipulating the MACC in a way that shows it would be less expensive to pay for 
permits. Overestimation of the costs of abatement opportunities could generate the 
impression that a higher amount was spent on abatement than actually was the case 
in order to facilitate a certain perception by investors and other stakeholders, even to 
illustrate superiority towards competitors. In this sense, the MACC’s power should 
be carefully considered and ideally not abused to legitimise higher emissions through 
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non-abatement rather than supporting more environmentally sound investments and 
contributing to the sustainable use of resources.  
2.3.2 Sustainability Accounting 
The purpose of this subsection is not to enter into a discussion of sustainability 
accounting, reporting or disclosure and guidelines (e.g., GRI)19 or to reflect on the 
critics of those guidelines20 or to discuss how sustainability aspects are measured.21 
The purpose of this section is to consider issues around the sustainability concept to 
show that incorporation of sustainability into a simple MACC, which ‘only’ 
considers CO2-e abatement amounts and their costs/benefits, will be difficult if not 
impossible to achieve.  
The Brundtland Report defines the term ‘sustainable development’ as “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland, 1987, p.43) and addresses issues 
of environmental degradation that go hand in hand with economic growth as well as 
the issue that such a growth can reduce poverty (Adams, 2006). However, the 
looseness of the Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development, while it 
allows many divergent ideas, is inexact so that diverse groups (e.g., governments, 
environmentalists, business people and economic/political planners) can assign 
different meanings to it (Kaidonis et al., 2010). There are also trade-offs to be made 
between each of sustainability’s dimensions – environmental, social and economic – 
which leads to the distinction between concepts of ‘strong’ (trade-offs are not 
allowed) and ‘weak’ (trade-offs are permitted) sustainability perspectives. In practice 
greater emphasis is given to the economy over the other dimensions of sustainability, 
with accounting as a means of quantification contributing to the overemphasis on the 
economy (Adams, 2006).  
Despite several methodological issues, attempts have been made to quantify the 
social cost of carbon (SCC). While Pearce (2002) states a range from US$4 to 
US$922 per tCO2, which might be an over- or underestimate, Watkiss (2005b) 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Bebbington (2001), Bebbington and Gray (2001), Bebbington et al. (2007), 
Bebbington and Gray (2000), Gray (2006a, b, 2010) and Gray et al. (1993). 
20 See, for example, Isaksson and Steimle (2009), Moneva et al. (2006) and Morhardt (2002). 
21 Milne (1991) suggests valuation methods to determine the value of nature. 
22 This is a ‘base case’ estimate without equity weighting and using a constant discount rate. 
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describes a study from the UK Government Economic Service (GES) recommending 
the social cost of carbon of £70 per tCO2 to be considered, but ranging from £35-140 
per tCO2 in 2000 (for a review of SCC-estimates see also Tol (2005)). Watkiss 
(2005b) found that the prevailing literature mainly focuses on the effects of SCC to 
markets, with market value, while socially contingent factors are not included at all: 
Therefore the uncertainty in the SCC values concerns not only the ‘true’ value of 
impacts that are covered by the models, but also uncertainty about impacts that 
have not yet been quantified and valued. (Watkiss, 2005a, p.4) 
Watkiss (2005a) concludes that existing studies on the SCC present only sub-totals 
of actual costs and the actual SCC remains unknown.  
This short discussion on issues around sustainability illustrates that its incorporation 
into a MACC is problematic for several reasons. First, the concept of 
sustainability/sustainable development is not clearly defined or easily definable and 
can mean different things to different (business) people, and even if there was a 
consensus about the definition it has to be decided whether to apply a ‘strong’ or 
‘weak’ sustainability definition, which itself bears issues of trade-offs among 
sustainability dimensions and how to deal with them. Second, attempts to give 
consideration to those trade-offs within a MACC calculation appear to be subjective 
and arbitrary on a company level, and could be expected to be biased towards the 
economic perspective of sustainability, apart from putting a number on those effects. 
Third, estimates of the SCC are spread over a significant range, depending on their 
underlying assumptions (e.g., discount rate, valuation of impacts and equity 
weighting), and they are criticised for excluding non-market and social 
contingencies. Fourth, the array of uncertainties underlying the SCC is vast so that 
the SCC is not a reliable measure for companies to incorporate into a MACC. 
Finally, it is also questionable to what extent the inclusion of the SCC would be 
prudent in business terms. Assuming an opportunity–social cost of carbon per tonne 
CO2-e of $120, the majority of abatement opportunities would be worth undertaking. 
However, the cash-flow implications are significant since $120 per tCO2 cannot 
easily be recovered from market or other financial sources as we have seen in the 
prices paid in the EU ETS. Thus, the decision usefulness of such a MACC would be 
very limited and not useful for a company’s investment decisions.  
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2.3.3 Accounting Inscriptions 
Robson (1992) explains characteristics of inscriptions in terms of accounting as 
‘action at a distance’, which is achieved by the establishment of a “two-way 
relationship between the centres of calculation … and the periphery” (Quattrone, 
2009, p.104). Since accounting translates remote organisations’ elements such as 
stocks, buildings, production processes and so on, into monetary quantities, 
accounting inscriptions build powerful ‘explanations’. Furthermore, accounting and 
graphical inscriptions are significant for construction and articulation as power 
knowledge since they are major forms of the ‘writing of money’. Refinement of 
writing and quantification procedures leads to an increased potential for accounting 
to represent reality in order to act on (control or dominate) it, and to provide a means 
of long-distance control to ensure compliance (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1994; 
Robson, 1992). Importantly, inscription can translate local events into textual, 
numerical or graphical forms, which are mobile and remain immutable through their 
displacements (Qu and Cooper, 2011). Therefore, they can communicate information 
and promote a common frame of reference. In addition to textual and numeric 
inscriptions, those in a graphical form have further features. They are a powerful 
mechanism to provide support for challenged knowledge claims, as they can 
convince opponents about the validity of one’s evidence (Smith et al., 2000) and are 
generally a persuasive means in the communication of information.  
First, graphs can reveal links between phenomena that seem to be unrelated; they can 
detect similarities between events that are separated in time and space; and they can 
support abstraction from details to generalities. Second, graphs are mobile and can be 
brought into different settings, but (third) remain stable even if they are transported 
into a different context. Fourth, “they are able to transcend scales of time and place, 
rendering invisible phenomena … into easily apprehended icons” (Smith et al., 2000, 
p.75). Apart from these additional features, graphical inscriptions need human 
support in the form of a spokesperson to overcome acceptance issues. As Chua 
(1995, p.132) describes, to “pass tests posed by human and non-human enemy 
forces”. The meanings depicted by graphical inscriptions have to be clarified, since 
they could mean different things to different audiences, rather than being 
predetermined by the graph itself, which lacks intrinsic meaning and therefore allows 
 
51 
multiple interpretations. The spokesperson has to give meanings and values to these 
graphs in order to make them circulate within an organisation (Latour, 1986).  
As for the implementation process of management tools such as the BSC, Qu and 
Cooper (2011) note that inscriptions can “mobilize the heterogeneous human and 
non-human actors that constitute that project” (2011, p.347) and abstract objectives 
can be translated into practice. That is, local specificity is provided by inscription 
building contrary to abstractly defined management tools; conceptual ambiguity is 
controlled by inscriptions, support is provided for management technologies through 
inscriptions’ “ability to mobilize distant locales, stabilize meanings, and establish 
new relationships through combining different elements” (2011, p.347).  
From the above discussion the MACC can be viewed as a new form of accounting 
inscription. The MACC reveals the relation between abatement opportunities and 
abatable CO2-e amounts and their respective benefits/costs per tCO2-e. This 
relationship might not be easily accessible from technical and/or accounting reports 
on abatement options, which can be complex and difficult to understand for non-
experts. The MACC provides a means for simplification by reducing NPV 
calculations and technical reports on CO2-e abatement options into single bars 
plotted as ascending according to increased costs (represented by bar length) and the 
width expressing the CO2-e abatement amount. The resulting graphical inscription 
can be used as a convincing tool for investment decisions, for example, arguments 
would have to be made regarding why obvious beneficial investments have not been 
made. The MACC can also show which abatement opportunities are to be undertaken 
in order to achieve a pre-given corporate emissions reduction goal and the costs of 
achieving this goal. Obviously, the MACC can make different abatement 
opportunities comparable and thus overcome time and space limitations, but it can 
also have a normative control function and thus act over distance. However, the 
MACC might need a spokesperson, such as that mentioned by Chua (1995), to 
explain and interpret the MACC to help others understand the concept. The 
implementation of the MACC might be eased by its graphical nature, and it might 
ease the divergence of NPV calculations for CO2-e abatement opportunities as a 
means of investment appraisal and informed decision-making, and help to mobilise 
local and remote actors within an organisation.  
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2.3.4 Visual Images 
Hui and Rudkin (2010) include under the term ‘visual images’ found in annual 
reports elements such as “photographs, diagrams, graphs and maps” (p.3). Among 
these elements, graphical representation is one aspect (Davison and Skerratt, 2007), 
which also includes the MACC; consequently emphasis will be placed on explaining 
the role of graphs in annual reports and their impact on users.23 Graphs can be seen 
as symbolic displays that require an interpretation that follows certain conventions 
(Kosslyn, 1989). Beattie et al. (2008, p.9) mention that “[t]he distinguishing feature 
of a graph is that the representation of quantitative information, as physically 
measured on the surface of the graph, should be directly proportional to the 
underlying numerical values”.  
Generally, graphs can be used for communication and for presentation of data to an 
audience or for analysis of data. Beattie et al. (2008) identify six reasons for a 
company to choose financial graphs rather than narratives or tables to communicate. 
First, graphs provide a flexible means to manage the information, because they are 
not subject to regulatory requirements. Second, graphs are eye-catching and provide 
an ‘oasis’ of colour in rather formal statutory reports, and can be seen as “graphical 
sound bites” (Henry, 1995, p.35). Third, graphs are a good means to summarise, 
communicate and distil financial information. They can also show trends, anomalies 
and/or patterns, and, if applied to annual reports, can show the development of KPIs 
such as EPS, sales, and others over time. Fourth, graphs require spatial rather than 
linguistic intelligence. Data can be seen more directly and clearly because sight is 
used as the dominant visual sense, which is favoured by humans’ cognition to 
process information (Beattie and Jones, 2002). Fifth, graphs can be more easily 
memorised and retrieved. Finally, graphs can be seen as international and egalitarian 
since they can be digested by sophisticated as well as unsophisticated readers, and 
are independent of language (Beattie et al., 2008).  
The pervasiveness of graphs within annual reports to readers, and especially the lack 
of regulation, mean graphs are subject to manipulation. A graph can represent a 
                                                 
23 For literature on images in annual reports in general, see Cho et al. (2009), Davison and Warren 
(2009), Graves et al. (1996), Justesen and Mouritsen (2009), Parker (2009), Preston et al. (1996) and 
Preston and Young (2000). 
 
53 
corporation’s performance in a more favourable light than it appears to be from pure 
numbers.  
There are three types of manipulation of graphs identified by Beattie and Jones 
(2002, p.1). First, ‘selectivity’ which refers to the inclusion or exclusion of those 
variables included in graphs. Second, ‘presentation enhancements’ such as three-
dimensional forms or highlights of certain aspects with brighter colour generally 
degrade or enhance certain aspects within the underlying data set. And third, 
‘measurement distortion’, which may describe the disproportionate graphical 
presentation of the underlying numbers (Beattie and Jones, 1992).  
Beattie (2002) found that measurement distortion should not exceed 10% to avoid 
distortion of users’ perceptions of companies’ performance. Arunachalam (2002) 
found that the four types of improper graphical design – proportionality distortion, 
year reversal, marking, and omission of negative values – affect a subject’s 
decisions. The use of graphs for impression management is supported by Beattie and 
Jones (2000), who found that key financial graphs were more often shown when 
performance was positive. In a UK sample of 240 companies, Beattie and Jones 
(1992) show that companies used graphs more often to convey favourable rather than 
unfavourable performance.  
These findings have several implications for the MACC. The MACC provides the 
five reasons (oasis of colour, good means of illustrating data/trends, spatial 
intelligence required, easy to memorise and internally useable) for companies to 
choose graphs over tables, but companies can use them freely since graphs such as 
the MACC are not subject to regulation. That means companies can be selective in 
choosing what to include or exclude, which provides them with opportunities to 
exclude abatement opportunities with low or negative cost and to avoid discussions 
of why they have not been implemented. Finally, a disproportionate plot between the 
graph and the underlying numbers can be used by companies to mislead users of the 
MACC.  
The previous discussion positions the MACC within the context of disclosure. One 
specific aspect of external disclosure, the discharge of accountability for CO2-e 





There is no universal definition of accountability, since accountability can be 
understood in many ways and is an elusive concept (Sinclair, 1995) (for a definition 
of accountability, see, e.g., Bergsteiner, 2012, p.156ff). Joannides’ (2012) 
interrelated questions of: 1) Who is accountable?; 2) To whom are they 
accountable?; 3) For what are they accountable?; and 4) By which means are they 
accountable?, will be addressed next in order to demonstrate the complexity of the 
concept of accountability and how the MACC can contribute to increased 
accountability.  
2.4.1 Who is Accountable?  
In this paper, the question of who is accountable is limited to accountability within 
the private sector; however, this is not to negate contributions made by public sector 
accountability research. This is also not to claim that the MACC would not be 
applicable to public sector enterprises, public–private partnerships or government 
organisations.  
According to Roberts and Scapens (1985), accounting information can be the means 
to shape and maintain accountability patterns within an organisation. Lozano (2004) 
argues that for a company to become accountable, it is a prerequisite to have its staff 
accountable (personal accountability) and to make them work with certain values. 
Similarly, Luo (2005) suggests that a multinational enterprise (MNE) cannot be 
accountable as a whole if its subunits are not accountable within any jurisdiction. In 
order to achieve accountability within a MNE, increased transparency within 
reporting, control, auditing and decision-making has to be established. Apart from 
this internal transparency, Gray (1992, p.415) suggests that: 
The development of accountability … increases the transparency of 
organisations. That is it increases the number of things that are made visible, 
increases the number of ways in which things are made visible, and in doing so 
encourages a greater openness. The inside of the organisation becomes more 
visible, that is transparent. 
The MACC might face a trade-off between transparency (e.g., explaining emissions-
reduction opportunities that are available at different costs) and secrecy when it 
comes to disclosing the MACC. Procurement data might be competitively sensitive, 
while costs and prices of investments are commercially confidential. However, for 
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the purpose of disclosure, a sector (e.g., airline transportation) could release 
underlying figures, such as the cost of new airplanes and standardised operating 
costs, and this would increase comparability between companies within an industry 
and remove the issue of secrecy, while increasing reliability (companies could not 
manipulate the MACC by changing figures in their favour) and correspondingly, 
their decision-usefulness. Within a corporation the MACC can be used to make the 
relationship between CO2-e abatement opportunities and their respective costs 
visible, and targets can be set for subsidiaries, departments or plants to be achieved 
and thus align subunits of the corporation to an emissions-conscious strategy. In the 
first place, the MACC would establish transparency about CO2-e abatement 
opportunities within the corporation.  
2.4.2 To Whom is the Corporation Accountable? 
According to Benston (1982, p.88), “shareholders, stakeholders and society in 
general” can be those to whom the corporation is accountable. However, under his 
free-market viewpoint, which is based on neoclassical economic theory, shareholders 
are privileged, since financial accountability as the only form of corporate 
accountability is prioritised.  
For Gray et al. (1988) the ‘contract’ between parties determines their responsibilities 
and thus their accountability. Laws set minimum rights and responsibilities, which 
determine the minimum level of legal accountability (see also Tinker et al., 1991). In 
addition to legal rights, “it seems difficult to deny that those who are affected by the 
environmental actions of business have a right to information about those actions” 
(Gray et al., 1993, p.289) and “the legal responsibility for actions brings a moral 
responsibility to account which is only partially discharged by the legal responsibility 
to account” (Gray et al., 1996, p.40). Furthermore, stakeholders that have no 
significant economic power to influence a particular company might find their lives 
impacted by the company’s activities (Tinker et al., 1991). Cooper and Owen (2007) 
argue that under current ‘Anglo-Saxon capitalism’, which is focused on shareholder 
value maximisation and the current situation in which corporate directors only follow 
the enforceable duties of stakeholder accountability. Under this approach broader 
accountability “is quite impossible to envisage” (p.664) (see also Collison, 2003). 
Rather than focusing on (equity) shareholder alone, stakeholder accountability would 
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require recognition of other normatively legitimate stakeholders (Phillips et al., 
2003), which Shearer (2002) refers to as supra-contractual obligations. An additional 
issue in identifying relevant stakeholder groups is the long-term impact resulting 
from business activities, for example, pollution, that future generations and the 
natural environment might be considered as stakeholders in many of today’s 
organisational activities. Furthermore, a negative impact on the natural environment 
also impacts on species other than humans, which have moral rights that should be 
considered (Singer, 1993). However, it is impossible to communicate with future 
generations and creatures other than humans, and even communicating with remotely 
located stakeholders appears to “pose almost insurmountable logistical problems” 
(Unerman and Bennett, 2004, p.691). 
Although the MACC cannot answer the question of to whom is the corporation 
accountable, its decision-usefulness for several stakeholders will be highlighted in 
the next subsection. 
2.4.3 For What is the Corporation Accountable? 
The legal responsibility described in Subsection 4.2 can be seen to set the minimum 
criteria of what companies are accountable/responsible for and for what they can be 
held accountable in legal terms (Gray et al., 1996). Financial accountability in the 
sense of financial disclosure practice as suggested by Benston (1982) is the only 
mandatory form of corporate accountability. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) go even 
further to argue that financial accountability should be voluntary and left in the hands 
of the market and its mechanism. Contrary to this argument, moral responsibility (see 
Subsection 4.2) would expand accountability to those impacted by the corporation’s 
actions.  
The MACC does not help to determine ‘for what’ an organisation is accountable, but 
as the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere increases and is likely to cause global 
warming and climate change (IPCC, 2007), the MACC illustrates abatement 
opportunities which have not been undertaken by the company at their respective 
costs/benefits. In this sense the MACC can be seen as a means to provide 
stakeholders with information about a company’s available abatement opportunities 
that have not been undertaken for which company’s management can be held 
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accountable. The principle rights to information can be seen as the key aspect of 
accountability (Gray, 2005). As Gray et al. (1993, pp.297–98) put it: 
The essence of environmental accountability and transparency is that 
environmental matters are too complex and crucial to be left entirely in the 
already overburdened hands of corporations. Not only is it unreasonable to ask 
corporations to take even more decisions which affect our futures but nobody 
has the information upon which to make such decisions in any unique and 
‘rational’ way. 
2.4.4 By Which Means is the Corporation Accountable? 
Hibbitt and Collison (2004) provide an overview of the legal requirements of 
disclosure within European countries. A critique of accounting’s role within an 
accountability context is provided by Lehman (1999, p.227) who states:  
[i]t is well known that accounting focuses on providing decision-useful 
information that steers accounting away from its role of narrating business 
activities to the community. 
Furthermore, McKernan (2012) argues that providing an account as part of 
accountability undermines the morality of decisions from individuals, especially 
when accountability is merged with business ethics, when an individual is expected 
to follow social prescriptions rather than his or her own moral principles. According 
to Joannides (2012, p.247): 
[t]he morality of decisions cannot explicitly fit with any pre-established format: 
accounting standards or management control systems do not enable us to identify 
whether a record has a moral foundation. 
Puxty (1986) criticises extended corporate accountability and disclosure practice as a 
means of legitimising capitalist socio-economic arrangements (Mouck, 1994). Yet 
disclosure and transparency are essential to the concept of accountability (Shearer, 
2002). As Luo (2005, p.12) contends: 
A central requirement for corporate-accountability is the firm’s ability to signal 
or provide relevant information quickly, accurately and effectively to its 
shareholders, stakeholders or other principal parties such as regulators who 
motivate and constrain the firm to behave in both the principals’ and society’s 
best interests. 
Oakes and Young (2008) claim that an accountable company not only has to assess 
stakeholders’ goals and needs, but also has to quantify those goals and needs (see 
also Archel et al., 2008). Information in annual reports has limited likelihood to 
change shareholder or management actions of the disclosing company, due to the 
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lack of enforceability of stakeholders’ claims. This is addressed by Bailey et al. 
(2000) who emphasise that accountability is more than merely providing information 
to stakeholders; it is also about facilitating actions. Cooper and Owen (2007) posit 
that stakeholder accountability through corporate social reporting should enhance 
stakeholder empowerment to facilitate actions on their behalf. Similarly, Roberts 
(2003) argues that dialogical engagement “with those most vulnerable to the effects 
of corporate conduct” (p.263) is needed.  
Through the information it provides, the MACC might be a powerful tool for 
stakeholders who are interested in environmental and, in particular, CO2-e emissions 
issues. It may enable them to hold a company accountable for CO2-e abatement 
investments. The MACC might provide stakeholders with a ‘legitimate voice’ to call 
for action, especially CO2-e emissions reductions. However, the MACC as a pre-
established accounting tool might undermine the morality of company decisions, as 
suggested by Joannides (2012). Also, as Gray (2005, p.8) states: “[i]t may well be 
blindingly obvious that full and frank accountability is not in an organisation’s self-
interest”, but rather could be used to legitimise capitalist socio-economic 
arrangements (Mouck, 1994). Perks (1993) argues that accountability and power are 
intertwined concepts. That is, accountability can be seen as an attempt to restrict the 
power of others, which might make it even less likely that corporations would 
discharge accountability about their CO2-e emissions reductions by using the MACC. 
After all, as Lozano (2009, p.162) notes: “[a]ccountability cannot be reduced to the 
development of measurement techniques, tools and processes (even though without 
these it could not exist). Accountability presupposes reflective action based on 
dialogue and inquiry”. The MACC might be the means to start such a dialogue. 
2.5 SUMMARY  
The prevailing cost accounting method within the company necessary to fulfil the 
MACC’s data needs for baseline and abatement opportunities has a significant 
impact on the compatibility of the MACC with cost accounting systems. That is, 
present- and past-oriented cost accounting systems, though providing a solid base for 
baseline calculation, might be limited to end-of-pipe solutions, and definitely lack 
information required for drafting future abatement opportunity costs and benefits. 
Furthermore, depending on the costing system applied, CO2-e data might be 
available but not necessarily. The extent to which a company has to adjust its 
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management accounting system to cope with the introduction of a price on CO2-e 
emissions will vary between companies, but certainly there are overlaps in the 
information needs of prevailing cost decision-making and the MACC. That is, for a 
company to make future (investment or pricing) decisions, relevant and opportunity 
costs have to be determined. While the MACC might add another layer to the 
traditional cost benefit analysis, combining it with some evaluation methods (such as 
the accounting rate of return) is not prudent. It is in the nature of environmentally 
sound investments that their payback ratio can be very long, especially when returns 
occur in the long term. Therefore, measures that put too much emphasis on short-
term results are more likely to distort investment decisions rather than enrich them.  
The establishment of the MACC itself might face issues of prevailing power 
structures, with resource allocation as a political process. Parties might support their 
own interests and therefore prevent the MACC from being enforced; however, a 
generalisation based on Burchell et al.’s (1980) finding is not possible and it would 
be speculative to foresee such power structures in each company. In a similar vein 
Hines (1991) emphasises some of the dangers of placing a figure on nature, which 
might also be applicable to the MACC if it is utilised for the ‘wrong’ purpose (one 
that does not aim to reduce emissions but rather to legitimise inertia on cost 
grounds). On the other hand, it might be speculated that the MACC as a practice on 
the margin of accounting (Miller, 1998) could one day become central to it, so that 
externalities such as CO2-e are accounted for and included in internal investment 
decision-making.  
Almihoub et al. (2013) contrast different approaches to establish a MACC and 
illustrate their respective advantages and disadvantages. They conclude that for the 
MACC to provide reliable information it should rely on actual data from the 
company accounts, which aligns with the bottom-up or ‘expert’ approach suggested 
in this paper. In order to model the MACC within a company, accountants require a 
MIS that provides suitable data. This includes data to model the baseline, future-
oriented costs and benefits for investments as well as variable costs associated with 
prevailing practices and abatement opportunities. To what extent the prevailing MIS 
within a company fulfils this requirement cannot be estimated, but a price on 
emissions and existing legal reporting requirements such as the National Greenhouse 
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Energy Reporting (NGER) Act 2007 might already ask for some of the necessary data 
needed to establish a MACC and an appropriate MIS.  
Action under the MACC can be important for employees to meet their performance 
goals. The MACC can set the abatement amounts and their implementation costs for, 
for example, divisions, departments or plants. With such performance goals, the 
MACC might lead to behavioural change and thus create visibility for CO2-e 
emissions abatement opportunities that otherwise could remain hidden (Hines, 1988, 
1991; Hopwood, 1987, 1992; Llewellyn, 1994, 1998). Behavioural change resulting 
from the introduction of a MACC also depends on changes in management practice 
and its integration into MCSs.  
In summary, for the internal implementation of the MACC within the context of 
management accounting, MIS and management, and whether the MACC can act as a 
trigger for behavioural change depends on several contingencies which are not only 
technical but also intra-organisational and power-related.  
To be efficiently and effectively implemented the MACC might have a normative 
impact on the management accounting systems’ attributes so that it fosters explicit 
awareness and consideration within a company’s cost-accounting and investment 
decisions. It could trigger a change towards a more environmentally sensitive 
management accounting system to support sound management (investment) 
decisions, which internalise the costs of greenhouse pollution in accordance with a 
national policy of reducing CO2-e in the atmosphere. This should go hand in hand 
with improvements in company MIS to facilitate the availability of sufficient and 
reliable data and to enhance a dialogue among departments involved in CO2-e data. 
The SBSC with its KPIs and holistic approach to management can then incorporate 
all relevant data into decision-making and evaluation to further enhance the 
awareness and abatement of CO2-e at a minimum cost to the company. The above 
measures taken together should result in increased visibility of CO2-e and CO2-e 
abatement opportunities and at best result in organisational and behavioural change 
within the company. 
The use of the MACC for external communication with stakeholders is subject to 
several issues. Voluntary disclosure, even though a most likely initial approach to 
publication of the MACC, does not require independent verification and does not 
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create any pressure for companies to improve their environmental soundness except 
if it is used by stakeholders. The complexity of sustainability and related costing 
issues does not allow ‘simple’ representation in other reporting media but the MACC 
is a way of representing a number of cost–benefit calculations in a comprehensible 
manner. The MACC has great potential for inscribing complex NPV calculations in a 
simple manner. But when distorted or manipulated, the MACC, as a graph, might be 
used for legitimation purposes or even to support a company’s inertia by misleading 
readers of the annual report. 
In terms of financial accounting and disclosure, issues from IFRIC 3 and IFRS 6 
were identified to show how powerful constituents influenced the IASB to prevent 
enactment of accounting standards that could be undesirable to them, which might 
also be the reason why private bodies filled the gap to provide accounting for CO2-
emissions. Similarly, the MACC might face either capture or prevention through the 
actions of external constituents if it is perceived as unfavourable. Therefore, it is 
more likely that private bodies will provide guidance for accounting and disclosure 
of the MACC for some time. That would also be favourable to companies since the 
MACC would not be subject to audits or penalties for non-compliance apart from 
stakeholder pressure.  
Even though this paper presents arguments for the introduction of the MACC its 
scope is limited and is therefore conceptual. Greater detail about obstacles for 
implementation and the general usefulness of the MACC can be drawn from case 







3 AVIATION HISTORY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The aviation sector has grown significantly over recent decades as has its economic, 
social and environmental impact. Airlines help to connect people, facilitate tourism 
and economic activities directly and indirectly. However, there is a price: with 
increased mobility which comes with higher GHG emissions, even though airplanes 
have become more fuel-efficient over the years. Yet there is no commercially viable 
alternative to aviation fuel-combusting engines (nuclear powered airplanes expose 
too much radiation, while solar powered airplanes are in their infancy) and therefore 
airlines are vulnerable when facing policy measures that are aimed at reducing 
GHGs. Understanding the history of aviation is vital to understanding the current 
aviation sector’s business conduct, relationships to governments and competitive 
structures that also underpin the current environment in which Qantas operates.  
This chapter on aviation history will discuss some developments within the global 
context in which the aviation industry has evolved. There follows a more in-depth 
discussion that focuses on the Australian and New Zealand aviation sector. The 
penultimate section deals with Qantas’ place as the main airline in Australia, and the 
final section provides a summary of this chapter with a link to the theories employed 
in this thesis. 
3.2 GLOBAL AVIATION  
The global aviation industry has been shaped by two major shifts in its regulatory 
environment during the past 40 years. First, the deregulation and privatisation of 
previously mostly government-owned airlines took place with the implications of 
increased competition and intense collaboration among airlines on a global stage. 
Second and most recently is the issue of climate change actions that also target 
airlines and their activities. Governments around the world include airlines in their 
ETSs or impose higher levies on aviation fuel in order to enforce a behavioural 





The development of the aviation industry has been closely linked to technical 
innovations such as the commercial use of jet aircraft in the 1950s and the 
introduction of jumbo jets in the 1970s. By 2010 there were 1,568 airlines under 
operation globally with more than 23,844 commercial aircraft serving between more 
than 3,846 airports with about 8.4 million direct employees. Airlines support about 
56.6 million jobs, the majority of which (about 34.5 million jobs) are in the tourism 
industry. The direct and indirect global, economic impact of the aviation sector is 
US$2.2 trillion which is equivalent to 3.5% of the global Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Air Transport Action Group, 2012).  
After airlines were deregulated in 1980 net profits became cyclical since government 
regulations and protections ceased, entering into the first period of net losses during 
the period from 1980 to 1983. The Gulf War in 1991 and subsequent recession, as 
well as the economic conditions during and after the 2001 terrorist attacks, caused 
total losses of US$22 billion (1990/93) and US$40 billion (2001/05). In terms of 
revenue tonne kilometres24 there was, on average, a growth rate of 5% to 6% from 
1987 until 2007, and except for 1991 (Gulf War) and 2001 (September 11) there was 
prevailing growth each year (Belobaba and Odoni, 2009). 
During its infancy the airline industry was heavily regulated, which created an 
environment that drove technical advances but at the same time was subject to 
government regulation, rather than competition and a drive for profits. Government 
ownership and subsidies were considered a means to ensure the economic growth of 
the ‘flag carriers’ until economic maturity was achieved (Belobaba and Odoni, 
2009).  
US airlines were the first to achieve economic maturity and on 1 January 1978 
economic deregulation within the US aviation industry was initiated. Other countries 
followed suit, although there are still some government-owned airlines (e.g., 
Emirates, Etihad Airways and Singapore Airlines).25 
                                                 
24 Revenue tonne kilometres (RTKs) is the total number of tonnes of paying passengers, freight and 
mail carried, multiplied by the number of kilometres flown (Qantas, 2012a, p.149). 
25 For a complete list of government-owned airlines see ICAO (2008). Among the most significant 
privatisations were: Air Canada, Air France, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa, SAS, Qantas, Air New 
Zealand and British Airways.  
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Privatisation and liberalisation within the EU marked another important phase: the 
process took place in three subsequent steps approved by the member states of the 
then European Economic Community in 1987, 1990 and 1992. The last step came 
into force on 1 January 1993 and the Ninth Freedom right26 for airlines within the 
EU was fully implemented by end of 1997. Every new member to the then European 
Economic Community or EU automatically became part of the intra-EU market, 
which now covers about 500 million people (Odoni, 2009).  
In May 2001, another treaty of significance, the Multilateral Agreement on the 
Liberalization of International Air Transportation, was signed by Singapore, Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and the US; in May 2002 Peru ratified the 
agreement as well. The First to Sixth Freedom applies to commercial flights and the 
Seventh Freedom also applies to cargo flights for the signatory parties (Findlay, 
2003).  
Finally, the EU and the US signed a provisional open-sky agreement on 25 and 30 
April 2007, which came into force on 30 March 2008 and was replaced by a Protocol 
on 24 June 2010. This agreement allows EU airlines to fly to any airport within the 
US and US airlines are allowed to fly to any European destination and also within 
Europe (EC, 2013).  
The basis for the international regulatory environment was laid out in the Chicago 
Convention, which was held in 1944. This convention of 54 US states decided that 
the regulation of air transport had to take place through bilateral air service 
agreements (ASA) rather than through a generally applicable framework. The 
meeting also decided to establish the ICAO as a result of the ‘need for international 
commonality in airport and air traffic control facilities equipment and pedicures to 
ensure the safety and operability of aircraft across national boundaries’ (Odoni, 2009, 
p.21). ASAs restrict competition in regard to market access, airline designation, 
capacity and airfares. Market access refers to the rights granted (or rejected) for 
airlines of two nations to operate between specified city pairs. Airline designation 
applied within treaties allows each country to typically nominate one airline. The 
designation depends on the share of ownership nationals hold within the respective 
airline. This implies the restriction of foreign ownership for reasons of national 
                                                 
26 The Ninth Freedom provides the most rights for airlines operating within and between those 
countries subject to the treaty. For a definition of all nine freedoms see ICAO (2004). 
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safety; some examples are provided in Table 3-1. This table outlines the maximum 
ownership that citizens from other countries can hold within a particular national 
carrier; for example, China allows 35% foreign ownership in any of its airlines. 
 
Table 3-1: Restrictions regarding foreign ownership of airlines in selected 
countries 
The table presents a sample of countries and their respective restrictions on foreign ownership of 
their national carriers. 
Country Limits on foreign ownership 
Australia 49% for airlines engaged in international operations (25% on any 
single shareholder); 100% for solely domestic airlines 
Canada 25% 
China 35% 
Chile 100% as long as airline’s principal place of business is in Chile 
European Union 49%, applies to non-EU citizens 









USA 25%, one-third of the board of directors; chairman/woman must be 
US national 
Source: Odoni (2009, p.28). 
 
When the frequency of flights between nations by the respective airlines is restricted, 
the ASA refers to ‘capacity’, while ‘airfare’ refers to the prices that are either set by 
government (authorities) or are subject to the market. Restrictions on airlines to enter 
into a market are also in place through the ‘schedule coordination process’ as 
outlined by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Airports that have 
more demand than slots available (e.g., Amsterdam, Manchester, Milan, Frankfurt, 
Heathrow, Gatwick) tend to grandfather the majority of their rights for landing and 
departing and therefore prevent new airlines from entering. This can have a 
significant impact on new airlines to provide additional routes due the fact that those 
airports with high demand are often used as hubs for flights to other less popular 
airports (Odoni, 2009).  
The ICAO and the IATA are also part of the regulatory regime. The ICAO, founded 
in 1947, has the status of a specialised agency of the UN with 191 member states in 
2013 comprising all nations that engage in aviation activities (ICAO, 2013). The 
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ICAO’s role is to develop, approve and update international technical standards and 
to recommend practice for airports and air traffic control. In addition, the ICAO 
prepares and publishes regulatory guidelines as well as environmental and economic 
policy proclamations in regard to international air transportation. The ICAO is also in 
charge of a register for all ASAs (ICAO, 2013). 
The IATA, founded in 1945, currently has 240 member airlines (IATA, 2013). Its 
primary task was originally to coordinate international airfares, a service it still 
currently provides to one third of its members,. Similar to a trade association, the 
IATA also provides legal, technical and financial advice (Odoni, 2009). Apart from 
the direct regulatory bodies, climate change has expanded the players impacting 
(directly or indirectly) on aviation activities. 
3.2.2 Airlines and Climate Change 
In the past decade, global public awareness about the aviation industry’s 
environmental performance has increased. Under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, 37 
industrialised countries and the European Community agreed on binding targets to 
reduce GHG emissions by, on average, 5% over the period from 2008 to 2012 
compared to their respective emissions levels of 1990 (UNFCCC, 2011c). According 
to IPCC (2007b), about 3% of the anthropogenic global warming in 2007 was 
attributable to aviation emissions, with a prospective increase of 5% until 2050. It is 
this negative potential the aviation sector’s activities pose on the globe climate that is 
of concern to most policymakers.  
Domestic GHG emissions from the aviation industry are included in the national 
GHG inventories of Annex 1 countries (e.g., EU, the US, Japan, Russia, and so on)27 
covered under the Kyoto Protocol. Emissions from international air traffic, however, 
were neither included in the respective national emissions targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol nor discussed during the “post-Kyoto emissions reductions negotiations at 
COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007” (Gössling and Upham, 2009, p.9). 
The responsibility to reduce aviation emissions in Annex 1 countries was deferred to 
the ICAO (1997), which rejected the idea of a global ETS during their annual 
assembly in 2004, but “endorsed the inclusion of aviation in existing 
                                                 




national/regional ETS as more cost-effective measure than fuel taxes” (Gössling and 
Upham, 2009, p.9). Despite its position, the ICAO withdrew from this idea and 
decided that airlines should not be included in the EU ETS (Environment News 
Service, 2007; Vieira, 2007) as a response to the EU Parliament’s November 2007 
reading which mentioned a 10% emissions reduction based on 2004–2006 average 
airline emissions to commence trading by 2011 (EU Parliament, 2007).  
From 1 January 2012 all international and regional flights were initially subject to the 
EU ETS. For the calendar year 2012 the emissions cap for each airline was set at 
97% but has since been reduced to 95% for the 2013–2020 trading period (subject to 
revision) of the baseline. The baseline is the average of the respective airline’s 
annual aviation emission for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Fifteen percent (13% for 
2013–2020) from 3% (5% for 2013–2020) of CO2 emissions for which airlines have 
to surrender emissions allowances are auctioned. However, the US has opposed the 
inclusion of its airlines (Euractive, 2012). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
confirmed within a trial brought forward by the US that the EU ETS is in line with 
international legislation. On 27 November 2012 the US enforced legislation that 
prohibits US airlines to participate in the EU ETS. In response, the EU suspended the 
operation of the ETS for all flights operating to and from non-European countries in 
April 2013.  
In 2007, the US Senate Committee of Environment and Public Works gave approval 
to the Lieberman–Warner Climate Security Bill and forwarded it to the US Senate 
for consideration. The Bill aimed to create a nationwide ETS for the aviation 
industry in the US similar to the one in the EU (Gössling and Upham, 2009). The US 
Air Transport Association, followed by other aviation-related organisations strongly 
opposed the introduction of an ETS as “its application to the transportation sector 
would come in the form of a highly punitive fuel tax. Specifically, the bill would 
require transportation fuel producers and importers to acquire sufficient GHG 
emissions allowances to cover the GHG content of the fuel they sell or import” 
(A4A, 2008, p.1). Under pressure from the aviation sector and the Republicans, the 
Bill was abandoned in mid-2008. 
Also in the US, a voluntary permit trader, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
exists with legally binding targets but no requirements to join trading. Five Canadian 
provinces and eight American states have set a target of 10% to 30% reduction in 
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emissions for 2020 below a 1990 baseline. Additionally, two Canadian provinces and 
six American states have set a target of 75% to 80% reduction in emissions for 2050 
below a 1990 baseline (Gössling, et al., 2008).  
In China the 12th Five-Year Plan, released in 2010, mentions an ETS as a key 
measure to cope with climate change and to reduce carbon emissions in particular. In 
2011 the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) confirmed that 
seven provinces and cities in China will introduce carbon-trading pilots; in 2012, 
specifications of those pilot schemes, began in 2013 on a city level and 2014 on a 
province level. Nationwide introduction of an ETS is proposed for China by 2015/16 
(Hannon, et al., 2011). It is yet to be determined if and when the Chinese aviation 
industry will be subject to a price on carbon. 
On 4 October 2013, the 38th ICAO assembly agreed on a resolution in which 
governments worldwide commit to develop a global market-based mechanism for 
aviation emissions by 2016 (the date of the next ICAO assembly) to commence from 
2020. 
3.3 AUSTRALIAN AVIATION HISTORY AND RELEVANT REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Many of the global developments in the aviation industry have also had an impact on 
the Australian aviation sector. One example is the inclusion of Australian airlines’ 
flights to Europe into the EU ETS and emissions reduction targets imposed under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
Air transport has had a significant role in Australia’s history; it has provided mobility 
for its people, services and goods, and has been important for Australia’s tourism. As 
in other countries, Australia deregulated its airspace and privatised its national 
carriers. Throughout the history of the Australian aviation sector airlines have 
evolved, merged, have been taken over, or have gone bankrupt (e.g., Ansett 
Airlines). Airlines faced pilot disputes in 1989 and 2013 with consequences for 
stranded passengers. And flights within Australia have faced an increased levy on 




3.3.1 Deregulation  
The US deregulated its aviation market in 1978 and many other countries followed 
suit. On 31 October 1987, an announcement about the deregulation of the Australian 
aviation market was made, three years before the regulation ended. The so-called 
‘Two Airlines Policy’ was in force from 1957 to the end of October 1990. As a 
consequence of the Federal government’s policy, Ansett Airlines and Trans Australia 
Airlines (TAA, later Australian Airlines) had identical schedules for the same aircraft 
on the same routes with the same destinations and fares (Gordon, 1989; Hooper and 
Findlay, 1998).  
Prior to the deregulation of the domestic airline market, the major two incumbents of 
the Australian aviation industry, Ansett Airlines and Australian Airlines, started to 
consolidate their feeder systems and networks. In July 1987 Ansett Airlines and 
Australian Airlines acquired other airlines (Douglas and Cunningham, 1992). 
The government played a significant role in the deregulation process. One major 
obstacle the first Chairman of new entrant into the Australian market Compass 
Airlines28 faced was that the government had had lease contracts with Ansett and 
Australian Airlines for over 30 years, which reduced the numbers at each terminal 
available to new entrants to one or two. This limited the availability of gates, and 
made it difficult for new entrants to schedule aircraft arrivals, passenger transfers and 
departures (Douglas and Cunningham, 1992). A further indicator of the 
government’s involvement prior to the regulation in shaping completion was the 
establishment of the Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) to take over the federal 
government’s ownership of major airports. On 31 December 1987, a day before the 
FAC commenced its operations, the government and two major airlines signed a 
gates agreement. This further reduced the ability of the Director of FAC to allocate 
terminal facilities to new entrants (Douglas and Cunningham, 1992).  
3.3.2 Pilots’ Dispute of 1989 
The Pilots’ Dispute of 1989 was another example of government involvement in the 
aviation sector and illustrates Australia’s dependency on air travel. The dispute 
resulted in more than $1 billion of costs to the Australian economy, thousands of jobs 
                                                 
28 Compass Airlines was established after deregulation of Australian aviation market in 1990. It was 
the first Australian low cost airline.  
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were impacted and 80% of the pilots involved did not return to their former 
positions. The dispute began on 18 August 1989 when the Australian Federation of 
Air Pilots (AFAP) decided to pursue a 29.47% pay claim, reduction in working hours 
and availability of pilots only during normal office hours. Subsequently, companies 
sent letters to pilots to either fulfil their working commitments or face dismissal. On 
23 August 1989 the airlines served pilots with writs and 1,647 pilots resigned from 
their positions. On the same day Ansett and Australian Airlines grounded their fleet 
and the Hawke Government authorised international carriers and the RAAF (Royal 
Australian Air Force) to carry domestic passengers. In November 1989 the federal 
government provided $30 million to the tourist industry as an assistance package, 
and by mid-November 1989 the cost for the RAAF was estimated to be $62 million 
while negotiations between unions and companies, and arbitration still continued. 
Further support was provided to the airlines by the federal government when $75.2 
million in landing charges were waived (12 January 1990) and a price increase of 5% 
in airfares was granted (23 January 1990). The dispute resulted in the destruction of 
the Pilots Federation, a general weakening of the pilots’ bargaining power and 
experienced pilots moving away from Ansett which was of particular significance in 
the context of the planned privatisation within the Australian aviation sector 
(Paterson, 2008).  
3.3.3 Privatization and Further Deregulation of the Australian Aviation Sector 
The Australian government followed the international trend to privatise state-owned 
enterprises, including airlines. The debate to privatise the state-owned Qantas started 
in 1990 with the then Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke announcing the 
government’s intention to sell 49% of its share in the Qantas Group. This goal was 
justified by claims that the government could not afford to acquire new airplanes and 
proceed with safety re-fits. The costs to keep Qantas competitive were meant to be 
above $2 billion and without those investments a collapse was foreseeable. 
Notwithstanding, on 2 June 1992, then Prime Minister Paul Keating announced that 
Qantas had received permission from the Australian government to purchase 
Australian Airlines for $400 million, which allowed an integration of domestic and 
international flight services (Qantas Airways Limited, 2013). On 17 December 1992 
the Australian government announced it would recapitalise Qantas with $1.35 billion 
(Hide, 1995) and in 1993, British Airways took a 25% stake of Qantas for $665 
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million. The remaining 75% of state-owned shares were sold in a public float in 1995 
with proceedings of only $2.1 billion. It was argued that this amount was far below 
Qantas’ actual value (Quiggin, 1995). This can be illustrated by the fact that three 
years after the privatisation Qantas shares were 49% above the price of the 
government’s initial offer, representing a return on investment to shareholders of 
160% (Dellit, 2002). 
The Commonwealth’s Independent Air Fares Committee (IAFC) set domestic 
airfares for passenger services prior to the deregulation, which resulted in Australian 
Airlines and Ansett Airlines having almost identical discount fares and identical 
schedules. After deregulation, IAFC was replaced by the Prices Surveillance 
Authority (PSA). The PSA established statistics based on airlines’ data to illustrate 
how airfares developed after privatisation.  
There was an immediate decline in the price of airfares after deregulation, which was 
also impacted by Compass Airlines commencing flights on 1 December 1990. After 
Compass Airlines ceased operations, prices increased and decreased again over the 
period (31 August 1992–March 1993) when Compass Airlines recommenced 
operations. From March 1993 until June 1995 airfares increased by 2.8% on average; 
yet compared to the time before deregulation, June 1995 fares remained in real terms 
22% below pre-deregulation level (Bureau of Transport and Communications 
Economics, 1995). 
Owing to deregulation and price cutting the number of domestic passengers 
increased significantly, on average 12.5% per annum over a four-year period ending 
June 1995. Despite the recession in 1991/92 the total number of domestic passengers 
increased by 25% compared to the previous year. The PSA indicated that the number 
of premium fare passengers (business and first class) remained relatively stable, 
about 10%, over this period, which means an absolute increase in this segment of 
25%. And from 1990/91 to 1994/95 there was an overall growth of 74.3%, or an 
average growth of 15.5% per annum (Bureau of Transport and Communications 
Economics, 1995).  
Another indicator of the effects of deregulation employed by the BTCE was the 
quality of service measured as the flight frequency improvements of the top 50 
domestic routes. This constructed index had an increase of 29% from the previous 
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full period prior to deregulation (September quarter 1990 until September quarter 
1991) (Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics, 1995).  
The privatisation of Qantas was fully executed after a public float of the 
government’s remaining 75% stake in Qantas Airways Ltd took place. Qantas was 
listed on 31 July 1995 at the Australian Stock Exchange. Overseas investors acquired 
20% or 200 million shares of Qantas: US investors obtained 50%, UK and EU 
investors 40%, and Asian investors 10% of the 20%. This, combined with British 
Airways’ 25% stake in Qantas, added up to 45% foreign ownership (Thomas, 1995). 
3.3.4 Developments within Australia and New Zealand’s Aviation Sector  
Besides the deregulation of aviation markets globally and within Australia, countries 
have entered into bilateral ASAs to allow airlines to extend their services. One such 
ASA was the planned open skies agreement between Australia and New Zealand. 
The Australian government initially prepared this agreement between the Australian 
domestic aviation market and New Zealand in 1994. Yet the ASA failed to come into 
force because the Australian government protected Qantas, and Air New Zealand’s 
only option was to purchase shares of Ansett Australia (Ballantyne, 1995) in order to 
gain access to the Australian aviation market. In June 1996 Air New Zealand bought 
50% of Ansett Airlines’ share for $465 million from TNT which created a 50/50 
partnership with News Corporation Ltd (James and Mike, 2005). This acquisition 
had severe implications for Air New Zealand. First, the New Zealand Commerce 
Commission required Ansett New Zealand (Ansett’s New Zealand subsidiary) to be 
sold, which later became Qantas New Zealand. The Australian Foreign Investment 
Review Board had a requirement that a stake of 51% of Ansett International 
(Ansett’s international business) was sold to an Australian consortium of institutional 
investors (Phelan, 1999; Kain and Webb, 2003). This limited Air New Zealand to the 
local market and meant that Ansett would be the only international carrier within the 
Air New Zealand–Ansett alliance. However, Ansett, unlike Qantas and Air New 
Zealand, as a designated national carrier, had never received favourable bilateral air 
agreements. Therefore, the regulators’ interventions reinforced the disadvantageous 
international position of Ansett (Weller, 2009).  
In order to improve efficiency and connectivity, Ansett Airlines, Singapore Airlines, 
and Air New Zealand formed the Star Alliance in 1998, which provided access to 
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other international carriers’ networks. British Airways and Qantas formed the 
Oneworld alliance for the same reason. These alliances had several advantages. First, 
airlines could expend their network without having their governments to negotiate 
bilateral agreements between states. Second, spatial expansion and non-exclusive 
access to each airline’s domestic market would be possible without the need to enter 
into equity-based partnerships. This shifted airlines’ interests from regional to global 
terms and created an environment that encouraged consolidation, mergers and 
acquisitions in order to further rationalise (Weller, 2009). Both Qantas and Singapore 
International Airlines (SIA) sought to increase their stake in Air New Zealand but 
were blocked by the 25% cap imposed on foreign ownership by the New Zealand 
government (Hsu and Chang, 2005).  
In order to gain access to the Australian domestic aviation market, in March 1999 
SIA made an offer to purchase the 50% stake of Ansett Airlines owned by News 
Corporation Ltd for A$500 million, but later withdrew its offer. In February 2000, 
Air New Zealand exercised its pre-emptive right, which it gained from the 50% 
acquisition of Ansett shares from TNT to buy the other half of Ansett Airlines’ 
shares. The takeover had significant implications for Ansett Airlines’ management 
and business model, which worsened the relationship between both airlines. Apart 
from this resistance, Air New Zealand was also accused by Ansett’s employees of 
having ‘milked’ Ansett’s profits, failing to invest in newer aircraft and maintaining 
existing ones, and wasting resources on misguided changes in Ansett’s organisational 
structure (Easdown and Wilms, 2002; Painter, 2001).  
After Ansett left Australian ownership the Australian government relaxed its 
protective aviation policy. As a result, in August 2000, Ansett Airlines as well as 
Qantas faced the entrance of Virgin Blue into the Australian market. With Virgin’s 
low-cost strategy, the support of the Virgin Group as well as Queensland’s state 
government in its base city of Brisbane, Virgin Blue posed an immediate threat to 
Ansett’s position. That is, Ansett followed a full-service business model and even 
attempts to restructure and reduce operational costs did not strengthen its competitive 
position. Therefore, Ansett lost market share and its daily losses were estimated to be 
$2.4 million (Easdown and Wilms, 2002). These losses also included the Air New 
Zealand Group’s fuel bill run over Ansett’s account, adding $300 million on cost a 
month (Horton, 2001). In addition, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority grounded 
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Ansett’s Boeing 767 flights over Christmas 2000 and Easter 2001 as a result of 
maintenance and operational errors. This impacted heavily on Ansett’s financial 
situation as well public confidence in Ansett (Jefferies, 2010).  
Only the brand value of Ansett was of significance to Air New Zealand after the 
Australia–New Zealand common aviation market was established in November 2000 
(NZMFAT, 2000). Air New Zealand tried to overcome this competitive threat by 
offering to buy Virgin, which, however, was not for sale. Air New Zealand’s 
worsening situation led its share price to fall and subsequently, the debt-to-equity 
ratio arrived at an unacceptably high level. The New Zealand government did not 
respond in a timely manner to offers from Qantas and SIA to inject money into Air 
New Zealand for a higher share of equity (Easdown and Wilms, 2002) nor to the 
offer from Qantas to replace SIA and inject cash. Air New Zealand even offered 
Qantas and the government Ansett’s assets and liabilities, for the price of one 
Australian dollar. Qantas’ then CEO Geoff Dixon rejected this offer on the grounds 
that Qantas could not resolve Ansett’s problems (Jefferies, 2010).  
3.3.5 Further Market Consolidation 
In May 2001, Qantas entered into an agreement with Impulse Airlines whereby the 
latter was to lease all services to Qantas while Qantas in turn marketed the routes, 
gave a cash injection and obtained an option to buy out Impulse. In November 2001, 
Qantas exercised this option and Impulse was integrated into the QantasLink Group 
as another subsidiary airline (Qantas, 2010).  
On 12 September 2001 the then Chairman of Air New Zealand, Jim Farmer, 
announced that Ansett Holdings and some of its subsidiaries resolved under the 
control of a bankruptcy administrator. Gregory Hall, Peter Hedge and Allan Watson 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers took over as administrators for Ansett. The Australian 
government decided not to intervene (Weller, 2009). The administrators announced 
on 14 September 2001 that all Ansett Australia’s flight operations were suspended. 
On 18 September 2001, the new administrators from Anderson Accounting estimated 
Ansett’s debt to be as high as $2 billion, with 16,000 jobs to be lost and about 60,000 
employees from suppliers and tourism under threat. Ansett and its subsidiaries 
represented 40% of Australia’s air capacity, leaving a huge gap (Jefferies, 2010). 
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On 29 September 2001, Ansett (also called Ansett Mark II) resumed some limited 
services between major cities after it received a federal government guarantee on 27 
September. This allowed 1,500 employees to return to work. The voluntary 
administrator negotiated on 6 October with SIA about the latter’s involvement in a 
reconstituted Ansett. As no prospective investors were available, the administrator 
had to cease all Ansett’s flying operations at 11.59 pm on 4 March 2002 (Korda and 
Mentha, 2013). 
In the aftermath of the collapse of Ansett, Virgin Blue became Australia’s second 
airline, while Qantas took over Ansett’s feeder regional air services and enhanced its 
dominance of Australia’s international air service linkages. In particular, the failure 
of Ansett prevented SIA from gaining access to the Australian aviation market and 
therefore secured Qantas’ international position (Weller, 2007). Previous subsidiaries 
of Ansett remained providers of regional routes after the collapse of Ansett, but 
through alliances closely tied to the trunk system with the QantasLink. The latter 
benefited indirectly, not through subsidies from the federal government but through 
support in the form of supply contracts, in particular mail deliveries, from state 
governments (Weller, 2007).  
In February 2002, the New Zealand government was forced to provide NZ$855 
million to Air New Zealand to prevent bankruptcy. This loan and equity investment 
resulted in an ownership share of the New Zealand government in Air New Zealand 
of 82%. After this revitalisation/nationalisation, Air New Zealand sought to enter 
into a strategic alliance with Qantas. In September and October 2003 respectively, 
decisions made by the Australian and New Zealand regulatory bodies declined such a 
collaboration on the basis that the Australasian market would become uncompetitive. 
Those decisions reinforced the position of both airlines as national carriers (Weller, 
2009).  
3.3.6 Expansion of Australian Airlines 
In October 2002, Qantas launched its international low-cost carrier, Australian 
Airlines, and in October 2003 it announced it would launch Jetstar. On 24 May 2004 
Qantas’ subsidiary Impulse Airlines ceased operations and became a vehicle for 
Qantas to launch its low-cost carrier Jetstar. One day later (25 May 2004) Jetstar 
started operations to replace the Impulse brand. As part of the two-brand policy, 
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Qantas ceased operations of Australian Airlines on 30 June 2006. In November 2006, 
Jetstar’s international flight services to Asia and Hawaii began (Weller, 2009).  
In December 2006, Airline Partners Australia (APA) made a bid of $5.45 per share 
(totalling $11billion) to take over the majority of Qantas shares. Yet on 4 May 2007, 
APA’s bid effectively failed, since APA had not achieved a share of at least 50% of 
Qantas stocks (Murphy, 2007). On 23 November 2007, Tiger Airways Australia 
entered the Australian aviation market. Tiger Airways Australia is a joint venture 
between Virgin Australia Holdings and Tiger Airways Holding, which is partially 
owned by SIA.  
The ‘National Aviation Policy White Paper: Flight Path to the Future’, released in 
December 2009, highlights the importance of air services to the tourism industry, for 
example, 23 million passengers entered Australia during 2008/09; nearly half of 
them were tourists from overseas. On an international scale and regionally, aviation 
is important so the government provides support especially to those routes that would 
otherwise not be commercially viable. Examples of programs in place include: The 
‘Payment Scheme for Airservices Enroute Charges’, the ‘Remote Air Services 
Subsidy (RASS) ($44.7 million over four years), the Remote Aerodrome Inspection 
(RAI) Program, the Remote Aerodrome Safety Program (RASP) ($20 million over 
four years) and the Remote Aviation Infrastructure Fund (RAIF) ($3 million in 
2009/10). Another measure to ensure “our airlines remain majority Australian owned 
and controlled” (Australian Dept. of Infrastructure Transport Regional Development, 
2009, p.14) is the Qantas Sale Act 1992 and the Air Navigation Act 1920, which 
restrict foreign ownership of Australian international carriers to 49%.  
Bilateral agreements between countries to set conditions for market access of the 
countries’ respective airlines limit competition amongst international carriers; 
currently there are 3,500 of those bilateral air services agreements apart from 
agreements made under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and international free 
trade agreements frameworks. An example is the “[a]ccess to the trans-Pacific route 
between Australia and the United States [which] remains one of the few valuable 
rights we have available to trade” (Australian Dept. of Infrastructure Transport 
Regional Development, 2009, p.43). While an open skies agreement between the US 
and Australia allowed Virgin Australia and Delta to join the competition between 
Qantas and United Airlines, Singapore and its national carrier SIA did not receive 
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access to this route. A single air services agreement between the EU and Australia is 
sought, since EU with about 4.6 million passengers flying between the EU and 
Australia in 2008 is one of Australia’s largest aviation markets (Australian Dept. of 
Infrastructure Transport Regional Development, 2009). 
3.3.7 Qantas’ Fleet Grounding 
On 29 October 2011, Qantas’ CEO Alan Joyce decided to ground a fleet of 108 
aircraft in order to enforce a lock out of 3,000 employees from 8pm Monday 31 
October onwards to resolve the dispute with the Australian and International Pilots 
Association (AIPA)), Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association (ALAEA) 
and the Transport Workers Union (TWA). The dispute had its origins in late 2010 
when the unions started to negotiate the conditions of a new enterprise agreement. 
During the nine months before October 2011, about 200 meetings in regard to 
industrial bargaining took place. Qantas claimed that industrial actions until this time 
cost in total $68 million or $15 million a week (O'Neill, 2012).  
The consequences of the grounding were significant. The cancellation of 447 flights 
from 5pm on 29 October left about 70,000 of Qantas’ domestic and international 
passengers without service. Qantas reported to the Australian Securities Exchange 
estimated costs from industrial actions totalling $194 million. This included $70 
million from the grounding of the Qantas fleet, $56 million from lost customer 
loyalty and losses in forward bookings, and $68 million for the actions undertaken 
prior to the grounding (O'Neill, 2012). 
The Fair Work Australia (FWA) Full Bench intervened on 31 October 2011 and 
terminated the industrial actions within Qantas under the Fair Work Act, s.424. It 
also directed the parties (Qantas and unions) to bargain for another 21 days. After the 
21 days had passed, on 21 November, Qantas and the AIPA, TWU and ALAEA 
failed to reach any agreement (O'Neill, 2012). 
3.3.8 Australian Government’s Actions against Climate Change 
Prior to Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, in 1999, a series of discussion 
papers was released by the Australian Greenhouse Office on the design of an AU 
ETS. In 2006, a task force created by the Australian states released a paper on the 
design that an AU ETS could take. In 2007, a group of leading business 
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representatives and senior officials represented in the Howard government’s Prime 
Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading recommended the adoption of an ETS 
to the government (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011b). On 18 November 2011, the 
Australian government’s climate policy including the AU ETS was assented to 
(Australian Government, 2011a). The AU ETS covers four out of six GHGs 
mentioned under the Kyoto Protocol29 and came into force on 1 July 2012.  
Under the Clean Energy Act 2011, airlines have to pay a fuel surcharge for each litre 
of aviation fuel for international flights of 5.98ct (2012/13), 6.279ct (2013/14) and 
6.604ct (2014/15), and can choose to join emissions trading after July 2015 or 
otherwise keep paying a surcharge. In this context, environmental efficiency related 
to CO2-e emissions for the combustion of aviation fuel gained even more importance. 
This might be one reason why Qantas formed a partnership with Emirates Airlines in 
March 2013, which brings together both national and international services of both 
carriers (Qantas, 2013d). 
3.4 QANTAS 
Qantas has played a significant role in the Australian aviation market. However, its 
financial performance over recent years has worsened and its environmental 
efficiency lags behind that of other international carriers. Nevertheless Qantas has 
implemented several measures to mitigate the financial impact an increased levy has 
had on their profit. Such actions include adjustments in airfares, measures to increase 
fuel efficiency, requests for support from the Australian government and construction 
of a trigeneration plant at Sydney Airport’s Terminal 3. 
3.4.1 Financial Performance 
The Qantas Group’s profit after tax has fluctuated from 2002 to 2013. While there 
was an increase in profit from 2002 ($429 million) to 2008 ($970 million), from 
2008 onwards Qantas’ financial performance has tended to worsen. Recently, in the 
financial year ending in 2012, Qantas even generated a loss of $244 million. This 
might have been impacted by the grounding the of Qantas’ fleet (estimated costs of 
$196 million) or as Qantas states, by ”Qantas’ international network [making] an 
Underlying EBIT loss of approximately $450 million” (Qantas, 2012d, p.1). 
                                                 
29 Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons from aluminium smelting (also called 
‘carbon dioxide equivalent’). 
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However, the business activities of Qantas domestic and Jetstar outweigh this loss 
with their profits (Qantas, 2012d). 
By the end of 2013 the Qantas Group generated a loss of $252 million (McGrath and 
Griffiths, 2013). An important driver of the Qantas Group’s financial performance is 
expenditure on fuel and the efficient use of fuel. 
3.4.2 Environmental Performance 
Qantas, like all other airlines, generates almost all (95%) of its emissions from the 
combustion of aviation fuel. A significant proportion of Qantas’ total cost is the fuel 
expense item. In the financial year (FY) 2002/03 fuel cost made up 16% of Qantas’ 
total expenses. Except for FY 2003/04 (14%) and FY 2004/05 (18%) the fuel 
expenses as a percentage of the total expenses increased to about 25% for FYs 
2007/08 to 2012/13 (Qantas, 2013b). 
In order to facilitate group-wide environmental awareness about fuel efficiency, in 
early 2008 Qantas launched its ‘begreen program’. The program aims to bring this 
environmental issue and related costs into decision-making and operational 
management at the company and operations level (Qantas, 2011a).  
In its 2011 report to the CDP, Qantas outlines the following measures to reduce its 
fuel consumption: investing in newer, more efficient aircraft; advanced navigational 
aircraft technology; reducing aircraft weight; flight planning improvements; 
improved aerodynamic performance; improved schedules; and optimised loading 
(Qantas, 2011b). As evidence of its ‘excellent’ environmental performance, Qantas 
provides a list of environmentally related awards: Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI; since September 2011); DJSI Asia Pacific (since 2009); FTSE4Good (since 
2009); Australia 30 Index (since 2009); 2010 Carbon Disclosure Project Leadership 
Index for Australia and New Zealand; Citi Award for ‘Best Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) disclosure by an Australasian Company’ (2010). 
3.4.3 Actions to Mitigate Increased Fuel Levy Resulting from Australian 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
Qantas (2013a) states the costs imposed on the Qantas Group by the introduction of 
Australia’s Carbon Pricing Scheme for FY 2012/13 to be $106 million. These costs 
mainly result from a levy on aviation fuel equivalent to $23 per tCO2-e. In order to 
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mitigate these costs Qantas mainline adopted a strategy based on three main 
aspects/pillars. First, a price put-through to airline passengers, which implies an 
increase in airfares. Second, there were improvements in environmental 
performance, especially in the area of fuel efficiency. Third, other measures such as 
the installation of a trigeneration plant at Sydney Airport. Qantas also seeks 
assistance from policymakers in the form of grants.  
3.4.4 Price Changes 
As a response to increases in fuel prices and participation in the EU ETS and AU 
ETS (in the case of airlines it is an excise on aviation fuel), Qantas has passed on 
costs as surcharges to their customers (see Table 3-2). 
Table 3-2: Surcharge as a result of the AU ETS 
This table outlines the additional charges Qantas imposes on its customers 
depending on flight distance travelled 
Zone  Distance (km) Charge AUD including  GST per sector 
1 1–700 $1.82 
2 701–1200 $2.79 
3 1201–1900 $4.00 
4 1901 + $6.86 
Source: http://www.qantas.com.au/travel/airlines/carbon-pricing/global/en 
From 15 February 2012, there has been an increased surcharge for one-way Qantas’ 
international fares due to fuel price increases (see Table 3-3). 
Table 3-3: Additional charges for fuel price increases 
This table outlines the current, additional and new charges Qantas imposes on its 
customers due to increases in fuel price.  
Destination  Current Surcharge New surcharge 
  (One way) increase (One way) 
Asia/Honolulu  $145 $20 $165 
Buenos Aires $200 $40 $240 
Johannesburg/Santiago     
United States  $250 $60 $310 
London/Frankfurt  $290 $60 $350 
Source: Qantas (2013b). 
3.4.4.1 Fuel Efficiency 
As another part of Qantas’ strategy to reduce fuel costs it has aimed for a 1.5% 
improvement per annum in fuel efficiency to 2020, and beyond 2020, the industry is 
targeting ‘carbon neutral growth’ and aims to reduce net emissions by 50% by 2050 
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compared to 2005 levels (Air Transport Action Group, 2012; Qantas, 2012b). 
Arjomandi and Seufert (2014) use Data Envelop Analysis and apply it to 35 Full 
Service Carriers (FSC) and 13 Low Cost Carriers (LCC) over the period 2007–2010 
and find that airlines from the regions ‘China and North Asia’ and ‘Europe and 
Russia’ are the most technically and environmentally efficient airlines in the 
industry, respectively, while LCCs are, in general, more environmentally oriented 
than FSCs. However, it was also found that the number of environmentally oriented 
FSCs increased over the period. This indicates that major world airlines are 
increasingly aware of the importance of fuel/CO2-e reduction. In regard to Qantas the 
study reveals that in 2010, 22 airlines were more fuel efficient while only eight were 
strictly less fuel efficient resulting in a ranking for Qantas of 28 out of 48 airlines. In 
regard to technical efficiency, which does not take into consideration CO2-e-
emissions as bad output, Qantas was, in 2010, among the best-performing airlines.  
3.4.4.2 Request for Policy Support 
In order to further mitigate costs from its inclusion into the ETS, Qantas required, in 
a submission to the Aviation White Paper, assistance from the Australian 
government in different forms (Qantas Airways Limited, 2008). One such form of 
support was provided by ARENA (Australian Renewable Energy Agency) for a joint 
investigation of Qantas and Shell into the feasibility of bio-aviation fuel generated 
within Australia. As a policy recommendation the report states:  
the study identified the importance of a supportive policy environment in 
facilitating the development of the SAF industry in Australia. Facilitating such 
an environment should be carefully considered by the Australian Government 
and be complementary to other policy imperatives at Federal and State 
government levels. (Qantas, 2013c, p.iii)  
 
Qantas showed its enthusiasm for the use of biofuels with the first flight within the 
Southeast Asian region fuelled by 50:50 bio and conventional fuel on 26 March 
2012. The biofuel was provided by SkyNRG. SOLENA, another producer of 
alternative aviation fuel, is also collaborating with Qantas (Qantas, 2012e).  
3.4.4.3 Sydney Airport Terminal 3 Trigeneration Plant 
Apart from actions in regard to aviation fuel, Qantas has also invested in a 
trigeneration plant at Terminal 3 at Sydney Airport, which came into operation in 
 
83 
June 2013. The plant provides energy for heating, cooling and electricity for Qantas’ 
headquarter building. Grid X constructed the trigeneration plant under a Build, Own, 
Operate and Maintain (BOOM) contract. The facility has a capacity of eight 
megawatts and Grid X will install a smaller four-megawatt plant to supply Qantas’ 
Terminal 3 building at Sydney Airport (Qantas, 2013f). 
3.5 SUMMARY 
The above sections provide a description of the global, Australian aviation and 
Qantas-related development. The aviation sector is rapidly developing with 
continuing high-expected growth rates in the future. On a global stage, however, 
airlines face cyclic changing net profits and currently many airlines are in weak 
economic positions. In the US 189 airlines have already filed bankruptcy protection 
since deregulation (The Associated Press, 2011) and the increasingly high oil prices 
put further financial constraints on them. It can be claimed that at least several 
airlines face an economic crisis of poor profitability, and high economic uncertainty 
reflected by low credit ratings.  
The significant, economic impact of this sector through the provision of direct 
employment and its strategic importance to nations and on other industries might 
explain the strong regulatory environment and measures to ensure national 
ownership within ‘flag carriers’ to protect the industry. Governments face the 
challenge of protecting their national carriers within the neoliberal context of free-
market ideology to maximise overall social welfare. In particular, environmental 
policy measures that impose a price on CO2 emissions from the combustion of 
aviation fuel challenge the rationality of governments’ actions. That is, on one hand 
governments try to protect their national carriers from financial failure and filing 
bankruptcy protection, and on the other hand by imposing financial burdens for the 
sake of combating climate change. At the same time governments face strong, public 
opposition from airlines and their associated organisations as a reaction to the 
imposition of an increased levy on aviation fuel as part of an ETS. This further 
challenges the rationality of governments and might create a rationality crisis for 
governments.  
An example of the active protection of a national carrier’s interest is the Australian 
government. In the process of liberalisation and regulation it chose measures that 
particularly hindered the entrance of new competitors to support its national carriers. 
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It also rejected the entrance of New Zealand’s carrier to the Australian market, and 
rejected support for Ansett when it faced economic failure because it was mostly 
foreign-owned. The Australian government also used bilateral agreements to prevent, 
for example, Singapore Airlines competing with Qantas on some routes. All of these 
measures came into place to protect its flag carrier and national icon, which is deeply 
intertwined with the Australian identity.  
Qantas, with its low financial performance since 2008, faces an economic crisis. The 
cost of aviation fuel has accelerated over the last decade as a percentage of its total 
expenditure, which is intensifying the economic crisis. Since the introduction of the 
Carbon Pricing Scheme Qantas has been confronted with even more costs, worsening 
its financial position still further. Qantas’ actions illustrate some of the measures that 
can be employed to curb the impact of a price on carbon: passing on costs to 
passengers, increased fuel efficiency and other measures to reduce CO2. It also 
shows the inextricable relationship between Qantas and the Australian government. 
Qantas wants further support from the Australian government in addition to its own 
actions in order to adapt to a changed political global environment with inherent 
challenges such as ETSs. It is yet to be understood how the Australian government 
can prevent its national carrier from a severe economic crisis without facing the 
rationality of its actions or even its legitimacy to govern being challenged. 
The interplay between the government, the people it represents, and the economy is 
explained by German philosopher Juergen Habermas’ ‘legitimation crisis’, which 
will be outlined in the next chapter. His theory on economic, rationality, legitimation 
and motivation crises will be enriched by German philosopher Ulrich Beck’s 
understanding of the global risk posed by climate change. 
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4 TENDENCIES TOWARDS CRISES IN LATE CAPITALISM  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents Juergen Habermas’ (1975) societal analysis of ‘legitimation 
crisis’, the advancements of this theory drawn from more recent scholarly 
publications, and theoretical arguments by Ulrich Beck (1996; 2006; 2008c; 2008b; 
2008a; 2010b; 2010a) about the ‘ecological crisis’. This provides the theoretical lens 
through which the relationship between Qantas and the Australian government, as 
well as the MACC itself, exemplified though Qantas’ MACC in the context of the 
ecological crisis, will be interpreted. 
This section will provide a summary of Habermas’ legitimation crisis. Section 4.2 
provides further developments of Habermas’ original work, Section 4.3 continues 
with Beck’s arguments on ecological crisis and Section 4 outlines the importance of 
this chapter to the thesis as a whole. 
4.2 HABERMAS’ LEGITIMATION CRISIS OR LEGITIMATION ISSUES 
WITHIN LATE CAPITALISM 
4.2.1 Definition of Crisis 
For Habermas (1973b; 1973a; 1975) the term ‘late capitalism’ goes hand in hand 
with the implication that even societal developments in state-governed capitalism can 
pass through contradictions or result in crises. A social crisis within late capitalist 
society occurs when the society (considered as a system) has insufficient resources to 
solve the problems that threaten its existence (Habermas, 1975, p.2; 1973a). 
Habermas distinguishes between structural-originated system crises and system 
crises related to changes in the environment. He explains that the parameters within 
the system exist and the elements of a system can change without causing a crisis. 
Structural changes within the societal system do not necessarily result in crises. The 
distinction between structural change and crisis has to be made. An indicator of crisis 
is the disintegration of societal institutions (Habermas, 1973a, p.12). Habermas 
identifies identity crisis as an indicator of a system crisis: subsequent generations do 
not identify with constitutional historical traditions (Habermas, 1973a, p.13). The 
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objective character of crisis procedures is connected to unsolvable steering problems, 
which themselves are related to identity crises (Habermas, 1973a, p.14). 
For Habermas, the systems theory approach to evaluate the crisis theorem is not 
adequate, because it cannot explain how crisis within a society is experienced as a 
crisis in its members’ consciousness. Since a society is made up of conscious human 
beings, a response to a crisis can only take place if those human beings are aware of 
the problem itself. Habermas deals with this issue by using the concepts of ‘system 
integration’ and ‘social integration’ (Habermas, 1975, p.3-4; 1973a).  
Habermas maintains Lockwood’s (1964) agency/system perspective when he adopts 
the social-/system-integration distinction. His crisis definition attempts to cater for 
both social and system integration. From a social integration perspective the social 
world is viewed from an ‘internalist’ and agency-oriented point of view. The term 
social integration refers to: institutional systems that socialise speaking and acting 
subjects; and societal systems are considered as lifeworld which is symbolically 
structured; under system integration, an ‘externalist’ perspective is adopted. That is 
the perspective of the external observer (opposed to the actors inside the society) 
who examines social orientation actions and the functional requirements for the 
maintenance and reproduction of the societal system. System integration refers to the 
specific steering actions of a self-regulating system: societal systems in this regard 
are analysed with regard to their ability to cope with a complex and changing 
environment to preserve the boundaries and elements of the system (Mouzelis, 1997; 
Habermas, 1973a, p.14).  
When crises occur, people can withdraw their commitment to the prevailing social 
order and can be open to alternative views, values, understandings, and even new 
identities, yet this does not necessarily lead to social movements per se. Collective 
emotions are a prerequisite for the rise of crisis and these emotions have to be 
interpreted within prevailing or emerging frames resonating with the actor’s network 
and social location, values and identities. Attempts to recreate or retain meaningful 
identities and lifestyles takes place on the social integration level (also see Langman, 
2013). 
In medical terms, for Habermas a crisis refers to that phase of a disease in which it is 
decided whether the self-healing power of an organism is sufficient for recovery. It 
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this sense the disease appears to be objective. That is, the difference between what it 
should be – the normal/healthy condition of an organism – can be objectively 
observed and if necessary measured against certain indicators. During the disease the 
patient’s consciousness is irrelevant and so are questions about how the patient feels 
and how he or she experiences the disease, which are symptoms of the happening 
that cannot be influenced by him- or herself. Yet if the medical condition becomes 
life threatening, we would not term it a crisis because the patient would also be 
trapped in this process with all of his or her subjectivity. The crisis to which the 
patient is exposed cannot be detached from the patient’s inner view:  
He experiences his impotence toward the objectivity of his illness only because 
he is a subject doomed to passivity and temporarily unable to be a subject in full 
possession of his strength. (Habermas, 1973c, p.39) 
Crisis can be understood as an objective force, which deprives a subject of some 
sovereignty that it normally owns. If a process is termed ‘crisis’ we give it a 
normative meaning: the resolution of the crisis means that the trapped subject 
achieves liberation.  
This becomes more apparent when shifting from a medical to a dramaturgical notion 
of crisis. In classical aesthetics crisis marks the turning point of a crucial/fateful 
process which, despite its objective nature, ‘does not just simply break in from the 
outside’ (Habermas, 1973c, p.39). The contradiction that exists between the structure 
of the system of action and the hero’s personality systems is expressed in the 
catastrophic culmination of conflict of action: 
Fate is revealed in conflicting norms that destroy the identities of the characters 
unless they in turn manage to regain their freedom by smashing the mythical 
power of fate. (Habermas, 1973c, p.40) 
This notion of crisis, which is found in classical tragedy, has its complement within 
the notion of crisis developed throughout the history of solvation. This figure of 
thought, recurring in eighteenth-century philosophy of history enters into nineteenth-
century evolutionary social theories. It was Marx who was first to develop a notion 
of crisis within social science, which builds the background to contemporary 
discussions of social and economic crises. An example is discussions the great 




Capitalist societies have the ability to steadily develop technological productive 
forces. Marx asserts that economic crises take the pattern of a ”crisis-ridden process 
of economic growth” (Habermas, 1973c, p.40). Accumulation of capital is bound to 
the acquisition of surplus. That is, economic growth is regulated by a mechanism that 
simultaneously conceals and establishes power relations: 
Thus the model of rising complexity is contradictory in the sense that the 
economic system keeps creating new and more problems as it solves others. 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.40) 
The accumulation of total-capital experiences periodic devaluations of certain parts 
of capital: this is what Marx observed as a form of ‘crisis-cycle’. He attempts to 
explain the classic type of crisis using the theory of value combined with ”the law of 
the tendential fall of the rate of profit” (Habermas, 1973c, p.40-41). Habermas 
attempts to answer the following questions: Does late capitalism follow the same or a 
similar evolution pattern of self-destruction as classical (competitive) capitalism? Or 
has the principle of organisation30 of late capitalism altered so that the process of 
accumulation no longer generates risks threatening its own existence?  
In order to explicate the differences between structural changes and crisis, Habermas 
introduces the term ‘principle of organisation’ referring back to Marx’s term of 
society formation. The principle of organisation is an indicator of limits a society 
faces to coordinate the societal system without endangering subjects’ identity within 
the society. For this purpose Habermas refers to four societal formations illustrating 
how crisis tendencies can be derived from the respective principle of organisation. 
This discussion will not go into detail about the relations of those past societies, their 
principle of organisation and their respective crisis tendencies, but will progress with 
the structural features of late capitalism according to Habermas.  
4.2.2 Structural Features of Late Capitalism 
The term ‘organised or state-regulated capitalism’ refers to two types of phenomena 
which can be traced back to the advanced state of the accumulation process. First, 
there is a process of economic concentration/monopolisation within the corporate 
                                                 
30 The principle of organisation determines the highly abstract steering mechanisms of society’s 
learning capacity inherent to a society which can be applied without losing society’s identity. It sets 
boundaries for three dimensions of societal evolution: development of productivity forces, increase 




realm (evolution of national and multinational enterprises) and the regimentation of 
markets for labour, goods and capital. Second, growing functional gaps in the market 
are filled by the interventionist state. The expansion of oligopolistic market 
structures bring an end to competitive capitalism. The steering mechanisms of the 
market remain in place as long as investment decisions are made in accordance with 
corporations’ consideration of profit maximisation, independent of how far 
companies forecast into the future or expand control over their environment. 
Furthermore, the complementation and partial replacement of the market mechanism 
with government interventions proclaims the end of liberal capitalism:  
But no matter how much the state may restrict the owner of goods in his private 
autonomous activity, there will be no political planning to allocate scare 
resources as long as the overall societal priorities develop naturally – i.e., as 
indirect results of the strategies of private enterprise. (Habermas, 1973c, p.42) 
The economic, administrative and legitimation systems of advanced capitalist 
societies are outlined as follows.  
4.2.2.1 The Economic System 
During the 1960s several authors (e.g. O'Connor, 1973, Poulantzas, 1969) developed 
a three-sector model exemplified by the American economy, which is based on the 
distinction between the private and public sectors. While private production is still 
market-oriented, one sector is still regulated by competition and the other sector is 
determined by the strategies of oligopolies, which just tolerate a ‘competitive fringe’. 
In contrast, the public sector and particularly armament and space travel production 
gave rise to large corporations that could determine their investment decisions 
independently of the market. These entities are either directly controlled by the 
government or they are private corporations that generate most of their income from 
government contracts. The monopolistic sector and the public sector are rather 
capital intense and the sector determined by competition consists of labour-intense 
industries. The monopolistic sector and the public sector are confronted with strong 
labour unions, while in the competitive sector labour is not well organised, which is 
reflected in different wage levels. The monopolistic sector shows relative rapid 
progress in production improvements. The public sector is not in urgent need of 
improving efficiency, and the competitive sector is not able to be more efficient 
(Habermas, 1973b, p.40 f.; 1973a; 1975).  
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4.2.2.2 The Administrative System 
On the one hand the state apparatus uses global planning to regulate the overall 
macroeconomic cycle. On the other hand the state improves conditions of utilisation 
opportunities for capital.  
The private autonomous use of the means of production, such as that there cannot be 
any restrictions on the freedom to conduct investments by private corporations, limits 
the state’s global planning; so does the avoidance of macroeconomic instabilities 
through (crisis management of) the government. In this regard measures such as 
fiscal and monetary policy as well as individual measures to regulate investments 
and overall demand (loans, price guarantees, subsidies, secondary redistribution of 
income, government contracts based on business cycle policies, indirect labour 
market policies, etc.) to regulate economic cycles have the reactive character of 
avoidance strategies within the preference system (Habermas, 1973c, p.42-43):  
This system is determined by a didactically demanded compromise between 
competing imperatives: steady growth, stability of money value, full 
employment, and balance of trade. (Habermas, 1973c, p.43) 
Global planning, with the aim of correcting market mechanisms in regard to its 
dysfunctional side effects, manipulates the marginal condition under which 
corporations make decisions and the government also replaces/supplants the market 
mechanism where it wants to create or improve conditions for utilising excess 
accumulated capital. The government does so: by strengthening national 
competitiveness by joining supranational economic blocs; through an imperialistic 
protection of international stratification, etc.; by government’s consumption of 
unproductive goods (armament and space travel industry); by politically structured 
guiding of capital into sectors which were neglected by an autonomous market; by 
improving the material infrastructure such as transportation, vocation centres, 
education and health, urban and regional planning, housing, etc.; by improving the 
infrastructure immaterial in nature (intermediary of patents, promotion of scientific 
research, capital expenditures in research and development, etc.); by improvements 
in human labour’s productivity (vocational schooling, universal education, training 
and re-education programs, etc.); and by compensating the social costs and 
consequences resulting from private production (ecological damage, welfare, 
unemployment) (Habermas, 1973c, p.43). 
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4.2.2.3 The Legitimation System 
The market’s weakness and inability to function properly and the dysfunctional side 
effects of the market mechanism leads to the collapse of the basic bourgeois ideology 
of fair exchange. And there is also an increasing need for legitimation. The state 
apparatus is no longer just securing the prerequisites of the production processes, but 
also on its own initiatives, intervenes and is entangled in that process. The state is in 
need of legitimation for its growing realms of state intervention, “even though there 
is now no possibility of reverting to the traditions that have been undermined and 
worn out in competitive capitalism” (Habermas, 1973c, p.43-44). The universalistic 
value system of bourgeois ideology contributes to make citizens’ civil rights, which 
include the right to participate in election (suffrage), universal. Therefore, the state’s 
procurement of legitimation can only under extraordinary circumstances and only 
temporarily be gathered independent of general elections. The problem that arises 
from such a situation can be resolved through formal democracy (Habermas, 1973c, 
p.44).  
The adjustment of democratic institutions and procedures ensures that administrative 
decisions are made independently from the concrete aims and motives of the 
electorate. Wide participation by the electorate in the shaping the process can be seen 
as ‘genuine democracy’ would reveal the contradiction of administratively socialised 
production and the fact that production outcomes/values are still privately owned. In 
order to avoid the revelation of this contradiction “[t]he administrative system has to 
be sufficiently independent of the shaping of legitimating will” (Habermas, 1973c, 
p.44). This is put in place by a legitimation process that guarantees mass loyalty but 
avoids participation. Even though the society is objectively politicised, citizens can 
opt to be passive with the right to withhold their acclaim. Civil privatism of a 
population builds a complement to private autonomous investment decisions.  
4.2.2.4 Class Structure  
Structures of late capitalism can be understood as a sort of reaction formation. In 
order to prevent system crisis, late capitalist societies direct all available socially 
integrative forces/strengths to the structure or part of society that is most likely to 
experience a conflict in order to keep that potential conflict even more efficiently 
latent (Habermas, 1973c, p.44).  
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In this regard the quasi-political wage structure, which depends on negotiations 
between corporation and labour unions, plays an important role. The ‘power 
determined price fixing’ prevailing on oligopolistic markets replaces price 
competition and has its complement in the labour market, such as the large 
corporations which on the one hand can exert quasi administrative control over 
prices in their sales market (marketing territories) and on the other hand during the 
negotiations of wages they achieve with their labour union adversaries quasi-political 
compromises. In those industry sectors that are central to the economic development 
within monopolistic and public sectors, labour as a commodity is assigned a 
‘political’ price. During wage negotiation, the labour unions and employee 
representatives (‘wage-scale partners’) find a broad range of compromise as 
increased labour costs can be passed through into prices “and the middle range 
demands made by both sides against the government tend to converge” (Habermas, 
1973c, p.45). This immunisation of the original conflict zone has major 
consequences which are as follows: first, disparate wage development; second, a 
permanent inflation which results in an accordingly timely redistribution of income 
to the disadvantage of marginal groups and unorganised wage earners; third, a 
continuous crisis of government budgets resulting in higher government debt with 
public poverty, for example, the pauperisation of public education, transportation, 
housing and health; and finally, an insufficient leverage of disproportionate 
macroeconomic developments both on a regional (e.g., marginal areas) and sectoral 
(e.g., agriculture) scale.  
During the decades after World War II, advanced capitalist societies have been able: 
to keep class conflicts in the core/essential areas of society latent; to stretch the 
macroeconomic cycle; to transform the periodic occurrences of capital devaluation 
into steadily increasing permanent crisis with less severe cyclical fluctuation, and; to 
filter dysfunctional side-effects of prevented economic crisis away from society, yet 
to distribute along ‘quasi-groups’ such as consumer, pupils and their parents, user of 
transportation, the sick, the elderly etc.) or along those groups which do not have a 
high capacity to organise themselves in a political sense. As consequence of this 
process the social identity of classes breaks down and class consciousness 
fragmentises. The class compromise implemented in the structures of late capitalism 
allow (almost) everyone to become participant and affected at the same time. The 
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growing uneven distribution of wealth and power makes it easy to distinguish who 
belongs to which category (Habermas, 1973c, p.45).  
4.2.3 Non-system-specific Crises  
The rapid growth processes of late capitalist societies confront the system of world’s 
societies with crises that are not specific to the system of nation state; yet the way to 
address and find solutions for those crises are specific to the system of nation state 
and therefore limited. Habermas identifies three crises: disturbance of the ecological 
balance; alienation or violation of the personality; and the international tension 
between states (war) (Habermas, 1973c, p.46).  
4.2.3.1 The Ecological Balance  
If economic growth can be achieved through technical sophisticated appliances that 
use more energy to enhance human labour’s productivity, then capitalist societies can 
solve the problem of economic growth. Capital accumulation almost naturally 
institutionalises and pushes for economic growth so that no option is left to self-
regulate this process. Those growth imperatives that were first followed by 
capitalism achieved global validity through competition between national systems 
and through global diffusion (independent of tendencies of stagnation or even 
retrogression in some Third World countries) (Habermas, 1973c, p.46).  
The established mechanisms to achieve growth force an increase in population and 
production output on a global scale. The economic needs of growing populations and 
the steadily increasing exploitation of nature is physically limited by first, finite 
resources such as fertile and habitable areas, water and food supply, as well as non-
renewable resources such as minerals and fossil-fuels; and second, natural systems 
that absorb pollutants such as carbon dioxide, (industrial) waste, heat and radioactive 
waste. There is a rather weak empirical grounding of studies conducted by Forrester 
(1973) and others trying to estimate boundaries/limits to the exponential growth of 
population, industrial production, exploitation of natural resources and 
environmental pollution. The mechanisms of population growth and the maximum 
limits of earth capacity to absorb (the most significant) pollutants remain unknown. 
Also, we cannot predict into the future which resources can be substituted or 
recycled/renewed by technological advancements (Habermas, 1973c, p.47).  
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Even under an optimistic assumption there is an absolute limit of growth, which is 
the warming of the environment as a result of energy consumption. If 
macroeconomic growth is associated with increased consumption of energy and if all 
available energy sources are freed as heat, energy consumption would result in global 
warming. When such an event will take place is not easily determined. Yet some 
thoughts express that one day the absolute biological carrying capacity of the planet 
will be reached due to the growth of population and production as expending control 
of ‘external’ nature (Habermas, 1973c, p.47).  
For all complex societal systems the possibilities of curbing ecological crisis are 
specific to the system. It would not be possible for late capitalist societies to limit the 
imperative of limited growth without revealing the principles of organisation, since 
such an overall shift would require spontaneous (natural) capitalist growth to be 
replaced by qualitative growth which has as a prerequisite the use–values oriented 
planning of the production (Habermas, 1973c, p.47).  
4.2.3.2 Anthropological Balance  
While a distorted ecological balance indicates the exploitation of natural resources, 
there is no such indicator for the capacity limits of personality systems: 
I doubt whether it is possible to identify such things a psychological constants of 
human nature that inwardly limit the socialization process. I do, however, see a 
limitation in the kind of socializing that societal systems have been using to 
create motives for action. (Habermas, 1973c, p.47) 
Our behaviour is oriented by interpretive systems that guarantee identity and in 
norms that require justification. This communicative organisation of behaviour can 
become a burden to complex societies because the ability to steer and the capacity to 
adapt within an organisation is dependent on the extent to which decision-making 
and administrative authorities are independent of its members’ particular 
motivations. The choice and fulfilment of an organisation’s targets in a system of 
high intrinsic complexity have to be made independent of the procurement of 
narrowly circumscribed motives. This is to ensure the procurement of a generalisable 
commitment to comply or agree (this willingness taking the form of legitimation 
within political systems). Legitimation of norms of actions is not possible through an 
unmotivated acceptance of decisions as long as socialisation infuses inner nature into 
a communicative behavioural organisation. The willingness of people to comply with 
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decisions whose content is yet to be determined comes through the conviction that 
these decisions are based on legitimated norms of action. Under the condition that 
motives for action no longer have to pass through norms that require justification and 
that personality structures are not required to find their unity under the interpretive 
systems guaranteeing identity, it is then (and only then) that it becomes routine that 
decisions find unmotivated acceptance, and ‘the readiness to comply could thus be 
produced to any desirable degree (Habermas, 1973c, p.48). 
4.2.3.3 International Balance  
The threat of self-destruction of the world system through nuclear weapons lies on 
another level. The accumulated potential of the world’s destruction is a result of the 
high advancement of production forces, which can take the form of destructive forces 
(which could happen because of the still undeveloped stage of international 
communication) due to their technically neutral basis. It is quite possible today that 
the natural substratum of global society is exposed to mortal damage. Therefore, 
international communication takes place under the new imperative of self-limitation. 
This is applicable not only to all highly militarised societal systems, yet possibilities 
to tackle this problem are system specifically limited. Disarmament under the 
consideration of capitalist and post-capitalist class societies is rather unlikely. Yet the 
regulation of arms and armaments is basically in line with structures of late capitalist 
societies as long as it is possible to substitute the capacity effect of governmental 
demand for unproductive consumer goods with an increase in the use-value of capital 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.48).  
Having elaborated on the three global issues that are side effects of late capitalism’s 
growth, the next section will investigate more deeply those disturbances specific to 
the system. 
4.2.4 Disturbances Specific to the System 
4.2.4.1 Economic 
Marxists follow the thesis that capitalistic structures remain unaltered and the 
appearance of economic crises takes different forms. In late capitalist societies 




The Orthodox state theory claims that the interventionist state’s activities follow and 
obey spontaneously emerging economic laws similar to those of liberal-capitalism. 
Different forms of manifestation of crises (the crisis of government’s budget and 
permanent inflation as well as the disparity between public poverty and private 
wealth) are a result of self-regulation of the realisation processes which are exerted 
through steering mechanisms of power rather than by exchange. The value law still 
determines the occurrences and tendencies of crises, that is, the structurally forced 
asymmetry within the exchange of labour for capital. Therefore, government 
activities cannot compensate for falling profit margins but rather mediate this trend, 
for example, consummate it with political means. The unconscious nature of overall 
macroeconomic processes is not altered by the replacement of market functions 
through state functions. This becomes apparent looking at the narrowly defined 
boundaries for government-possible manipulation. As such the government neither 
can substantially intervene into the property structure without causing a strike of 
investor nor can it prevent in the long run cyclic disturbances of the accumulation 
process such as stagnation tendencies that are created endogenously (Habermas, 
1973c, p.49). 
According to the revisionist version of Marxist theory, employed by leaders of the 
German Democratic Republic, the government/state apparatus does not follow the 
nature-like logic of the law of value but rather consciously supports the interests of 
united monopolistic capitalists. This agency theory, which is tailored to late 
capitalism, understands the state not as a blind tool of the realisation process, but as a 
potent supreme capitalist with the ability to make the accumulation of capital part of 
political planning. The high degree of socialisation of production leads to 
convergence of the individual interests of large corporations and interest in 
sustaining the system. And this all the more since its existence is endangered through 
forces transcending within the inner of the system. As a result, an overall capitalist 
interest is generated which united monopolies enforce with help of the state 
apparatus (Habermas, 1973c, p.49).  
Both versions of economic crisis theory are considered by Habermas to be 
insufficient. That is, the first version (orthodox state theory) underestimates the 




The orthodox thesis raises the question that, if the state’s organisation of scientific-
technological progress and the system of collective bargaining (which in particular 
enforces a class-compromise in for capital- and growth-intense industries) have not 
changed the mode of production. The state modifies the determinants of the process 
of utilising capital and becoming involved in the process of production. The 
administrative system gains on the basis of a partial class compromise a limited 
planning capacity, which the state can use as part of the formal democratic 
procurement of legitimation with the purpose of avoiding crises reactively. The crisis 
cycle was stretched over time, mediated in its social aftermath and replaced through 
higher inflation and a permanent crisis of public budgets. Whether those ‘surrogate 
phenomena’ indicate success in coping with the economic crisis or whether it is just 
a temporary shift into the political system is an empirical matter. For such a 
development to happen depends on whether the indirect productive capital invested 
into research, development and education can increase the labour productive, 
increase the rate of surplus value and reduce costs for fixed capital necessary for the 
accumulation process to continue (Habermas, 1973c, p.50).  
In regard to revisionist theory there are the following concerns. First, there is no 
empirical evidence to support the assumption that a state could develop and carry out 
a central and holistic macroeconomic strategy, independent to whose interest. The 
theory of state-monopolistic capitalism fails to admit the limits of administrative 
planning in late capitalism. The way bureaucratic planning is moving forward is 
reactive to avoid crises. The multiplicity of bureaucracies is only partly coordinated 
and due to its shortcomings in perceiving and planning it is dependent on the 
influence of their clients. In particular the lack of rationality allows some organised 
partial interests to be put in place. Second, the assumption that the state will act as 
agent for united monopolists cannot be empirically supported. This theory or state-
monopolistic capitalism overestimates the importance of personal contacts and direct 
impact on standardisation of actions. Studies that investigate recruitment, 
composition and interaction amongst power elites cannot explain the functional 
relationships between the economic and administrative systems (Habermas, 1973c, 
p.51). 
Habermas with this argument provides reasons to reject each of the abovementioned 
theories, but rather joins Claus Offe (1972, 1974), who believes that late capitalist 
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societies face two difficulties which result from the state’s interventions into the 
growing functional gaps in the market. As such the state can be understood as a 
system that uses legitimate power. While its output is the sovereignly executed 
administrative decision, its input consists of possibly least specific mass loyalty. 
Both can suffer crises. First, there can be output crises in the form of a rationality 
crisis, which occurs when the administrative system cannot fulfil the steering 
imperatives it took over from the economy. A disorganisation of areas of life is the 
result. Second, input crises take the form of legitimation crisis. This occurs when the 
legitimation system fails to procure the necessary level of mass loyalty. This can be 
exemplified on the difficulties public finances all late-capitalist countries did and 
some still face (Habermas, 1973c, p.51). 
The state budget is confronted by overhead costs associated with socialised 
production processes. As such, the state has to cover the costs of international 
competition and the costs for unproductive consumer goods such as armaments and 
space travel. It also bears the costs arising from direct production-related 
infrastructure investments (scientific, technological advancements, vocational 
training, transportation and communication); indirect production-related social 
consumption (education, social security, health, housing and transportation); social 
security provided to the unemployed; and finally, externalities caused by private 
economy and production processes. Ultimately, those costs have to be recovered 
through taxes. The government/state has two simultaneous tasks: it has to collect 
sufficient taxes from income and profits and spend them most ‘rationally’ 
(efficiently) in order to prevent crisis-like disturbances of growth; additionally, the 
selective taxation of some groups, the recognisable prioritisation within its utilisation 
and the administrative performance have to be set up so that the need for legitimation 
is satisfied. To fail in the former task results in a deficit of rationality/administrative 
efficiency; to fail in the latter causes a deficit in legitimation (Habermas, 1973c, 
p.52).  
4.2.4.2 Rationality Crisis 
The rationality crisis cannot just be analysed in economic terms. The state can be 
comprehended as system that is exposed to several demands such as policy and 
administrative decisions and actions. In this context a rationality crisis can occur 
when “the administrative system does not succeed in reconciling and fulfilling the 
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imperatives received from the economic system” (Habermas, 1975, p.46). In this 
sense it is imperative to achieve steady economic growth and accumulation. 
According to Habermas, the rationality crisis is a result of the anarchistic, unplanned 
nature of commodity producing, which has been transferred onto the administrative 
system. This is due to the state’s position within the accumulation process of capital. 
On the one hand the state is expected to add as a collective capitalist acting in order 
to save the accumulation process of capital as a whole. On the other hand, as long as 
there is no restriction on investment, an individual capitalist cannot carry through of 
form as collective will. Thus, the individual interests of capital exert pressure on 
policymaking with none of those interests corresponding with the general interest of 
the whole. This leads to inconsistent policymaking and a fall into rationality deficit 
(Habermas, 1973a, p.68).  
Habermas mentions three reasons why the rationality crisis is inevitable. First, the 
contradiction of the administrative system are exposed as policy failure, yet do not 
cross thresholds of tolerance. There are not such clear criteria as exist in the 
economic realm (e.g., bankruptcy or unemployment), thus is it is not possible to 
predict the state’s ability or inability to adjust to a contradicting environment. 
Second, the state has the opportunity to make policy choices visible to competing 
clients thereby creating a possible opportunity to bargain and compromise. Finally, 
the state is able to formulate and set its objectives consciously and thereby try to 
avoid unintended consequences. The anarchy of the market cannot be directly 
transferred into the administrative system and therefore it might be possible to avoid 
a rationality crisis (Habermas, 1973a, p.68; also see Held, 1980, p.290f.).  
The state not only has the task of keeping an eye on economic issues but it also has 
to maintain mass loyalty in order for the system to function; failure would lead to a 
legitimation crisis. 
4.2.4.3 Legitimation Crisis 
Legitimation problems have their origin in the fact that administrative planning 
requires legitimate power. There is an increasing need for legitimation owing to the 
growing number of tasks the state in late capitalism has to take over and the 
administration expanding into social areas. Liberal-capitalism has constituted itself 
as bourgeois democracy. As such, the growing need for legitimation has to be 
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secured by political democratic means on the basis of universal suffrage. These 
formally democratic means are costly. The state faces the dilemma of, on the one 
hand, having the role of ‘supreme capitalist’ to cater for the conflicting interests for 
various capital factions, and, on the other hand, it has to pay even more attention so 
that the generalisable interests of the population are served in order to ensure a 
sufficient amount of mass loyalty to prevent a conflict-ridden withdrawal of 
legitimation. The state has to sense and mediate between three interests 
(supreme/state capitalism, individual capitalism and generalisable interests) and their 
conflicting and/or competing demands. The crisis theorem has to explain not only 
why the state faces such difficulties, but also why some problems cannot be solved. 
There is an obvious objection: the state can bypass legitimation problems to the 
extent that it can detach the administrative system from legitimating will formation. 
This can be achieved by separating those expressive symbols that trigger universal 
willingness to follow from an administration’s instrumental functions. Such 
strategies are: personification of objective issues; the symbolic use of (political) 
inquiry groups/procedures, expert opinions, legal incantation and others; and the 
advertising techniques borrowed from oligopolistic competition which support and 
exploit the existing structure’s prejudices. By drawing on emotional appeals, and 
rising unconscious motives, occupying some contents positively, and devaluing 
others. The legitimation ensures that constructed publicity functions to structure 
public attention by means of areas or themes and therefore to downplay the issues, 
uncomfortable themes and arguments below the threshold of attention. In the words 
of Niklas Luhmann “the policy system fulfils the task of ideology planning” 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.53). 
There is a narrowly defined scope since the cultural system peculiarly resists the 
control of the administrative system. There is no creation of ‘Sinn’ through the 
administrative system but rather ideological erosion of culture values. As soon at the 
mode of the state’s procurement of legitimation is revealed, the acquisition of 
legitimation is self-destructive. The limits to the system of attempts to make up 
legitimation deficits by means of targeted manipulation consist of the structural 




To construct a crisis argument from these considerations they have to be conflated 
with the fact that the expansion of state activities has the side effect of an over-
proportional increase in demand for legitimation. This over-proportional increase in 
the need for legitimation is likely because cultural matters of course which were 
external conditions of the political systems are now part of the planning area of 
administration. Traditions that were previously not subject to public programming 
and were definitely not subject to practical discourse are thematised. Educational 
planning and particularly the planning of the curriculum is one example of the direct 
administrative treatment/procession of culturally embedded traditions. While there 
was a canon naturally developed that school administration just had to codify, 
curriculum planning works on the premise that traditional models can be altered and 
different. Therefore, administrative planning causes a universal urge for justification 
of a sphere which was previously self-legitimising (Habermas, 1973c, p.54). 
There are further examples of direct disturbances of cultural matters of course drawn 
from regional and urban planning (private ownership of land), planning of the health 
system (‘classless hospital’), and family policies and marriage laws (these shake off 
sexual taboos and enforce emancipatory behaviour). A consciousness about 
contingencies is not only created for (content of) traditions but also for the technique 
of historical traditions, that is socialisation. The formal education of children starts at 
preschool age and competes with family education. These pedagogic tasks (which 
schools perform under the umbrella of family law) exemplify the problematisation of 
education routines as do psychological and pedagogical scholarly publications 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.54-55).  
In all those areas, the effects of disquieting and publicising are unintentionally 
caused by administrative planning. These effects also “weaken the justification 
potential of traditions that have been forced out of their natural condition” 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.55). Once their taken-for-granted status is diminished, 
stabilisation of demand for validity can take place only through discourse. The 
forcible shift of cultural matters of course politicises areas of life that until then were 
part of the private sphere. This threatens bourgeois privatism, which was informally 
secured by public structures. Signs of such development can be seen in secondary 
and primary schools, in print media, the church, theatres and other institutions 
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striving for participation and seeking alternative models to replace existing ones 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.55). 
The above arguments support the thesis that late capitalist societies are facing severe 
issues of legitimation. It is questionable if those arguments are sufficient to explain 
the problems to be unsolvable to the system and if they can predict legitimation 
crises. Even if the state can succeed in increasing the productivity of labour and 
distribute the gains in productivity that macroeconomic growth to ensure crisis free 
(yet not disturbance-free) macro-economic growth, this growth would follow 
“priorities independent of the generalisable interests of the population” (Habermas, 
1973c, p.55). The priority models that Galbraith analysed under the notion ‘private 
wealth vs. public poverty’ are a result of a class structure that is still kept latent. This 
class structure is ultimately the cause of legitimation deficit and legitimation crisis 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.55). 
The state cannot take over the cultural system, but rather there is an expansion of the 
state’s planning, which problematises areas of culture that are taken for granted. 
‘Sinn’ is an increasingly rare resource. Therefore, there is an increase in expectations 
that are user-value- (concrete and identifiable need) oriented and which can be 
checked by their success. There is a positive linear relation between increasing levels 
of aspirations to the need for legitimation. This implies that the scarce resource of 
‘value’ absorbed by the tax office has to replace the scarce resource of ‘Sinn’. The 
lack of legitimation has to be compensated for in the form of system-conforming 
compensation such as money, time and social security (Habermas, 1973c, p.55-56):  
A crisis of legitimation arises as soon as the demands for these rewards mount 
more rapidly than the available mass of values, or if expectations come about 
that are different and cannot be satisfied by those categories of rewards 
conforming with the present system. (Habermas, 1973c, p.56). 
It could be possible that the level of demands can be kept within operable boundaries 
as long as the welfare-state’s program in conjunction with widespread technocratic 
collective consciousness (which sees responsibility for bottlenecks in the 
uninfluenceable system-constraints) maintains sufficiently a civil privatism, as a 
result the urgent deficits of legitimation do not worsen into crises. The formally 
democratic version of legitimation could result in a non-recoverable cost when 
competing parties force each other to programmatically outbid and thereby 
continuously raise the expectations of the population. Even if it were possible to find 
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empirical evidence to support this argument, the question remains as to why late 
capitalist societies retain formal democracy. With a focus on the administrative 
system, late capitalist societies could have replaced democracy first, with variants of 
conservative-authoritarian welfare states, which reduce people’s political 
participation to a risk-free level; and second, with variants of the fascist authoritarian 
state, which keeps the population in line with a rather permanently high level of 
mobilisation. Apparently, both variants are not as compatible with developed 
capitalism in the long run as a party state based on mass democracy, because 
authoritarian systems cannot satisfy demands created by the sociocultural system 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.56-57). 
This argument results into the thesis of legitimation deficits becoming a crisis of 
legitimation when a rigid/inflexible sociocultural system cannot be randomly 
functionalised for the needs of the administrative system. The legitimation crisis 
must therefore be grounded in a motivation crisis. That is, a discrepancy between the 
state’s and the occupational system’s claimed need for motives and the supply of 
motivation offered by the sociocultural system (Habermas, 1973c, p.57). 
4.2.4.4 Motivation Crisis 
The late capitalist society’s sociocultural system’s most important contribution 
towards motivation entails characteristics of civil and family vocational privatism. 
Civil privatism refers to phenomena where there is a strong interest in steering and 
social service abilities of the administrative system with very little participation in 
the will-formation process; there is a low input orientation versus a high output 
orientation. Civil privatism has its equivalent in a public sphere that is depoliticised. 
Family-vocational privatism is complementary to civic privatism: it is determined by 
family orientation including explicit consumption and leisure interests as well as 
status competition based on respective carrier orientations. This privatism is also in 
line with those structures that reinforce a competitive performance-based guidance of 
educational and occupational education systems (Habermas, 1973c, p.57). 
Both motivational clusters are necessary to maintain the political and economic 
system. Yet those elements most relevant to bourgeois ideologies related to 
privatistic orientations are threatened by social change on this basis. The following 
examples may provide clarification. 
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4.2.4.4.1 Performance Ideology 
From the beginning of modern natural law to contemporary election campaigns the 
bourgeois perception remains of social compensations to be distributed according to 
the individual’s performance and achievements. The allocation of gratifications is 
meant to correlate with the individual’s performance. One prerequisite is the equal 
opportunity to join a job competition, which allows all external influences to be kept 
neutral. The market was an allocation mechanism of this kind. Since it became 
apparent to the broader community that the current form of exchange exerts social 
violence, the market lost credibility as a mechanism to distribute rewards of system-
conforming life chances based on individuals’ performance. In more recent versions 
of performance-driven ideology, professional achievements mediated by formal 
schooling replace market success. However, there are certain conditions this version 
needs to fulfil to maintain credibility. There has to be equal opportunities for higher 
education; evolution standards for school performance which is non-discriminatory; 
simultaneous development of occupational and educational systems; and labour 
processes that have a structure which allows evaluation on the basis of each 
individual performance (Habermas, 1973c, p.57-58). 
Justice within the schooling system in terms of access and standards of evaluation 
has to some degree increased in all advanced capitalist societies since World War II. 
There is a countertrend in two other dimensions: it seems that the expansion of the 
education system becomes independent of the alterations on the labour market 
(employment system) and therefore the relation between formal education and 
occupational success weakens. It is simultaneously increasingly difficult to evaluate 
individual performance for production structures and work dynamics. Therefore, the 
extra-functional elements of occupational roles to confer occupational status gain 
importance (Habermas, 1973c, p.58). 
Furthermore, fragmented and monotonous work processes increasingly replace 
traditional processes in the sector in which the vocational role helped to develop 
personal identity. An intrinsic drive for performance finds less support from 
structures of labour processes in market-dependent labour areas. As such, there is a 
spread of instrumentalist attitudes towards work in traditional (white collar worker, 
professionals) bourgeois professions. There are certain conditions that make 
externally imposed performance motives through a wage income sufficient and 
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stimulating. First, effective competitive pressure has to be exercised by the ‘reserve 
army’ on the labour market and second, there is a sufficiently large income 
differentiation between the low-income occupations and the occupational inactive 
population. Both conditions are not necessarily met in today’s late capitalist 
societies. The division of the labour markets into organised and competitive sectors 
interferes even in countries with chronic unemployment with the natural mechanism 
of competition. The increase in the poverty line, which is acknowledged by the 
welfare state, assimilates the living standards of the lower-income groups and the 
groups set temporarily from the labour process within the subproletarian strata 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.59). 
4.2.4.4.2 Possessive Individualism  
The bourgeois society identifies itself as instrumental group that accumulates societal 
wealth purely by means of private wealth accumulation. For example, the belief that 
economic growth and general welfare is guaranteed “through the competition among 
strategically acting private persons” (Habermas, 1973c, p.59). Therefore, collective 
aims can only be achieved under circumstances that allow individuals to act upon 
their maxim of utility orientation. This preference system has the following 
preconditions:  
that the private economic subjects can with subjective unambiguity recognize 
and calculate needs that remain constant over given time periods; that this need 
can be satisfied by individually demandable goods (normally, by way of 
monetary decision that conform to the system). (Habermas, 1973c, p.59) 
Both conditions cannot be taken for granted in developed capitalist societies. These 
societies achieved a level of societal richness that goes beyond the prevention of 
fundamental hazards to life and the fulfilment of basic needs. That is one reason why 
there is vagueness in individualistic systems of preference (Habermas, 1973c, p.59).  
The steady interpretation and reinterpretation of needs becomes a matter of collective 
will formation, with the consequence of having “either free or quasi-political 
communication among consumers as citizens or massive manipulation” (Habermas, 
1973c, p.60), for example, through strong, indirect steering. “The greater the degree 
of freedom for the preference system of the demanders, the more urgent the problem 
of sales policies for the suppliers” (Habermas, 1973c, p.60). This is at least the case 
when attempts are made to sustain the illusion that decisions for consumers can be 
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made privately and autonomously. The maintenance of the facade of possessive 
individualism takes place through the opportunistic adjustment of consumers to the 
market strategies as an ironic form of consumer autonomy. Moreover, there is an 
increasing quota of collective commodities among consumer goods resulting from 
growth in socialised production. In complex societies life conditions in urban areas 
are increasingly dependent on infrastructure such as transportation, health, leisure, 
and education, among other factors, which are not subject to “the forms of 
differential demand and private appropriation” (Habermas, 1973c, p.60). 
4.2.4.4.3 Exchange-value Orientation 
There are tendencies that weaken the socialisation effects of the market. First, the 
growth of that part of the population that does not support itself through income from 
employment, for example, students, the ill, criminals, soldiers and recipients of social 
welfare. Second, the expansion of those areas of working activities such as civil 
services or blue-collar job education in which abstract work is replaced by concrete 
work: 
In addition, the relevance that leisure acquires with fewer working hours (and 
higher real income), compared with the relevance of issues within the 
occupational sphere of life, does not in the long run privilege those needs that 
can be satisfied monetarily. (Habermas, 1973c, p.60) 
Normative structures responsible for the reproduction of civic and family-
occupational privatism emerge as a result of the erosion of bourgeois traditions.  
The faith in science, postauratic arts and universalistic moral values are those areas 
around which today’s dominant components of cultural heritage crystallise 
themselves. In each of those areas irreversible developments have taken place. These 
developments have caused functional inequalities of the economic and political 
systems to be blocked by cultural barriers which  
can only be broken down at psychological cost of regressions;31 an example is 
the extraordinary motivational damage. One example was the wasteful attempt 
by German Fascism to organize a collective regression of consciousness below 
the thresholds of fundamental scientistic convictions, modern art, and below the 
conceptions of universalistic legal and moral standards. (Habermas, 1973c, p.61) 
                                                 
31 The term ‘regression’ refers to a psychological phenomenon introduced by Sigmund Freud. It is a 
defence mechanism by which the ego revises to an earlier stage of development for temporary or 
long-term reversion rather than to handle the unacceptable impulse. Behavioural patterns include 
tearfulness, escape into illness and an overly functioning appetite (Ruch, 1974). 
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4.2.4.4.4 Scientism  
In developed societies, the scientific system enjoys authority with its political 
consequences being ambivalent. On the one hand, the traditionalistic attributes 
cannot stand the demand for discursive justification, which the rise of modern 
science has established.  
On the other hand, short-lived popular synthesis of scientific data (which have 
replaced global interpretations) guarantee the authority of science in the abstract. 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.61) 
The populistic critique on arbitrary structures of prejudice as well as the new esoteric 
of expert judgements and specialised expertise can be covered by the authority 
known as ‘science’. On the one hand, a positivist common-sense of the depoliticised 
public can be furthered by a self-affirmation of science. On the other hand, scientism 
sets benchmarks that can be used to criticise itself and to reveal its own residual 
dogmatism. The necessity of an institutionalised civic privatism is maintained by 
theories of technocracy and of democratic elitism but their presumption of being 
theories does not make them invulnerable against criticism (Habermas, 1973c, p.61). 
4.2.4.4.5 Postauratic Art 
The aftereffects of modern art are less ambivalent. The relationship between the 
autonomy of bourgeois art towards external purposes for which art could be used was 
radicalized by the modern age: 
For the first time, bourgeois society itself produced a counterculture against the 
bourgeois life style of possessive individualism, performance, and practicality. 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.61-62) 
The Bohème32 embodies a critical claim that arose unpolemically in the aura of the 
bourgeois artwork.  
The alter ego of the businessman, the ‘human being’, whom the bourgeois used 
to encounter in the lonesome contemplation of the artwork, soon split away from 
him. In the shape of the artistic avant-garde, it confronted him as a hostile, at 
best seductive force. (Habermas, 1973c, p.62) 
The bourgeoisie could find their own ideals and the fictions of promises for luck and 
happiness that were suspended in everyday life reflected in traditional art. The 
bourgeoisie had to recognise the negation of societal practice in radicalised artworks 
                                                 
32 This term refers to a milieu in which (mainly) artists do not feel they are obliged to follow 
bourgeois conventions.  
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as a complement. Modern art become the area in which bourgeois art was 
transformed into a counterculture. Surrealism as part of modern art destroys the 
illusion of beauty. New techniques of mass reproduction and reception accelerated 
the levelling of different reality degrees of art and life. Modern art dispensed with the 
aura of classical bourgeois art; its production processes are visible and it shows itself 
as a newly made product. Yet modern art only enters into range of utility values 
when it abandons its autonomous status. This process is ambivalent. It might either 
result in art degenerating to a propagandistic mass art or a commercialised mass 
culture, or art being transformed into a subversive counterculture (Habermas, 1973c, 
p.62).  
4.2.4.4.6 Universalist Morality 
The blockage function of bourgeois ideologies created for the development of 
political and economic systems becomes even more apparent in the moral system 
compared to the self-disintegration of modern art or the authority of science. As soon 
as traditional societies enter into a process of modernisation, steering problems result 
from increasing complexity, which requires an accelerating change of social norms.  
The tempo inherent in natural cultural tradition has to be heightened. This leads 
to bourgeois formal law which permits releasing the norm contents from the 
dogmatic structure of mere tradition and defining them in terms of intention. 
(Habermas, 1973c, p.62) 
Legal norms are decoupled from the corpus of privatised moral norms on the one 
hand and are in need of their creation and justification principles on the other hand. 
The area of pacified state power counts the abstract law. No barriers in the 
continuing natural condition between states are encountered by the morality of 
bourgeois private persons, which is raised to a level of universal principle.  
Since principled morality is sanctioned only by the purely inward authority of 
the conscience, its claim to universality conflicts with public morality, which is 
still bound to the concrete state-subject. (Habermas, 1973c, p.63) 
This reflects the struggle between the cosmopolitanism of the human being and the 
loyalty of the citizen. This conflict can only be resolved looking at the logic behind 
the development of overall societal systems of norms. The resolution is achievable 
under the following conditions: the dichotomy between inner and outer morality has 
to vanish; the contrast between legally regulated and moral areas has to be 
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relativised; and all norms gain validity in the discursive process of will formation for 
those people potentially impacted (Habermas, 1973c, p.63). 
During the time of competitive capitalism there were strong universal value systems. 
The time exchange of equivalents offered a basic ideology to be effective in the 
bourgeois class while at the same time the system of exchange had to be regulated 
universalistically. In organised capitalism, the basis of this model of legitimation 
breaks down, while at the same time some new and an increasing number of 
legitimation demands arise. There is neither the possibility that the system of science 
can fall intentionally behind an already attained stage of cumulative knowledge, nor 
can the moral system simply make us forget the stage of moral consciousness that 
was collectively attained through practical discourse. 
4.2.5 Further Developments 
Legitimation Crisis was written in the late 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s in 
a context that was very different to today. In the (sociological) literature authors have 
criticised Habermas’ work, suggesting advances to fit the current (global) capitalist 
context and questioning its relevance for the most recent global financial crisis. The 
following paragraphs will summarise some of the positive and negative critiques as 
an update to Habermas’ work. 
Held (1980) raises several criticisms of Habermas’ work on legitimation crisis. For 
him it is questionable if system crisis (within the economic and rationality realm) can 
be contained by and treated by governments on the expense of legitimation. Also he 
claims that Habermas’ 
[d]iscussion of past and present economic tendencies pays little, if any, 
systematic attention to developments of international capitalism. (Held, 1980, 
p.376) 
Yet after the global financial crisis, crises theories of capitalism regained popularity 
since crisis theories developed over the last 20 years cannot provide explanations for 
this event (e.g. Borchert and Lessenich, 2005). An analysis of late capitalism based 
on the crisis theories from 1960 and 1970 requires an update of those theories to 
cater for increasing privatisation and less government impact as well as the reduced 
dependency of political systems on legitimation (Nachtwey, 2010). The following 
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subsections will outline some of the further developments that add to Habermas’ 
societal analysis. 
4.2.5.1 Crisis Definition  
The term ‘crisis’ has changed since 1970 and it is now understood as a phenomenon 
that does not necessarily lead to an endangerment of the social system (Nullmeier, 
2009). The end of state socialism marked the end of an alternative to capitalism. 
Societal analysis targets variations of capitalism but no other forms of society (Offe, 
2006). Klenk and Nullmeier (2010) claim that even if the global financial crisis led to 
the end of current capitalism, a system similar to capitalism would arise. Therefore, a 
shift to an absolutely new society system is for them not feasible.  
Apart from the system and social integration considered by crisis theorists the 
ecological integration of modern society became popular. This is the relationship of 
the society with its physical, chemical and biological environment (Reese-Schäfer, 
1996). Even though Juergen Habermas (1973a, p.61 ff.) emphasised the ecological 
crisis, he took for granted that an ‘environmental crisis’ would not lead to a vital 
question of society’s existence. For Schimank (2000), the ecological crisis is an 
example of the interplay between objectively given problems, professional 
interpretation of and opinion on those problems and societal actors interested in the 
environmental problems (e.g., energy supply, food production, climate change, waste 
deposal or treatment or biodiversity). All these environmental problems need expert 
knowledge to create visibility (e.g. Beck, 1996; 2008c). However, only if the expert 
knowledge is spread through the mass media and enters into the partially system-
specific communication channels, ecological integration becomes a societal issue. 
Schimank (2000) follows Latour’s (1995) opinion of societal self-delusion, which 
lies in the ontological separation of nature on the one hand and the societal world on 
the other. A socialisation of the environment that reduces the environment to just one 
aspect of modern societies that has to compete for attendance among other aspects 
takes place.  
Another new aspect of crisis is specific to financial capitalism. Since the 1970s, the 
financial markets have been the driving force behind globalisation and since then 
financial crises are more common than they were before. These crises in the financial 
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sectors trigger crises within the ‘real’ economy simultaneously as a result of an over-
accumulation of capital (Altvater, 2009).  
4.2.5.2 Late Capitalism  
Nachtwey (2010) sets Habermas’ (1973a; 1975) analysis of then late capitalism into 
its context during the late 1960s. That is, social-state elites achieved a consensus 
after World War II furthering the establishment of Keynesian macro-economic 
policy due to the then favourable economic conditions. Also, the successful 
management of the 1966 recession furthered the belief in Keynesian-informed 
politics, one reason why Habermas saw legitimation deficits as a source of crisis, not 
the economy itself.  
In the late 1970s there was a paradigm shift of the social-state elites. This shift 
supported the free-market ideology and redefined the relation between capitalism and 
democracy. The market mechanism expanded and wealth redistribution and ‘class 
power’ were newly negotiated. Accordingly, markets should not have been hampered 
by organisational or institutional boundaries. This ideology triggered the reduction of 
labour unions’ and civil society’s power through policy measures while at the same 
time providing extended freedom to globally acting companies (Nachtwey, 2010; 
also see Harvey, 2007). 
During the period of financial capitalism, a new model of capital accumulation was 
targeted: all elements alien to the system (social welfare and other government 
provided services) were subjected to an examination of their usefulness to the capital 
utilisation. The boundaries of late capitalism expanded towards a freer market and 
some limiting factors were transformed to be used by capitalists. Rationality inherent 
in financial capitalism based on shareholder value and short-term profit-
maximisation was expanded to almost all economic sectors (also see Dörre, 2009; 
Windolf, 2005). Regulations and market-restricting institutions were undermined and 
large parts of infrastructure, social security and publicly owned corporations were 
privatised. Prior de-commodification society’s parts experienced a re-
commodification, which as a result introduced markets for social services and 
diminished the volume of publicly held property. This type of policy shifts the 
welfare state towards a ‘market-dominated society’ (Nachtwey, 2010). Streeck 
(2010) refers to the financial sector to exemplify that nation states are vulnerable in 
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their attempts to impose height regulations on particular industries, in this case the 
financial sector. 
Even though current capitalism as characterised by Habermas and Offe provides 
compensation methods for protection against market risks and their undesirable side-
effects, it follows a different dynamic. (Financial) capitalism needs the state to treat 
the contradictions of capitalistic socialisation without altering the underpinning 
(capitalist) logic. But current capitalism displays the following significant patterns: it 
does not restrict but frees; there is no globally macro-economic steering but short-
term profit investments are provided; there is no social integration based on a build-
up of societal property and civic rights but a reduction in state ownership and the 
provision of further investment opportunities (Nachtwey, 2010). Additionally, 
political parties lost their foothold within electorates and became  
agencies that govern […] rather than represent; they bring order rather than give 
voice […] What remains is a governing class. (Mair, 2006, p.48)  
Nachtwey (2010) identifies the organisation Attac as a potential collective actor that 
protests against financial capitalism. He concludes that the financial crisis might go 
beyond legitimation problems within late capitalism to legitimation problems of 
capitalism. Yet neoliberalism is a worldview that legitimises the unjust distribution 
of power and wealth (Streeck, 2010).  
4.2.5.3 Internationalisation / Globalisation  
Higher social injustice is accepted by neoliberals, who are in opposition to those 
advocating ‘social democracy’ with equal social rights. Both camps agree that 
national governments are in a situation that imposes more and more economic 
imperatives on them and which puts important social and political imperatives at 
risk. In order to be internationally competitive, nation states can only restrict their 
own capacity to act, resulting in social erosion and challenging democratic stability 
(Habermas, 1998, p.236f).  
Habermas (1998) notes several characteristics of globalisation. First, international 
trade expands and an increasing interaction in numerous international markets takes 
place. This transforms national economies so that they depend on and are more 
interconnected with the world economy. Also, trade itself has transformed over time, 
with services being exchangeable through new communication technologies. Second, 
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the interconnectedness amongst financial markets encourages short-term investments 
and increases capital flows. It is therefore easier to avoid national fiscal authorities’ 
supervision. Also, governments are increasingly under pressure from financial 
markets that evaluate national investment conditions. Third, multinational 
corporations become more flexible in their choice of location and even less 
concerned about local matters and concerns. Fourth, OECD countries face increasing 
competition in the export of industrial goods from ‘new industrialized countries’ 
(Habermas, 1998, p.237; also see Habermas, 2001; Wegner, 2003).  
With the dependence of governments on globalised markets, previous protectionism 
and demand-side economic policies are no longer viable. Globalisation means the 
end of the welfare state compromise that kept the social disparities sufficiently 
limited (Habermas, 1998). Habermas (2009) claims that it has become impossible to 
break out of the capitalist system but ‘the only option is to civilize and tame the 
capitalist dynamic from within’ (Habermas, 2009, p.228). Nation states cannot see 
themselves as isolated anymore but as members of the international community (e.g., 
EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR), which might even be in their own interest 
(Habermas, 1998; Offe, 2003). This shifts our understanding of politics. 
Traditionally, governments are understood to be representatives of the electorate to 
make independent and sovereign decisions. Yet on an international stage, the 
substance and composition of what we call ‘politics’ is continuously changing 
(Habermas, 2009, p.231). Genschel (2003), in a similar vein, considers the global 
market-imposed restrictions on nation states as a source of crisis not national 
problems. He compares the arguments of three globalisation camps: the globalisation 
theoretic, globalisation scepticism and the revisionist argument. In particular he 
compares the interrelation between globalisation and macroeconomics politics, and 
globalisation and social political redistribution. From his analysis he found the 
following consensus among those three camps. First, globalisation is neither the 
ultimate nor an irrelevant determinant for the development of nation states. Second, 
globalisation might cause some problems but help to solve others. Finally, it is 
widely acknowledged that the magnitude and direction of these effects varies across 
countries, time and political arenas. It is a matter of globalisation’s impact on nation 
states, the problems that arise or could be resolved and the magnitude of those effect 
(Genschel, 2003).  
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Beckert (2009) claims that crisis theories of capitalism have to put greater emphasis 
on the conditions and intra-systemic functionalities of capitalistic macro-economic 
systems. In addition, over the last 30 years, the state has experienced diminishing 
power to intervene in or steer the market in order to follow its political aims. This 
process was exacerbated by the politics of privatisation whose aim was to 
depoliticise the economy. Yet this policy itself becomes a target of legitimation and 
rationality issues mentioned by crisis theorists, such as Habermas. This shift in 
nation states’ involvement in markets came along with an ideology shift from 
Keynesian interventionism to neoliberal absenteeism; a belief that markets have to be 
set free from state-introduced boundaries in order to achieve growth in production 
and raise living standards (Beckert, 2009).  
Genschel and Zangl (2008), in their analysis of power distribution among private 
actors, nation state governments and international institutions (UN or EU) conclude 
that even if private actors and international institutions gain on decision-making 
competency they cannot replace the national government as a source of political 
power. Yet the governance structures become more complex and states might lose 
some governance to these other actors. National interests are not freely determinable 
since they are intertwined with international politics and global economic structures 
(Mayntz, 2010). The state transforms from a political power monopolist to a power 
manager. Even though states delegate some decisions to other actors, in the case of a 
failure states are the ultimate subject for criticism and blame. One example could the 
availability of transport infrastructure (e.g., Qantas) and financial incentives that 
have to be provided in order to maintain ‘unprofitable’ businesses (Genschel and 
Zangl, 2008; Zürn, 2008).  
4.3 BECK ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
The most urgent ‘crisis’ that has received the most public attention recently is the 
ecological crisis in general and climate change in particular. In his analysis, 
Habermas considered the ecological crisis and the build-up of GHGs in the 
atmosphere as external to the system. As recent reports by the IPCC (2013) suggest, 
the climate catastrophe has, to some extent, an impact on every country in varying 
magnitudes. German philosopher Ulrich Beck elaborates on the ecological crisis and 
global warming/climate change. The arguments about the crisis, the role of the state, 
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and motivation and legitimation will be considered in more detail as the most 
relevant aspects for this thesis.  
4.3.1 Crisis 
According to Weber (1975, p.181), capitalism undermines its own foundations by its 
need for natural resources, “until the last ton of fossil fuel has burnt to ashes”. In a 
similar vein Leahy (2008, p.481) claims: “[c]apitalism as a growth economy is 
impossible to reconcile with a finite environment”. The majority (97%) of climate 
scientists have reached consensus on anthropogenic global warming (John, et al., 
2013) with several impacts on climate resulting, including droughts, floods, 
hurricanes (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World 
Bank, 2013) and economic impacts (Stern, 2006). While possible solutions for a 
fossil fuel-free economy are available (Jacobson and Delucchi, 2013; Wright and 
Hearps, 2013). From a sociological perspective: 
The catastrophic character is only revealed within the field of reference of the 
society affected. The catastrophic potentials cannot be deduced from nature or 
from scientific analyses, but reflect the social vulnerability of certain countries 
and population groups to the consequences of climate change. (Beck, 2010b, 
p.171) 
The concept of social vulnerability, central to ‘world risk society’, refers to the 
capacity of individuals and communities to respond to the threats of climate change. 
While some groups or countries have the ability to protect themselves or absorb the 
consequences of natural disasters, “the non-privileged on the scale of social 
vulnerability” (p.175) have to face escalating violence as a result of the collapse of 
the social order (Beck, 2010b). However, even the wealthiest and most powerful 
inhabitants will find themselves impacted when planetary threat arises Thus, there is 
a hierarchical and democratic dimension to climate change.  
A further challenge inherent in climate change is the aspect of temporality. Beck 
(2010b) sees climate catastrophes as still unreal ‘future future’ and the anticipation of 
climate risk as real and ‘present future’, which can lead to transformation and  
[t]hat is why climate change by no means leads straight and inevitably to 
apocalypse – it also presents the opportunity of overcoming the nation-state 
narrowness of politics and developing a cosmopolitan realism in the national 
interest. (Beck, 2010b, p.176; see also Diamond, 2011)  
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Similarly, Guyer (2007) outlines that current public rhetoric emphasis either the short 
term (e.g., immediate actions) or “orientation to a very long-term horizon” (p.409) 
such as economic growth, while the medium term remains vacant. Applied to climate 
change this means that climate science  
provide[s] ‘requisite’ accuracy in anticipations over very long time horizons (100 
years), actual climate disasters manifest instead an acute presentism, attracting 
immediate global attention before being cast aside as the media gaze turns to the 
next disaster. (Beck, et al., 2013, p.10) 
For actions, plans or attempts at transformation as a response to climate change, to be 
efficient these mid-term projects connected to climate change require that the gap of 
missing ‘middlerange temporalities’ will be overcome (Beck, et al., 2013; also see 
Giddens, 2011). Climate change goes beyond short-term natural disasters such as  
hurricanes, droughts, floods, [and social disasters such as] refugee movements, 
impending wars or unprecedented market failure … [i]t has suddenly become 
much more than that: for the first time in history, every population, culture, 
ethnic group, every religion and every region in the world is living in the 
common presence of a future that threatens one and all. (Beck, 2008a, p.79; also 
see Beck and van Loon, 2011) 
This calls for the inclusion of “those who have been excluded” (Beck, 2008a, p.79). 
The response to climate change is necessarily inclusive and global (‘cosmopolitan 
realpolitik’) while ‘national realpolitik’ remains important and dominant, yet it is still 
backward looking and increasingly ineffective. As such, the order established 
through capital and the state’s neoliberal coalition will be overturned by strategies of 
action in the face of global risk. And climate change results in political threats from 
social upheavals (Beck, 1996). 
Beck and van Loon (2011) hold the view that climate change as well as other ‘global 
issues’ can be dealt with by having “both aggregated and collective changes in 
behaviour” (p.112) forming new ways of cooperation and solidarity that go beyond 
(insufficient) actions within national boundaries (Beck, et al., 2013). However, there 
is a spatial and temporal inequality inherent in climate change. Those who contribute 
most to climate change are not those suffering most from its consequences – they are 
future generations and people from poorer societies (e.g., Kiribati, Bangladesh and 
many African nations) (Sem, 2009; Friedman, 2009). The lack of holding actors 
accountable who create adverse effects for others caused “an [worldwide] organized 
irresponsibility” (Beck, 2010b, p.173). Furthermore, there is an unequal, temporal 
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and spatial distribution internationally and nationally of costs and benefits that come 
with an active climate change policy. Current generations have to cover the highest 
costs of climate change policy that aim to reduce GHGs while future generations 
would benefit. Also Beck (1996) demands for the wealthiest nations to demonstrate 
the greatest willingness for action even though their vulnerability towards global 
warming is not the highest (also see Beck, et al., 2013).  
Beck (2010b) mentions the ambivalence of climate change and its responses. On the 
one hand, Beck and van Loon (2011) exemplify the power of climate change as a 
mobiliser and the support of the nations’ people for climate change actions in 
Australia federal election 2007 is an important example. It might be even possible 
that “the politicization of climate change” (p.113) helps to overcome nation states’ 
narrow-minded frame into which the prevailing environmental politics fits (Beck and 
van Loon, 2011). This, which Beck (2006) calls ‘cosmopolitan realism’, can serve 
the national interest to renew nation states’ “sovereignty in the era of global warming 
and global interconnectedness” (Beck and van Loon, 2011, p.114). This might lead 
to “a ‘Hegelian’ scenario [which] promises the emergence of a collaborative 
cosmopolitan socio-cultural force” (Beck, et al., 2013, p.3). 
On the other hand, climate change risk is unevenly distributed and “separate[s] ‘rich 
producers’ (‘North’) from “poor receivers” (‘South’), suggest[ing] a sinister 
‘Schmittian’ alternative of intensified local-national-global conflicts and a permanent 
securitized ‘state of (climate) emergency’” (Beck, et al., 2013, p.3). Keeping and 
constructing climate change as a latent side effect is rooted in the fact that managing 
transnational environmental problems requires actions that “collide with the national 
perspective and the national logic of political institutions” (Beck, 2010b, p.173). To 
overcome this obstacle and to achieve consciousness and practice directed at 
mitigating climate change, Beck et al. (2013) suggest social science needs to 
transform in two ways. First, the focus has to change from “methodological 
nationalism to methodological cosmopolitanism and, second, an empirical 
reorientation towards cosmopolitization as the social force of emerging cosmopolitan 
realities”33 (Beck, et al., 2013, p.2).  
                                                 
33 According to Beck (2008c), the theory of reflexive modernisation is split into theorems of 
‘cosmopolitisation’ ‘individualisation’ and ‘risk society’ (inhibiting the following characteristics: 
delocalisation, uncalculability and non-compensatability). 
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Diamond (2011) illustrates the term ‘crisis’ with the collapse of societies and how 
they choose to fail or succeed. He defines ‘collapse’ as “a drastic decrease in human 
population size and/or political/economic/social complexity, over a considerable 
area, for an extended time” (p.3). Yet it is arbitrary to decide when the decline of a 
society becomes a collapse. From his analysis of past societies Diamond identifies 
five factors indicating a possible environmental collapse. The first four – 
environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbours and friendly trade 
partners – are more or less significant than the last factor – societies’ response to 
environmental problems – which, throughout the societies analysed is significant 
(Diamond, 2011, p.11).  
The response to environmental problems requires group decision-making, and 
Diamond (2011) identifies four categories in which it might fail. First, there is a 
failure to anticipate the problem before it occurs. Second, there is a lacking 
perception of the problem after is occurred. Third, there is a perception of the 
problems but failure to solve it. Fourth, attempts to solve the problem fail. Climate 
change, according to Diamond (2011), is a typical example of the failure to perceive 
a problem after it has occurred, that is, the slow trend of global warming with up-
and-down fluctuations not easily perceived as a change. Politicians with their short-
term focus (in the case of the US about 90 days) on problems as part of that state 
play a vital role.  
4.3.2 State 
The nation state and its “[f]rontiers act as watersheds of perception: they turn social 
inequalities into a political issue – internally – and simultaneously produce, stabilize 
and legitimate them – externally” (Beck, 2010b, p.167). There is an implicit 
assumption of equality between states in order to ensure existing inequalities are not 
revealed, which could perhaps have politically explosive consequences. The 
perception of common equality enables, for example, tremendous differences in 
wages for the same job across borders. Such a common frame of equality emerges 
for people within the same nation, or even within different national subsidiaries 
(Beck, 2010b). In the context of climate change/risk, social inequality arises from the 
principle “pollution follows the poor” (Beck and van Loon, 2011, p.122). As such, 
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those predicted to suffer the most from the consequences of climate change are those 
nations and people who have contributed least to the ecological crisis.  
In this vein Beck (2010b) and Beck and van Loon (2011) accuse social science and 
sociology of following methodological nationalism that cannot display the inequality 
that goes along with groups’ or people’s positions in this world based on territoriality 
and nationality. Under methodological nationalism two assumptions exist. First, 
there is a congruence of boundaries (of territories, politics, economies, societies and 
cultures) and second, a “congruence of actor perspective” with both assumptions 
reinforcing each other (Beck, 2010b, p.169). Based on three insights Beck (2010b) 
rejects the assumptions that boundaries of state, territorial, economic and social life 
are coterminous: first, forms of historical inequality are made up of more than just 
social classes; second, there are more historical frames for interpretation than just 
nation states; lastly “the end of the national class society does not mean the end of 
social inequality, on the contrary: inequality both in the national and the transnational 
sphere is exacerbated” (Beck, 2010b, p.169).  
Therefore sociology’s task it is to go beyond methodological nationalism and to 
consider inequality as more than just economic measures and calculations (GNP or 
‘per head income’) and place emphasis on “the fatal attraction of poverty, social 
vulnerability, corruption, humiliation, accumulation of dangers and denial of dignity 
– the factors determining attitude, conduct and group integration” (Beck and van 
Loon, 2011, p.123). Yet this is not to deny the remaining importance of ‘sovereign 
nation state’ as outline above, even though “we now have power free of politics and 
politics devoid of power” (Beck and van Loon, 2011, p.123); and the existing 
potential that climate change transforms and goes beyond prevailing boundaries and 
categories such as “nature–society, local–global, past–future, us–them” (Beck, et al., 
2013, p.3). Digital media and grassroots environmental movements might have their 
roles within the emergence of transnational communities. The latter have the 
potential to link local and global concerns and therefore might challenge 
“conventional nation-state power structures” (e.g., Apple being challenged for its 
contentious politics of pollution in China) (Beck, et al., 2013, p.17). 
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4.3.3 Motivation and Legitimation Aspects 
Beck (2010b) explains how national inequalities are legitimated by the performance 
principle and global inequalities through the nation state principle. First, what is 
politically relevant is determined through national boundaries. That is, inequalities 
on a national level are magnified while they are faded out among states. Global 
inequalities are hence legitimised by what Beck (2010b) calls ”institutionalized 
‘looking the other way’“ (p.167) which implies ”a double exclusion: it excludes the 
excluded” (p.167). Second, in the absence of an international regulatory body which 
has responsibility and oversees global inequalities there are ”approximately 200 
islands of nation-state inequalities” (Beck, 2010b, p.167). 
Since equality spreads globally Beck (2010b) claims that this will challenge the basis 
of global inequality based on ‘institutionalized look away’. As such, wealthy 
democracies that advocate human rights do not notice through this process that 
national borders set up to protect nations from migration lose their legitimacy. Beck 
(2010b) claims for the possibility  
that both the exacerbation and the defusing of the legitimation problem will exist 
conflictually side by side, or indeed, that the interpretative patterns of different 
regions will polarize accordingly. Be that as it may, there is no choice but to 
open people’s eyes to the possibility of barbarization. (Beck, 2010b, p.174) 
This situation might be exacerbated when a predicted 1 billion climate migrants seek 
new habitats over the next 50 years. Or when by the year 2080 climate change has 
caused a scarcity of water impacting on 1.1 to 3.2 billion people, hunger for 200 to 
600 million, and coastal folding for 2 to 7 million people a year (IPCC, 2007a; Vidal, 
2007). On the one hand, such new uncertainties can reduce trust in technologies, 
delimitate institutional authorities, corrode scientific rationality and “insinuate 
radical doubt about the future” (Beck and van Loon, 2011, p.116). On the other hand, 
it can provide new sources of legitimation and the possibility of actions empowering 
civic movements and states, while globalised capital faces disempowerment through 
destabilised markets, activated power of the consumer and the revealed consequences 
of investment decisions which contribute to climate risk. This scenario provides an 
alternative to national and global neoliberal politics (Beck and van Loon, 2011). The 




the political reflexivity of global risks also generates quasi-revolutionary 
opportunities for national and transnational actions, which may be exploited in 
very different ways. A new competition, or even contradiction, may emerge 
between mediatized global risks and democratic values and procedures; the new 
sources of political legitimation, in short, can turn out to be undemocratic or 
even anti-democratic. (Beck, et al., 2013, p.6) 
Thoughts on the ecological crisis supplement Habermas’ work on legitimation crisis. 
Beck’s notion of the ‘future future’ of climate change can further explain the 
ambivalent behaviour of people on the issue of global warming. Even though this 
climate problem exists ‘objectively’, the motivation for actions depends on current 
momenta. That is, climate catastrophes will mount in the ‘future future’ rather than in 
tangible, short-term time periods. As Diamond (2011) highlights, climate change is a 
slow process with up and down fluctuations in global temperature, which makes it 
even more difficult for people to perceive an upward trend of global temperature. 
Another factor that will impact on people’s motivation is the different vulnerability 
of nations to climate catastrophes in the short and long term. Australia and 
Australians, for example, do not face an immediate loss of habitat like those in the 
Kiribati Islands and other Pacific Island nations. The different motivations and 
motivation crises have on the social integration realm a direct impact on the 
legitimation of governments. People’s inertia and lack of motivation around actions 
against climate change to some extent legitimise the inertia of their governments; 
therefore they will not create a legitimation crisis.  
4.4 SUMMARY 
Habermas outlines four different types of crisis. He begins by distinguishing crises 
from the development of societies and combines the notions of social integration and 
system integration to cater for the objective and subjective nature of crisis. It is not 
only through crisis within the economy or the ruling system, it is through the 
withdrawal of people’s changed motivation, the subjective crisis, that a legitimation 
crisis arises in late capitalism. Accordingly, it is not the cyclical economic crisis 
which in late capitalist societies is prevented through government intervention nor 
the rationality crises from governments’ action to prevent this crisis and to 
administer tax-payer money. The legitimation crisis is caused through both 
rationality and the (subjective) motivation crisis, which means the withdrawal of 
support for the ruling system. The notion of crisis and late capitalism has changed 
over time and crises are now constant occurrences with less magnitude, as forecast 
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by Habermas. The late capitalist context has changed to be affected by more 
international influences on states/governments as well as more international 
economic involvements and a neoliberal ideology. Additional to the existing crises, 
the ecological crisis mentioned by Beck adds another important and contemporary 
component. The ecological crisis can trigger each of Habermas’ crises: the economic 
crisis in the case of climate catastrophes or the costs of adaptation, the rationality 
crisis for governments to respond to those catastrophes, the motivation crisis through 
a threat to people’s livelihood, which might cause a legitimation crisis for 
governments. Contemporarily, the ambivalence of climate change and its slow 
emergence and fluctuation during the steady increase in global average temperatures 
hamper people’s motivation to bring the ‘future future’ of climate change to the 
present, to tackle its causes, and thus change behaviour.  
To mediate the ecological crisis in general, and climate change in particular, requires 
behavioural change on the part of citizens and corporations. Beck’s theory and 
Habermas’ work on legitimation crisis and its extensions through more recent 
literature have formed the basis for further analysis of the relationship between 
Qantas and the Australian government, and the ability of the MACC to trigger 
behavioural change. 
The Australian economy, including Qantas, is at a stage of what Habermas calls late 
capitalism, with increasing signs of neoliberal and global impact. Late capitalist 
societies will ultimately face all four crises as a result of climate change and its 
subsequent impact on humans and the environment. Habermas’ (updated) analysis of 
capitalism will be a starting point to analyse Qantas’ relationship with the Australian 
government, which itself faces each of Habermas’ suggested crises to a more or less 
significant magnitude. The Australian government has to mediate in the economic 
crisis within Qantas as a main supplier of air travel within Australia and other 
countries, and potential rationality, motivation and legitimation crises. This implies 
that the environment and its crisis cannot be regarded as outside the system but rather 
are conflated and intertwined with one another. As Beck notes, the ambivalence of 
climate change (ecological crisis) and Diamond’s historical analysis that responds to 
climate change are a key to ‘succeeding’ and avoiding an environmental collapse. 
For them the responses to and actions against climate change are crucial. 
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The MACC is one option for triggering environmentally prudent investments to 
mediate the ecological crisis. Beck suggests that climate change is either here right 
now as ad hoc catastrophe or in the ‘future future’. The MACC can fill the temporal 
gap between those as part of a solution to curb environmental damage. The 
neoliberal idea of profit maximisation, especially in the Australian context of a price 
on carbon, is expected to drive behavioural change within companies, and the 
MACC in this context gains even more (economic) significance. In the context of 
Habermas’ late capitalism, the MACC can play a role within each of the crises. The 
MACC can assist companies in cost saving and reduce the financial risk or even 
create new opportunities, thus avoiding an economic crisis. This will be illustrated on 
Qantas’ MACC. The MACC, it will be argued, can be particularly important as a 
means to discharge corporations’ accountability for their CO2-e abatement 
opportunities. The tendency towards a rationality crisis arises from the question of 
how well governments manage the economic crisis using public funds. In the case of 
Qantas, that can be its environmental efficiency which earns the support of the 
government through money and in kind. From a motivational perspective the MACC 
can be part of action against climate change within neoliberal ideology, which can 






5 METHODOLOGY  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will outline the researcher’s ontological and epistemological stance, the 
underlying methodology and the methods employed in this thesis. Section 5.2 
describes and critically evaluates Laughlin’s (1995; 2004; 2007) middle range 
thinking research approach to position this work in terms of ‘theory’, ‘methodology’ 
and ‘change’ applicable to the research of Qantas’ situation in late capitalism and its 
link with the Australian government. This is followed by Section 5.3, which 
describes the case study methodology and the method used in this study.  
5.2 MIDDLE RANGE THINKING 
Laughlin’s (1995) paper on middle range thinking (MRT) illustrates a diversity of 
research approaches, compares and contrasts their particular characteristics, which 
follow multiple paths to discovering partial (not absolute) truth. This allows us to 
gain only a partial understanding (Laughlin, 2007) and increased awareness 
(Gallhofer, et al., 2013).  
Laughlin (1995) develops Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) classification scheme of 
social science approaches to empirical research, with its two bipolar continuums, 
‘subjectivist’ to ‘objectivist’ and ‘sociology of regulation’ to ‘sociology of radical 
change’, to overcome its overly simplistic rigidity in the categorisation of mutually 
exclusive paradigms (see e.g. Willmott, 1990; 1993). He then applies it to accounting 
research so that emerging scholars can understand the implications that come with 
the commitment to a particular paradigm (Roslender, 2013).  
In Laughlin’s (1995) MRT, Brown and Dillard (2013) see theory and practice 
development “that assist in enabling the transformation of accounting and the wider 
socio-political context towards a more socially just society” (p.4). MRT also helps 
scholars argue about their chosen paradigm’s advantages.  
While the classification scheme and its dimension of theory, methodology and 
change can only provide a partial understanding, “[c]hoices are contestable, as are 
the criteria which drive them, with possibly the most vulnerable being either the 
criterion that appeals to accuracy of representation or the choice which 
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unquestioningly tries to amalgamate all approaches” (Laughlin, 1995, p.77). Yet the 
reflexive process that occurs before the launch into empirical details that is involved 
in the choice of a particular paradigm can explicate one’s own biases and exclusions, 
direct one towards new methods, improve the findings’ interpretation from the use of 
a specific method, and therefore result in increased rigour and improvements in the 
research process itself (Gallhofer, et al., 2013; Chua, 1986; Gallhofer and Haslam, 
1997). 
MRT is a research approach with distinctive particularities and even though it is 
linked to German Critical Theory and especially Habermas’ (adapted) work, there 
are other ideas that are complementary to MRT (Laughlin, 2004). Over the years, 
Laughlin, Broadbent and others (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997) have applied and 
complemented Habermas’ work in order to make it practically useful (Laughlin, 
2004) and have informed several studies as well as discussions about how to conduct 
accounting research (Gallhofer, et al., 2013). The classification scheme as one part of 
Laughlin (1995) alongside the dimensions of theory, methodology, and change will 
be explained in more detail to position this research.  
5.2.1 Theory 
Theory in the context of the present research refers to the researcher’s choice of 
ontology, which is how the world is viewed, and epistemology, which refers to the 
type of accepted knowledge either past or present and its relation to the 
investigation’s current focus (Laughlin, 1995). For Habermas, it is the drive of 
modernity for enlightenment while rejecting the idea of pure rationality and 
acknowledging subjectivity that sets out ‘theory’. Laughlin (1995) notes that the 
choice of ontology results in the adaptation of a particular research approach.  
The middle position of MRT has its own distinct ontological features. On the one 
hand, patterns of social behaviour are not generalisable and are able to be expressed 
in ‘definable theoretical terms’. On the other hand, such social behaviour is not 
totally random. Skeleton theories need further development through engagement 
with empirical sites. Based on the assumption of the actual existence of skeleton 
theories in the first place, these theories “formulate their nature and then 
subsequently … provide a framework for understanding further empirical situations 
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which, in turn, provides the base for developing their ongoing nature” (Laughlin, 
2004, p.268).  
In the reverse, empirics inform those skeleton theories to bring them to life, 
expending and/or reforming them; therefore, “’skeletal’ theory guides the discovery 
process but in such a way that can be reactive to the ‘fit’ of the detailed ‘flesh’ that is 
being added” (Laughlin, 2004, p.268). Put another way, theory in the ‘medium’ 
preserves the possibility of building on theoretical insights gained from other 
situations (strength of the ‘high’ position) while those theories need empirical flesh 
to be meaningful and complete (strength of the ‘low’ position) (Laughlin, 1995). 
Followed by the choice of ‘theory’ is the choice of ‘methodology’. 
5.2.2 Methodology 
The methodological choice is an ‘amalgam’ of “the nature and role of the observer in 
the discovery process … and the level of theoretical formality in defining the nature 
of the discovery methods” (Laughlin, 1995, p.66). Within the methodology 
dimension the extent of theoretical definition for the ‘set of spectacles’ impacts on 
the nature of the methods used for the empirical investigation, and simultaneously 
and implicitly, on the role of the researcher (human agent) within the process. A 
higher theoretical determination would guide the researcher as to how to investigate 
while the investigation can rely “on the implicit perceptual powers of the individual 
observer” (Laughlin, 1995, p.67). 
In MRT the methods of investigation are theoretically defined, but only to such an 
extent that the accepted multiplicity of subjective perceptual power is preserved. 
Therefore, the strengths of each approach lie in the combination of ‘part-constrained’ 
and ‘part-free’ being retained, which means that ‘the perceptual rules are made 
public and clear, but their nature is “skeletal”’ (Laughlin, 1995, p.84). 
Laughlin (2004) expands on his original work and includes ‘data narratives’ and 
‘data collection methods’ in his overview of research approaches (see Figure 5-1). 
The position of the (quantitative and qualitative) ‘data narrative’ illustrates the lesser 
importance of the distinction between quantitative versus qualitative, which results 
from the choice of the respective higher levels’ (theory, methodology and change) 
dimension (Laughlin, 2007). Finally, Laughlin (2004) suggests four generic data 
collection instruments: documents (which in a broad sense includes the media, public 
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records, private papers and visual documents), interviews, questionnaires and 
observations (which in general are used to investigate aspects of the empirical world) 
(Laughlin, 2004). 
Figure 5-1: Modal research approaches 
 
Source: Laughlin (2007, p.275). 
Change, which is the last dimension of Laughlin’s (1995) classification scheme, 
follows on from the understanding of theory and methodology dimensions and is 
explained in the following subsection. 
5.2.3 Change 
Laughlin (1995, p.67) subsumes under the term ‘change’  
attitudes by the researcher concerning the worth or otherwise of maintaining the 
current situation that is being investigated as well as views about the necessity 
for actually doing something about this situation. 
For Laughlin (2007), the philosophical ends of a continuum represented by Comte on 
the one hand and Kant/Fichte on the other (see Figure 5-1) have very low intentions 
for bringing forth change: the former in order to avoid the subjectivity that comes 
with prescribing it and the latter because of the central matter of subjectivity, which 
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does not allow a judgement of what a better future could be owing to the existence of 
diverse subjective viewpoints.  
According to MRT, research that is intent on change can only be adapted after an 
understanding of the researched phenomena has been achieved. That is, the 
researcher needs an understanding of the underlying assumptions behind ‘theory’ and 
‘methodology’ in order to make a judgement about what should be done about the 
results of discovery; whether they should initiate change or not (Laughlin, 1995; 
2004). MRT keeps the options of change and critique open. It is possible to remain 
within the status quo while simultaneously having the option that some change might 
be required. This position calls for “a deliberate and deliberated evaluatory policy to 
decide when critique and change are appropriate” (Laughlin, 1995, p.82). MRT 
specifies the processes of an engagement between the researcher and those under 
investigation (Brown and Dillard, 2013).  
Laughlin’s MRT has found wide application in research and has shaped many 
methodological discussions; yet it has also been subject to (positive/negative) 
criticism. The following discussion presents some of the existing arguments.  
5.2.4 Discussion 
For Broadbent (2013), MRT provides an arena in which the conceptual language of 
theoretical frameworks can be used to elaborate on empirical aspects. That is, the 
entire world cannot be defined by theoretical frames since empirics can reshape those 
theories. Gallhofer et al. (2013) note that a particular advantage of MRT is that 
Laughlin’s classification scheme “does not constrain the reader to one way” (p.195). 
This openness potentially supports a discourse that respects and is open to other 
discourses. Also the use of a continuum (or continua) indicates continuity in favour 
of communication between different schools. Gallhofer et al. (2013) continue to see 
as an advantage in that 
Laughlin (1995) uses the construct ‘empirical theory’ helpfully and insightfully 
in that an appreciation of his argument enhances understanding of the broad 
range of empirical approaches, not restricted to positivism, empiricism or 
functionalism. This again points to dimensions of continuity and unity. (p.201) 
Laughlin’s adapted German Critical Theory is not restricted in learning from a broad 
range of research perspectives which can lead to different research foci and the 
opening up of new research questions. Lehman (2013) sees another advantage to 
 
130 
Laughlin’s MRT approach in that it encompasses “a broader approach to language 
than that offered by Habermas” (p.217). Therefore, Laughlin’s research approach 
departs from Habermas’ to provide new research avenues in critical accounting 
research: “contours and reasons that have created the connections between book-
keeping, capitalism and Western modernity” (p.217). Yet there are not only 
arguments in favour of Laughlin’s MRT but also criticism. 
Roslender (2013) challenges the classification of structuration theory, French critical 
theory and symbolic interactionism under MRT. He sees them for the change 
dimension in ‘the middle’ of MRT rather than at the ‘low’ end. Besides concerns 
about the classifications of Berry et al.’s (1985) study, Roslender (2013) suggests 
that institutional theory, actor network theory and practice theory be included within 
MRT.  
Broadbent (2013) sees some danger in Laughlin’s (1995) graphs depicting a rather 
concrete ‘reality’. This could be overcome with narrative descriptions to avoid 
readers being ‘seduced’ by the graphs or graphs being interpreted in a functionalist 
fashion (see also Roslender, 2013). Gallhofer et al. (2013) point out the 
oversimplifications inherent in classification schemes (also see Arrington, 2004; 
Lowe, 2004). Laughlin’s (1995) emphasis on the endpoints leads to exaggerated 
characterisations and contrasting points along the continuum. It is also problematic to 
describe different research approaches as ‘absolute opposites’ since they differ in 
degrees, not in absolute terms, and they are simply different approaches not 
opposites. This association with endpoints at each end of the continuum can be 
confused with the actual tendencies Laughlin’s (1995) graphs depict (Gallhofer, et 
al., 2013).  
Other issues related to Laughlin’s (1995) paper pointed out by Gallhofer et al. (2013) 
include the (over)emphasis on empirical (descriptive) research as opposed to 
normative (prescriptive) research. German Critical Theory does not exclude either 
description or prescription. Adopting a reflexive position, the prescriptive view 
comes from somewhere, while the description from an Archimedean viewpoint is 
never value- or interest-free (Tinker, et al., 1982). This also applies to Laughlin 
himself in that his classification scheme cannot be separated from his own preferred 
stance (Gallhofer, et al., 2013). 
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Chua (2004) criticises Laughlin (1995) for his idea that critical theory necessarily 
requires heavily descriptive case study data. Also, the distinction between 
‘description’ and ‘analysis’ is flawed since critical theorists do not distinguish 
between observation and interpretation, or between fact and value. In a similar vein 
Gallhofer et al. (2013) disagree with Laughlin’s claim to link quantitative methods 
with positivism or more generally speaking:  
Differing perspectives, outside of the extreme, hypothetical and abstract end 
points of the simplifying schema, neither rule in nor rule out particular methods 
in research in an absolute sense, rather they influence preferences and 
evaluations of particular research methods. (Gallhofer, et al., 2013, p.197) 
Chua (2004) mentions, in regard to Geuss’ (1981, p.2), three essential themes of 
critical theory34 which build the basis of a reflexive theory to guide agents to achieve 
emancipation and enlightenment. These themes are redesigned by Laughlin (1995) 
into a ‘skeleton’ theory branded as “an undifferentiated notion of a medium-level 
desire for change” (Chua, 2004, p.259). And the ‘skeleton’ theory itself fails to 
express “well the commitment of critical theory to reflexive emancipation” (Chua, 
2004, p.259). Likewise, Gallhofer et al. (2013) note that Laughlin (1995) is at risk of 
oversimplifying Hegel’s notion of change; by understatement of emancipatory 
change commitment in the attempt ‘to make latter commitment subject to 
understanding’. For Chua (2004, p.260) it appears that  
the meaning of Laughlin’s middle derives solely from its ‘spatial position’ from 
the constructed alternatives on either side of it (see Laughlin, 1995, Table 1, 
p.80). That is, its derivation owes little if anything to critical theory; instead its 
meaning is attributed solely from it being simultaneously between the 
‘high/high/low’ variety on the left and the ‘low/low/low’ variety on the right. 
Middle-range thinking would then be warranted by its constructed position as the 
‘middle’. 
Gallhofer et al. (2013) oppose this position and refer to studies by Laughlin (1987), 
Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) and Power et al. (2003), according to which, 
particularities of Laughlin’s commitment to German Critical Theory become more 
                                                 
34 ‘1. Critical theories have special standing as guides for human action in that: 
(a) they are aimed at producing enlightenment in the agents who hold them, i.e. at enabling those 
agents to determine what their true interests are; 
(b) they are inherently emancipatory, i.e. they free agents from a kind of coercion which is at least 
partly self-imposed, from self-frustration of conscious human action. 
2. Critical theories have cognitive content, i.e. they are forms of knowledge. 
3. Critical theories differ epistemologically in essential ways from theories in the natural sciences. 
Theories in the natural science are “objectifying”; critical theories are “reflective”’. 
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explicit. Such an in-depth specification was due to oversimplification which could 
not be expressed in Laughlin’s (1995) paper.  
Roslender (2013) elaborates on Laughlin’s (1995) attempts to distinguish MRT from 
Merton’s middle range theory, which suggests he is not seeking any development of 
a general theory. He gives the example of internal colonisation theory by Laughlin 
that is able to contribute to the grand theory of Habermas’ communicative action and 
thus illustrates a case of theorising in line with Merton’s middle range theory.  
5.2.5 Implications  
As previously noted, MRT allows generalisation in the form of a ‘skeleton theory’, 
which is fleshed out by empirics particular to an individual case. For this study MRT 
provides the flexibility needed to draw on and develop Beck’s ecological crisis and 
Habermas’ (1975) thoughts on ‘legitimation crisis’ in a late capitalism context using 
the example of Qantas. Regulatory, economic, financial, competitive, sectoral and 
other contextual factors might be unique to Qantas; however this ‘flesh’ on the 
skeleton theory can guide future enquiries into other companies within other contexts 
and add to or alter the proposed theory.  
Additionally, the middle range position towards theory allows us to gain a broader 
understanding of Qantas’ relationship with the Australian government, which goes 
beyond a purely numerical, ahistorical investigation. Prior theory selection guides 
this study but does not restrict the set of methods employed. In line with MRT, the 
role of the researcher in this study is not detached from the enquiry, but the 
researcher’s understanding of Habermas’ (1975) ‘legitimation crisis’ shapes the 
investigations.  
Finally, this study adds to MRT by extension through Habermas’ legitimation crisis 
and Beck’s ecological crisis. Even though the engagement with Qantas might not 
directly lead to change it is possible that certain aspects of this study, such as the 
MACC, the financial and economic connections, the hidden subsidies between 
Qantas and the government or Qantas’ special treatment under the CPRS can deepen 
our understanding, which can then be used in a broad accountability dialogue. 
Contrary to a strict Marxist endeavour to change the status quo, MRT allows scholars 
to introduce change or otherwise. 
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5.3 CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Scapens (1990, p.268) distinguishes between descriptive (explanatory), illustrative, 
experimental and exploratory case studies. This research does not seek statistical 
generalisation, but rather ‘theoretical generalisation’ and therefore employs an 
exploratory case study to “explain the particular circumstances of the case” (p.270), 
enabling the building of a ‘skeleton theory’ that allows explanation of observations 
that have been made. In this sense “theory both informs, and is developed by 
observations” (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, p.100). In line with the middle range 
position, reliability and its quest for “an independent, impersonal investigator and 
validity which implies an objective reality [and which] are likely to be meaningless 
to a holistic researcher” (Scapens, 1990, p.274) are rejected. 
In order to cope with the richness of data and achieve in-depth analysis a single case 
study was chosen. In an attempt to “explain individual observations in their actual 
context” (Scapens, 1990, p.271) implications from holistic research apply. First, 
“social systems develop a characteristic wholeness or integrity and it is inappropriate 
to study their individual parts taken out of context” (Scapens, 1990, p.271). Second, 
there is only one ‘unit of analysis’, which supports a theory that is holistic in nature 
(Yin, 2009; Creswell, 2013) such as the one promoted in this thesis.  
The research site for this study, Qantas, was chosen for its significant CO2-e 
emissions and thus economic vulnerability towards a price on carbon. Of particular 
interest is the period from 2003 to 2012, while the historical analysis of Qantas goes 
back to 1978 (the beginning of the privatisation of airlines). Two thousand and three 
marked the year during which Qantas’ subsidiary Jetstar was founded. The focus is 
on Qantas as a whole rather than its five business units. Of particular interest is how 
Qantas in a social, economic and sectoral context is related to the Australian 
government, its national and international competitors and the Australian people in 
general. Applying the methodology to an investigation of Qantas’ single business 
units would have added much complexity without additional analytic value.  
Smith et al. (1988) highlight the importance of locating the ‘unit of analysis’ 
(organisation) within its social, economic and political context since management 
decisions are not neutral and context cannot be assumed to be given. To 
contextualise business practice requires multiple data sources from inside and outside 
the company. While quantitative data can provide descriptions about otherwise silent 
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relationships, qualitative data contribute substantially to the detailed explanation of 
the subject, or as Eisenhardt put it: 
While systematic data create the foundation for our theories, it is the anecdotal 
data that enable us to do the building. Theory building seems to require rich 
description, the richness that comes from anecdote. We uncover all kinds of 
relationships in our hard data, but it is only through the use of this soft data that 
we are able to explain them. (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.578) 
To investigate the research questions related to Qantas several data sources were 
considered: 
• annual reports, SEA reports and other disclosures presented on Qantas’ 
webpage; 
• government and Hansard reports;  
• publicly accessible industry reports;  
• public media; 
• data envelop analysis to assess Qantas’ environmental efficiency and cost 
efficiency compared to other major world airlines;  
• interviews with Qantas staff; 
• existing academic literature that partially deals with Qantas’ relationship 
with the government.  
The MACC for Qantas was modelled on publicly available information. This 
approach is widely accepted in the academic literature, as indicated by previous 
studies (Turner, et al., 2010; Almihoub, et al., 2013; Baker, et al., 2008; Bauman, et 
al., 2008; Criqui, et al., 1999; De Cara and Jayet, 2011; Delarue, et al., 2010; Kiuila 
and Rutherford, 2011; Kuik, et al., 2009; Murphy and Jaccard, 2011; Nordrum, et al., 
2011; Park and Lim, 2009; Vijay, et al., 2010; Nauclér and Enkvist, 2009).  
Extensive reports of CO2-e abatement opportunities are provided by Kar et al. (2010) 
and Farries and Eyers (2008). These reports engaged with stakeholders in the 
aviation industry to identify potential CO2 savings from either procedural, 
technology-related improvements, or substitution of conventional aviation fuel with 
biofuel. Qantas’ individual specifications of fleet, processes and deployed 
technology, as well as key determinants set by the Australian government and 
aviation market are identified from Qantas’ annual reports, government reports or 
other publicly available sources.  
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There are different approaches to constructing a MACC: the top-down, bottom-up or 
hybrid method, all of which have advantages and disadvantages (Murphy and 
Jaccard, 2011). The MACC calculations under each method are restricted to their 
underlying assumptions (Delarue, et al., 2010). This means that the results of the 
MAC calculation might vary according to different assumptions about, for example, 
interest rates, future energy prices, amount of subsidies and so on. Transparency can 
be increased by providing sensitivity analyses of factors crucial to the abatement cost 
calculation (Kesicki and Ekins, 2011; Kesicki and Strachan, 2011), which is 
provided for different interest rates in Appendix A1.  
At a company level, a bottom-up approach is most suitable because of the 
availability of detailed data. This method has been widely used to model MACCs on 
different levels (Almihoub, et al., 2013; Delarue, et al., 2010; Klepper and Peterson, 
2006; Moran, et al., 2011; Vijay, et al., 2010; Wächter, 2013). The company focus of 
this study overcomes most of the limitations associated with the MACC, for 
example, emissions generated for new technology production, and behavioural and 
long-term changes can be considered in the decision-making process, while not 
easily feeding into macro-level MACCs. The MACC on a company level can be seen 
as a part of a cost–benefit analysis, so all factors, such as energy prices, interest rates, 
subsidies, individual corporate tax rates and other kinds of opportunity costs will be 
considered. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
This section outlined MRT and its implications for ontological, epistemological and 
methodological foundations and choices in method (qualitative and quantitative) as 
well as a deeper discussion of MRT in the existing literature. MRT as a research 
approach was found to be the most suitable to apply Habermas’ (1975) ‘legitimation 
crisis’ to Qantas and to explain the relationships between Qantas and the Australian 
government to raise issues about accountability that might lead to deeper 
understanding and perhaps enlightenment followed by change. And to extend the 
current research program established by Laughlin based on and supportive of the 







6 UNDERSTANDING AUSTRALIAN AVIATION HISTORY 
FROM HABERMAS AND BECK’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section draws on the theory in Chapter 4 to explain the role of SEAR in the 
political economy of Australia in regard to the interaction of Qantas and the 
Australian government. The existing accounting literature demands research into the 
role of accounting in the bigger societal and ecological realm. Section 6.2 reviews 
the existing accounting literature around political economy, SEAR and 
accountability and also explicates the political and ethical stance on which this 
analysis draws. Section 6.3 draws on Chapter 4 to apply Habermas and Beck’s 
theories to the Australian and Qantas context, that is, to illustrate the interrelationship 
between Qantas, the Australian government and the Australian people in an attempt 
to understand the occurrences of economic, rationality, motivation and legitimation 
crises in the context of the ecological crisis. Particular focus will be given to the role 
of accounting used by each actor to create, hide or resolve crises. Section 6.4 
provides a summary of this analysis.  
6.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The accounting and reporting discourse of Qantas in the context of late capitalism is 
studied through the lens of Habermas’ legitimation crisis and Beck’s studies on the 
ecological crisis. The present study positions itself within and contributes to the 
literature on critical accounting and, in particular, political economy and SEAR. The 
(environmental, political) ethical stance closest to social ecology will be outlined and 
the thesis’ contribution to accountability literature highlighted.  
Critical accounting research, exemplified by studies from Zhang et al. (2012), 
Cooper and Hopper (1987), Mäkelä (2013), Cooper (1995), Gaffikin (2009), 
Gallhofer and Haslam (1997) and Laughlin (1987) draws on different theories to 
encourage academics to be critical about accounting practice’s implications and to 
reveal its link with the wider social, political and economic contexts. These theories 
include (neo-) Marxism, German Critical Theory (encompassing Habermas), French 
Critical Theory and critical thoughts on Neoliberalism (Harvey, 2007, and others) as 
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lenses through which researchers can understand accounting in and interaction within 
its context.  
6.2.1 Political Economy  
The urgent need for accounting researchers to engage in theories and world views 
other than mainstream positivist accounting research has its basis in the failure of 
conventional accounting to shed light on the relationship between accounting and the 
macroeconomic and political context which it shapes and through which it is shaped 
(Sikka, et al., 1995). From a mainstream point of view, accounting as neutral 
technology is a means to reduce information asymmetry and increase transparency to 
ensure efficient functioning of capital markets. The credibility of this single-
mindedness on neoclassic theory has been thrown into doubt especially since the 
global financial crisis (Arnold, 2009a). Mainstream researchers in accounting have 
persistently focused on a small interest group and ignored accounting’s ability to 
serve several interests and impact on a variety on societal groups (Gaffikin, 2009). 
The ‘non-intellectual’ approach of some (mainstream) accounting researchers does 
not aim to contribute to ‘broader social goals and policies’ but intends instead to 
“objectively serve the practical interests of business” (Gaffikin, 2009, p.270-271).  
Research in the realm of political economy overcomes the narrow view imposed by 
mainstream researchers and adopts “an alternative theoretical perspective for 
understanding the links between the micro world of accounting and the macro 
economy” (Arnold, 2009a, p.805). One branch of political economy research 
challenges the notion of efficient markets and illustrates accounting practice as 
facilitating the distribution of income between social classes rather than being a 
neutral objective measure (Cooper, 1995; Tinker and Neimark, 1987) and facilitates 
the generation and allocation of resources (Cooper, 1980; Sikka, et al., 1995). 
Therefore, accounting is inherently political, impacts on and is impacted by the 
political environment, supports ruling classes though its influence on wealth and 
power distribution and is shaped by dominant ideologies (Arnold, 2009a).  
Followers of neo-classical economic thought depict accounting as neutral and 
objective, which ignores the underlying social ideology of accounting and the power 
of accounting practice to legitimise and maintain social, political and economic 
relations of power and wealth distribution (Arnold and Hammond, 1994; Ding and 
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Graham, 2007; Hopwood, 1987; Tinker, et al., 1982; Zhang and Andrew, 2012). This 
helps to sustain the status quo, prevents alternative institutional forms and obscures 
“the question about the social desirability of the existing society” (Cooper, 1980, 
p.164). For example, the existence of legislation and social institutions such as 
markets and private property are taken for granted as the basis for and limit to current 
theories (Cooper, 1980).  
In the wake of the global financial crisis, Arnold (2009a) hopes the scholarly 
community will contribute with research to our understanding of the relationship 
between practices in accounting and its context within the political and economic 
systems in which it functions. She calls for inquiries guided by political economists 
and historians as well as the political economy of Marx to go beyond the narrow 
focus of accounting academe of narrowly defined interest groups for an 
understanding of power within society and the way it functions. Researchers ought to 
investigate ‘accounting in action’, and its “politically and socially contested nature” 
(Arnold, 2009a, p.808) to overcome numerical-based accounting research lacking an 
understanding of “ways in which financial reporting standards, accounting firms, and 
accounting ideologies were implicated in the build-up to the [global financial] crisis” 
(Arnold, 2009a, p.808). 
Arnold (2012) draws on macro-institutional analysis, an approach that goes beyond 
traditional political economy studies to emphasise the institutional forces and 
arrangements that regulate the political, social and economic conditions of capitalism 
to ground  
accounting history within the context of developments within the global political 
economy and the world inter-state system in order to provide an economic, 
political and institutional perspective on the rise of international accounting 
standards. In so doing, the study aims not only to bring economics back into 
institutional analysis (Arnold, 2009b), but also to bring an institutional 
perspective to political economy by showing that the institutional arrangements 
set in place to govern economic activity matter. (Arnold, 2012, p.377) 
Arnold (2009a) identifies the post-structuralist and micro-institutionalist turn within 
accounting research and the emphasis on cultural attributes over political and 
economic concerns as part of the reason why accounting failed to anticipate the 
global financial crisis. Political economy research, which draws on state theory to 
understand accounting in a late capitalist context, viewed as an interacting tool of 
state policies and the economic (Arnold and Sikka, 2001; Tinker, 1984) and societal 
 
140 
systems (Puxty, 1997) it can overcome (Arnold, 2009a) the aforementioned 
shortcomings of positive accounting research.  
Puxty (1997) draws on Habermas’ legitimation crisis to explain British Gas and 
British Telecom’s accounting practices before and in the wake of their privatisation. 
Differences in the accounting practices of those companies were explained as a 
means to mitigate crises faced by the entities and the British government:  
[C]risis management is not restricted to governments in respect of general social 
and economic policy. Just as the state can face the various crisis tendencies 
referred to, so, potentially, can individual institutions. Hence they will take 
actions to avoid economic crises, manage rationality crises and sustain their 
legitimacy. (Puxty, 1997, p.728-729) 
Puxty, with some ease, altered Habermas’ dimension of ‘economic system’ 
underpinned by imperatives of system integration to two individual corporations. 
Like Qantas in Australia these corporations have had a significant role in the British 
industrial landscape. Building on Puxty’s study, the present thesis places more 
emphasis on the social integration perspective and especially the subjective nature of 
crises without abandoning the wider (national, regional and international) macro-
economic context in which Qantas is situated. Therefore, the present study will also 
extend previous studies to look beyond the national level. The case of Qantas, as 
shown in Chapter 5, is special in that Qantas has an iconic status within Australian 
society. This is important because it has a unique interrelation with the social-cultural 
realm from which a motivation crisis can arise. Puxty et al. (1987) draw on theories 
of late capitalism similar to that adopted by Habermas (1978) to examine four 
different late capitalist societies and conclude that each of these nations provides a 
unique context in which accounting regulation has evolved:  
We have suggested that an analysis of accounting regulation as a social and 
organisational phenomenon requires critical appreciation of its construction 
within a nexus of ‘market forces’, ‘bureaucratic controls’ and ‘communitarian 
ideals’. (Puxty, et al., 1987, p.275) 
The present study acknowledges those insights to consider Australian late capitalism 
as a unique environment with its own particularities that shape and determine 
occurrences or crises (economic, rationality, motivation and legitimation) of the 
government and Qantas as well as accounting discourse. Furthermore, this study will 
consider the environmental crisis and related SEAR disclosure and public discourse.  
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Rahaman et al. (2004) draw on a combination of institutional theory and Habermas’ 
legitimation crisis to explain social and environmental reporting in a Ghanaian public 
sector organisation, the Volta River Authority (VRA). In this case, a major influence 
on environmental reporting is the constant pressure to comply with the requirements 
of the funding agency (i.e., the World Bank) to provide institutional legitimation. 
However, this pressure also led to undesirable outcomes for the local population, 
which remained invisible in the accounting systems designed to meet the 
requirements of international institutional legitimation. The result of institutionalised 
reporting procedures was not legitimacy, but a crisis of legitimation. Habermas’ 
legitimation crisis can therefore be blended with other critical theories and the 
present study will enrich Habermas’ theory by considering the ecological crisis 
outlined by Ulrich Beck and as mentioned in Chapter 4, to also expand on our 
knowledge of SEAR.  
6.2.2 Social and Environmental Accounting and Reporting 
The SEAR literature deals with social and environmental aspects of business conduct 
and their communication to stakeholders in depth, and is another aspect of 
accounting to which the present study will contribute. The SEAR literature provides 
a wide array of theoretical perspectives in order to understand corporate disclosure 
practice.  
6.2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) draw on agency theory to examine the factors that 
impact on companies’ decisions to provide social information in their annual reports. 
They conclude that 
the decision to disclose social information is positively correlated with social 
performance, economic performance and political visibility, and negatively 
correlated with contracting and monitoring costs. (p.38)  
Research in this realm of economic rationalism links the choice of accounting 
methods to firms’ contracting and monitoring costs; social disclosure to long-term 
shareholder interest (Abbot and Monsen, 1979); voluntary environmental disclosure 
practice to firm value (Plumlee, et al., 2008); and cost of equity (Richardson and 
Welker, 2001; Dhaliwal, et al., 2011) to lower forecast error (Dhaliwal, et al., 2012). 
Mathews (1997) emphasises that such a perspective of accounting ignores the wider 
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impact of accounting on many groups that consist not only of investors. Parker 
(2005, p.846) argues that agency theory is undesirable to explain social and 
environmental accounting (SEA) since such research  
impose[s] an individualistic, economic based conception of agency onto a clearly 
non-economic communitarian issue, aggravating such ‘unreality’ with their 
assumptions of free markets which have repeatedly failed in the area of SEA! 
Predominant theories that go beyond this limited view include, but are not limited to, 
legitimacy (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Lindblom, 1993; Patten, 1992; Buhr, 1998; 
Campbell, 2000), stakeholder (Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992; Gray, et al., 1997; 
Owen, et al., 2001) and political economy theory (Cooper and Sherer, 1984b; Puxty, 
1991; Guthrie and Parker, 1990). These theories are not mutually exclusive but vary 
in their levels of resolution of perception (Spence, et al., 2010; Gray, et al., 1995).  
6.2.2.2 Legitimacy Theory 
The origins of legitimacy theory go back to Shocker and Sethi (1974), Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975), and the seminal work by Lindblom (1994), and legitimacy theory has 
been widely discussed in the accounting literature by Deegan et al. (2002), 
O’Donovan (2002), Milne and Patten (2002) and Pattern (1992). Lindblom (1993, 
p.2) defines legitimacy as 
a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent 
with the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part. 
When a disparity, actual or potential exists between the two value systems, there 
is a threat to the entity's legitimacy. 
As such, legitimacy is necessary for the survival of organisations (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; O'Donovan, 2002). In order to maintain, ensure or restore legitimacy 
companies can employ different strategies. SEAR can be a part of these strategies, 
and includes informing or educating the audience, altering the audiences’ perceptions 
or expectations, or diverting attention to different issues (Gray, et al., 1995; Fiedler 
and Deegan, 2002; Deegan, 2002); generally speaking this implies closing the 
legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1977; Nasi, et al., 1997).  
Parker (2005) criticises legitimacy theory in its form of ‘bourgeois managerial 
theory’ for its lack of specificity, failure to consider concepts of accountability and 
transparency (Deegan, (2002); Gray et al. (1995), its overlap with institutional and 
political economy theory and its inability to explain managements’ behaviour. There 
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is also a suspicion that an analysis drawing on legitimacy theory favours the financial 
stakeholder.  
Legitimacy theory was further developed into reputation risk management (RRM) to 
overcome the lack of specificity and to offer a “refined explanatory framework” 
(Unerman, 2008, p.363) of corporate social responsibility (CSR). That is, RRM links 
CSR to reputation and processes for RMM within companies (Bebbington, et al., 
2008; Adams, 2008; Unerman, 2008). Another overlap exists between legitimacy 
theory and institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Fogarty, 1996; Scott, 1995) and is explained in more detail by Deegan (2002). 
Under this theoretical lens, the survival of a corporation essentially relies on 
confirmation of external expectations through the adaption of internal structures or 
operations. The contrast between those two theories lies in the ability of managers to 
alter external perceptions (legitimacy point of view) or to accept these expectations 
as given, resulting in managers having to conform with those ‘norms’ (Deegan, 
2002).  
6.2.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
A stakeholder can be defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose” (Freeman, 1984, p.25). 
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory (for a discussion on the ethical 
normative accountability side see Deegan, (2007) identifies stakeholders according 
to a company’s self-interest to maintain and manage relations with particularly 
important stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985). SEA disclosure from the perspective of 
stakeholder theory can be explained  
in terms of corporate responsiveness to the intensity of stakeholder demands, 
corporate strategic orientation towards its social and environmental 
responsibilities, and the trade-off between corporate economic and 
social/environmental objectives. (Parker, 2005, p.846)  
Similar to legitimacy theory, under stakeholder theory SEA disclosure is not a means 
for companies to discharge or commit to responsible corporate behaviour, but it is 
driven by strategic considerations to be responsive to the most influential and 
powerful stakeholders in a corporation’s self-interest (Deegan, et al., 2002; Gray, et 
al., 1997; Gray, et al., 1995)As such, SEA is a medium through which to manage a 
company’s relationship with its stakeholders (Roberts, 1992) by selecting the 
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information disclosed in order to maintain or obtain particular stakeholders’ support 
(Gray, et al., 1996). Nonetheless, this theory allows for consultation and dialogue 
with stakeholders (Gray, et al., 1997). 
On the one hand, legitimacy theory places emphasis on the expectations of society 
and the social contract while stakeholder theory has a more refined view (Deegan, 
2002, p.295). On the other hand, legitimacy theory explains SEAR more 
sophisticatedly through highlighting conflicts in the social sphere opposed to 
stakeholder issues considered by stakeholder theory (Gray, et al., 1995; Gray, et al., 
1996; Buhr, 1998). 
6.2.2.4 Political Economy Theory  
Gray et al. (1995, 1996) distinguish between classical political economy following 
Karl Marx and bourgeois political economy following John Stuart Mill (see also 
Parker, 2005). While structural inequality and the role of the state are the main focus 
of classical political economy, bourgeois political economy emphasises the 
interaction among groups in a pluralistic world. Accordingly, under the latter, SEAR 
is a means for mediation of structural conflicts without emphasis on how mediation 
takes place or whether it impacts on the relation of class interests (Gray, et al., 1995). 
Therefore, bourgeois political economy has a higher resolution than classical 
political economy since the former does not consider the difference in power 
structures or distribution (Gray, et al., 1995) but draws a pluralistic assumption 
resulting in a lack of political dimension. Classical political economy, drawing on 
neo-Marxist state theory, explicitly takes into account the role of the state and its 
tools of regulation as a mediator of inter- and intra-class conflict. Juergen Habermas’ 
legitimation crisis conflated with Ulrich Beck’s ideas on the ecological crisis add to 
this theoretical perspective with a significance not to be found “in the credibility of 
the interpretations … but rather in the relevance of the questions they pose for future 
research” (Arnold, 1990, p.178). As outlined in Chapter 4, Ulrich Beck’s work 
complements Habermas’ state theory in that it adds ecological crisis, global warming 
and accountability to the analysis as aspects for nations’ contributions to the build-up 
of GHGs in the atmosphere.  
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Before contributions of the present study to the accountability literature will be 
explained, the ethical and political stance will be outlined (Andrew, 2000; Cooper 
and Sherer, 1984b; Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997).  
6.2.3 Ethical and Political Stance 
Environmental ethics extends existing ethical stances to prescribe how humans ought 
to interact with the environment. It encourages moving beyond individualistic 
assumptions imposed by advanced capitalist societies and embracing values that 
might be more sensitive and conscious in regard to environmental dealings (Andrew, 
2000; Palmer, 1997; 2003; Hargrove, 1989). The following provides a brief 
discussion of ecological modernisation, radical ecology, including deep ecology, and 
ecofeminism, and provides justifications for social ecology as the most suitable 
ethical stance for this thesis. 
6.2.3.1  Ecological Modernisation 
Ecological modernisation is an argument based on ‘sustainable development’ 
advanced by a Brundtland Commission ideology and further shaped by politicians 
such as Margret Thatcher and Al Gore. Under this technicist35 point of view 
environmental pollution ought to be brought back into the marketplace to serve the 
‘polluter pays’ principle and thus impact on the respective profit and loss 
calculations. This stance allows political intervention, regulation and control of 
environmentally damaging activities from economic activities which systematically 
produce environmental harm (Everett and Neu, 2000). Similar attributes can be 
found in the environmental accounting literature, which claims for “’win-win’ 
possibilities (cf. Gray, 1992; Herremans, et al., 1993), the need for greater regulation 
(Gray, 1996) and appeals to science (cf. Rubenstein, 1992)” (Everett and Neu, 2000, 
p.6). Everett and Neu (2000) criticise this position as supporting current societal 
arrangements and beliefs that consider society as detached from its ecological 
environment, the ‘politics of status quo’ (Neu and Taylor, 1996). The danger lies in 
environmental accounting creating the false belief that there is progress within the 
capitalist realm and at the same time 
                                                 
35 This theory originates from German sociologist Joseph Huber in the mid-1980s. The early idea was 
to inspire rigorous technological innovation with the aim of greatly improving energy and 
materials efficiencies (Everett and Neu, 2000). 
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distract[ing] us from asking difficult questions about the role of environmental 
accounting in perpetuating unequal and exploitative social relations. (Everett and 
Neu, 2000, p.6)  
This limits our discourse to ignore the fact that separation of human beings from 
their ecological environment and discrimination of nonhumans or even particular 
groups under a white male capitalist human regime still takes place. Everett and Neu 
(2000, p.23) express the danger of (mainstream) environmental accounting’s 
discourse: 
to an extent, discourse – the contextually-specific way we talk about, write 
about, and represent the world we live in (Harvey 1996: 78) – constrains, 
controls and masters us.  
Yet discourse can also be enabling and transformative in nature:  
certain discourses need to be changed, particularly those that suggest that the 
only way out of the ecological crisis is through further industrialization; that we 
need not pay serious attention to current social relations and the capitalist mode 
of production; or that we must depend on the treadmill of ‘economic growth. 
(Everett and Neu, 2000, p.23) 
6.2.3.2 Deep Green 
A deep green ethical stance identifies modernity underpinning ideologies (e.g., 
liberal capitalism and Marxism) grounded in anthropocentric humanism as the source 
of the environmental crisis. It challenges anthropocentrism, which it considers 
“environmentally hazardous legitimating ideology” (Andrew, 2000, p.204) with the 
aim of encouraging consideration for nature and the rights of other living species in 
our decision-making. The possibility of the market to mediate or correct the 
exploitation and misallocation of natural resources is rejected. And underpinning 
concepts of modernity such as development and economic progress are challenged 
on those grounds. A critique on deep green is given by Wildavsky (1994, p.478): 
The darkest green environmentalists want to replace capitalism with a better 
political economy but are unable to specify it or to provide appropriate forms of 
accounting. 
From the viewpoint of the author of this thesis, the issue mentioned by Wildavsky is 
the biggest drawback of this ethical stance imposed on researchers’ endeavours (for 
further criticism and discussion see Zimmerman, 1987; Fox, 2003; Andrew, 2000; 
Sale, 1990; Jones, 2010; King, 1996). Habermas and Wildavsky (1994), posit that the 
capitalist system will persist even after major crises (e.g., global financial crisis) take 
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place, because of the lack of alternative political economies; in the same vein 
Churchill, in a House of Commons speech on 11 November 1947, stated: 
‘Democracy [capitalism] is the worst form of government [political economy], 
except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’. Another 
critique is advanced by eco-feminism, which accuses the deep ecology perspective of 
neglecting gender discrimination and notes “that patriarchy plays a pivotal role in the 
domination of nature (Salleh, 1992; Slicer, 1995)” (Andrew, 2000, p.205). 
6.2.3.3 Ecofeminism 
Drawing on feminism and its aversion towards masculine and capitalist values, 
ecofeminism adds an ecological perspective to the claim of suppression of both 
women and nature, under the masculine discourse underpinned by a ”logic of 
domination” (Warren, 1990, p.128). It is not a focus on women that dominates 
ecofeminism but the rejection of the patriarchal system of domination:  
structures of patriarchy need to be recognized as the major source of oppressive 
technologies, ideologies and practices and that they are implicated in the 
domination of nature, women and also the domination of men that do not 
identify with the traditional white, property owning stereotype (minority 
cultures, indigenous peoples and issues of race and poverty are not excluded, see 
Cheney 1987, Zimmerman 1987, Salleh 1992, Slicer 1995). (Andrew, 2000, 
p.211) 
Yet an analysis focused on gender fails to consider class struggles and ethnicity. The 
replacement of a patriarchal, capitalist system with matriarchy bears several issues. It 
is not easy to identify and separate masculine and feminine characteristics, nor is it 
possible to know ex ante if a matriarchy is a better system since positive and negative 
traits are inherent to it (Archambault, 1993; Zimmerman, 1987). 
6.2.3.4 Social Ecology 
Social ecology aims to overcome the individualist attitude prevailing in advanced 
capitalist societies to allow more environmentally friendly and conscious stances. 
Beck and van Loon (2011, p.112) state:  
If the post-war modernization narrative presupposes the separation of ‘natural’ 
and ‘societal’ forces … climate change actually demonstrates and enforces 
exactly the opposite: an ongoing extension and deepening of combinations, 
confusions and ‘mixtures’ of nature and society; it makes a mockery of the 
premise that society and nature are separate and mutually exclusive …  
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Social ecologists see environmental pollution rooted in the human domination of 
nature enforced through capitalist conduct. The inequality among classes, skills or 
even among humans in society also reflects the inequality between human and non-
human nature. Nature is seen as inferior to humans and can therefore be deployed for 
profit. Yet according to a social ecology stance, human beings and the environment 
are interrelated (Jones, 2010; Lehman, 1996; Bookchin, 1995). 
From the perspective of social ecology, mainstream accounting ignores the 
ecological crisis and the conflicts between economic growth and environmental 
sustainability; thus it is inadequate as a means to discharge social and environmental 
accountability (Lehman, 2002; Shearer, 2002). One branch of social ecology not only 
adopts Marx’s emancipatory aims but also fills the gap of a neglected environment. 
Therefore, it resolves the contradictions of production and ecology and abandons the 
neo-classical capitalist prioritisation of profit maximisation and economic growth 
(Andrew, 2000; Shearer, 2002). That is, it overcomes the prevailing short-term focus 
with the desire for a more balanced value system that takes into account 
environmental wellbeing and social welfare (Cooper and Sherer, 1984a; Hargrove, 
1989; Lehman, 2002). This perspective calls on accounting to fully realise its 
emancipatory potential and also for alternative forms of accounting practice that 
support accountability beyond the narrow focus of financial interest (Dillard, et al., 
2005; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Batley and Tozer, 1993). Social ecology allows 
accounting to facilitate a dialogue with stakeholder groups including those who are 
not a contractual party to the company to further awarenes, a holistic understanding 
of company imposed effects on the world and what is of significance to communities 
(Cooper and Owen, 2007). This would allow an examination of the reliability of 
SEAR’s data, comprehensiveness or consistency within the public realm to foster 
democratic social and ecological progress (Dillard, et al., 2005).  
The MACC has the ability to encourage stakeholder dialogue and discharge 
accountability, as outlined in Chapter 2. The MACC can have emancipatory 
attributes to assist those interested in curbing global warming as a result of the GHG 
build up in our atmosphere by providing a means of holding companies accountable 
to their CO2-e abatement investment opportunities. This has the potential to move 
companies away from pure profit considerations into a public discourse about future 
abatement opportunities. As a result there will be a greater emphasis on the 
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environment and more environmentally sound conduct by companies. Yet it does not 
comprise social premises but shifts the notion of progress and development into 
different connotations to shift the ‘future future’ of climate change into the ‘present 
future’, as Beck demands. Beck considers the threat of climate change to be a 
mobiliser for actions to curb the worst effects; and the MACC can be a useful tool 
for companies to undertake investments (Seufert and Andrew, 2014). Actions are not 
restricted to the corporate world, and advanced nations that are mostly accountable 
for the build-up of GHGs should take the lead in actions against climate change. 
Informed citizens can provide or withdraw legitimacy from governments and their 
climate policies.  
6.2.3.5 Political–Ethical Stance 
The above ‘environmental ethical’ stance and the ‘political-ethical’ one inform this 
study: a German Critical Theoretical perspective from Habermas’ legitimation crisis 
refined by Beck’s thoughts on ecological crisis with numerous other value-laden 
perspectives (Held, 1980; Laughlin, 1995). There is an emancipator and the 
acknowledgement of groups within the community suffering from suppression and 
disempowerment (Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997). This research recognises the 
contributions of the social and environmental dimensions to the wellbeing of any 
individual. This stance helps ‘constitute and stimulate a more meaningful and deeper 
assessment of “value”’ (Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p.81). Consistent with this 
point of view there is a belief in the emancipatory and enabling nature of accounting 
guided by critical thought (Chioni Moore, 1991) which allows  
for radical emancipatory social change through making things visible and 
comprehensible and helping engender dialogue and action towards emancipatory 
change. (Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p.82)  
The aim of this study is to shed light on the role of Qantas in the late capitalist 
context of Australia and evolving actions against climate change through the lens of 
Habermas and Beck’s theories, involving an enhancement of accountability of 
Qantas and the Australia government for their climate change actions or policies. 
Annual reports and SEAR are means to manage crises and maintain corporate 
legitimacy through discharge of accountability in the light of global warming. 




The term ‘accountability’ refers to an entity’s duty to account for those actions for 
which it is held accountable (Gray, et al., 1997). There is an explicit and implicit 
relation for the right of information between interest groups, individuals and 
organisations. From a narrow neoliberal perspective accountability informs 
shareholders in order to enable them to allocate their financial resources efficiently 
(Lehman, 1999). Such a ‘procedural accountability’ has put corporations into the role 
to drive “social change at the expense of other levels of society” (Lehman, 1999, 
p.232). In a broader sense, accounting not only has a moral obligation to provide 
information to assist in the construction of justice, fairness and viability within 
society, but also a process of negotiation, articulation and explanation. (Lehman, 
1999). The current SEA literature sees a radical potential in the concept of 
accountability (Owen, 2008) and many scholars have engaged with environmental 
accountability experiments (Adams, 2004; Bebbington, et al., 2001) to express non-
market values in a more complete and alternative manner, given the existing 
dominant business rhetoric (Milne, et al., 2003; Laine, 2010; Thielemann, 2000; 
Gray, 2013). Furthermore, Lehman (1999, p.232) demands: 
While social and environmental accountants are right to insist on the state’s 
protecting the rights and procedures for democratic accountability, a more 
adequate account involves developing the inter-relationships between civil 
society and the state. Modern environmental accounting and auditing do not give 
enough emphasis to the scope for politics in civil society or to its relationships 
with the state. 
Also, SEA could allow for and encourage the public assessment of the accuracy of 
claims from the economic system (Gray, 2013). Following Habermas’ argument that 
modern communities can be reformed to measure the sort of communication that is 
incompatible with the ‘good life’ (accountability) (Lehman, 1999), Lehman (2001, 
p.720) introduces the notion of placement ethics: 
The placement ethic reflects Habermas’ notion of a discourse arena where 
differences are debated, and involves two steps. The first outlines key 
assumptions on which different theorists develop their insights … The second 
provides a means to reconstruct a radical and participative democratic system 
that is committed to explaining the possibilities open to humanity. 
The present study draws on the above claims: the MACC can provide a silent 
account of CO2-e abatement investments that have not been undertaken. The public, 
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under the threat of global warming, can assess the accuracy and claims of Qantas’ 
MACC. The following section will provide an account of the unique position of 
Qantas within Australia, drawing on Habermas’ legitimation crisis and Ulrich Beck’s 
ecological crisis. The relation between the economic system represented by Qantas, 
the administrative system represented by the Australian government and authorities, 
and the social system represented by the Australian people, will be explored to 
highlight the (hidden) relations of accountability and connections in the wake of 
actions against climate change. According to Beck, accountability for the ecological 
crisis exists not only between government and society but also between future 
societies and other nations. For Beck it is the role of (sociological) research to bring 
the ‘future future’ into the ‘present future’ to efficiently curb the ecological crisis. 
One such means, as will be argued later (Chapter 7), is the MACC. The 
accountability relations, as will be shown, are incremental to understanding the crisis 
as outlined by Habermas and Beck. Habermas outlines some accountability of the 
nation state to prevent economic crisis while being responsible to its people to use 
tax income rationally, otherwise producing a rationality crisis. If people withdraw 
their support (motivation crisis) from the government in the wake of climate change 
(ecological crisis) the government faces a legitimation crisis. The following findings 
will illustrate how Qantas manages its legitimation and accountability relationships 
within the Australian context through the provision of accounts. 
6.3 CRISES IN RELATION TO QANTAS AND THE AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 
6.3.1 Qantas’ Economic Crises 
Both before and after its liberalisation, the Australian aviation market has been 
characterised as an oligopoly. The privatisation of Qantas was driven by a free-
market ideology and the domestic market has been dominated by Qantas, particularly 
since Ansett Airlines went into bankruptcy and as a result of Qantas’ merger with 
Australian Airlines. However, even though Qantas has been the market leader within 
Australia it has faced challenges through international and national competitors, the 
introduction of the Australian and European ETS, staff and labour cost-related issues, 
and the burden from increasing fuel and financing costs. Each of these ‘crises’ will 
be elaborated on next.  
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6.3.1.1 International Competition 
As of March 2014, Australia has Air Service Agreements with 89 countries. These 
agreements determine how often airlines from a particular country can fly into 
Australia and therefore compete with Qantas in the international aviation market. 
Qantas Airways Limited’s main competitors are: Singapore Airlines, Emirates, 
Virgin Australia, Jetstar, Air New Zealand, Cathay Pacific Airways, Malaysia 
Airlines, Thai Airways and AirAsia X. During 2012 and 2013 these airlines held a 
combined market share of 57%. 
According to Habermas, the government does not assume the role of global planner 
of the economic system but allows the natural forces of capitalism to expand 
naturally in an economic environment that becomes more and more internationalised. 
From 2005 to 2013 under the ‘free market’, Qantas Group’s share of the international 
aviation market in Australia declined from 30% to 26% with Qantas Airways losing 
almost one third of its market share over this period, from 28% to 18%. Over the 
same period, Jetstar increased its market share from 2% to 8%. These developments 
contributed to the domestic regimentation of markets for labour as will be shown 
below. 
One reason for Qantas’ declining market share might be the competition on Asian 
and European routes with full-service airlines. Emirates, Etihad, Singapore Airlines, 
Air New Zealand and Malaysia Airlines receive government benefits either through 
income tax breaks or support in capital. They also have advantages through lower 
labour costs and through their geographical locations as aviation hubs.  
The last period in which Qantas International achieved a positive return on assets 
(Clark, 2011) was in 2008, when the Australian economy was booming and Qantas 
International’s seat capacity was stagnant. As the international market and conditions 
for capital and labour procurement intensified the pressure on diminishing profit 
rates, the Australian government had a greater need to fill the functional gaps of the 
market. Qantas’ domestically employed staff also faced pressures for lower wages. 
Another example of the extended impact of international competition on the 
domestic market (Habermas, 1998) was the overcapacity on the protected routes 
between North America and Australia, another reason for Qantas’ poor performance. 
In the past Qantas had had the advantage of a reputation for safety over its direct 
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competitor United Airlines on this route. Yet during a period when Virgin and Delta 
entered into the competition and provided increased seat capacity, when the US 
economy experienced a recession and when a high Australian dollar caused the 
demand to fall, Qantas introduced the A380. Conditions improved when the US 
economy recovered and the Australian dollar depreciated (Ergas, 2014). According 
to (Zander, 2014, p.1), ‘Qantas has dug its own grave through mismanagement’, and 
thus intensified the economic crisis. For international operations this meant a loss of 
about $200 million (2010/11), $484 million (2011/12), $246 million (2012/13) and 
$262 million as of 31 December 2013, all measured in ‘underlying EBIT’. The 
rationale for choosing this type of accounting construct over ‘statuary profit’ might 
lie in comparability with airlines from other countries. EBIT excludes income tax 
expenses and allows the impact of corporate tax rates from different countries on the 
profit to be overcome. To exclude interest expenses is by far a more serious 
assumption since no company is fully equity financed. Accounting is thus used to 
reduce the extent of Qantas’ economic crisis. 
Nevertheless, the economic crisis in international business led Alan Joyce to 
conclude that “Qantas International absorbs a large amount of capital that could 
arguably better be invested in growing and profitable businesses in the group” 
(Fitzsimmons, 2011, p.2). Accounting communicates this worsening international 
situation as well as the costs of actions to curb the crisis within the international 
business segment at cost of $376 million which contributed to Qantas Groups’ loss of 
$244 million. Yet the plan was justified by Qantas management: it would “turn 
around Qantas’ international network” (Qantas, 2012a, p.4) and “improve business 
economics and transform the cost base in order to develop a strong and viable 
business” (Qantas, 2012a, p.22). In the 2013 annual report Qantas’ CEO announced 
that Qantas “reduced Group-wide comparable unit costs by 5 per cent (including a 5 
per cent reduction for Qantas International)” (Qantas, 2013a, p.7). Therefore, the 
international market conditions place direct (cost) constraints on the national 
procurement of labour and other commodities for Qantas to remain competitive. 
The transformation of national business implies a higher interconnectedness with the 
world economy (Habermas 1998), and accounting is a means to understand such a 
development, as is evident from Qantas’ partnership with Emirates. To further curb 
the crisis of international operations Qantas entered into a partnership with Emirates 
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that took effect from 31 March 2013. The combined market share of all international 
flights from and to Australia as of 30 June 2013 totals 26% (17.2% Qantas and 8.8% 
Emirates), resulting in an economic concentration within the existing aviation 
oligopoly. Besides an increase in sales figures Qantas has “taken significant costs 
permanently out of the business” (Jacob, 2013, p.2), and there have been benefits for 
Qantas’ customers in the form of more destinations being available and a shorter 
time to reach (European) destinations beyond those already offered under previously 
existing code share agreements and networks.  
Qantas creates the impression that the market concentration resulting from the 
partnership with Emirates benefits tourist destinations and the local tourism industry, 
thereby legitimising its partnership with Emirates. Yet it is unclear if the overall 
number of bookings has increased or only the sales for Qantas. The annual reports 
hide the actual revenue or profit figures that result from code sharing with Emirates, 
and so the question about the benefits Qantas has gained remains unanswered. In any 
case, the gain was not significant enough to turn the loss of Qantas’ international 
operation as at 31 December 2013 of $262 million (measured in Underlying EBIT) 
into a profit or even bring it to the same level of the previous year, a loss of 
$91 million. Neither could it offset the impact of foreign exchange, undesirable 
developments in fuel cost nor the oversupply of market capacity “as a result of 
aggressive competitor growth largely from foreign government owned or sponsored 
airlines” (Qantas, 2014a, p.5). With regard to ecological disasters, the national 
boundaries for economic matters do not act as ‘watersheds’ as suggested by Beck. 
Later in this thesis it will be illustrated how Qantas and the Australian government 
address, maintain or draw on competitive and economic inequalities in their own 
self-interest as a political issue.  
6.3.1.2 National Competition 
The Qantas Group’s market share of the Australian domestic aviation market was 
66% in 2005/2006 and 65% in 2012/2013 reaching a high of 67% in 2006/2007 and a 
low of 64% in 2007/2008. While the Qantas Group’s domestic market share has not 
varied significantly, Qantas Airways has served fewer and fewer passengers while 
Jetstar’s market share almost doubled from 12% in 2005/2006 to 23% in 2012/2013. 
This shift has had cost implications and has put pressure on labour while weakening 
the position of labour unions during wage negotiations, as supported by Habermas.  
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According to Virgin (2013), the domestic market capacity as at July 2013 was: 
Qantas 62%, Virgin (including Tiger) 34% and Other 4%. Qantas and Virgin possess 
more than 95% market share in Australia and therefore form a duopoly.  
Qantas in its investor presentation mentions the “[u]neven playing field distorting the 
marketplace” (Qantas, 2014b, p.19) and provides as evidence the list of state-owned 
airlines – Etihad, Singapore Airlines and Air New Zealand, their stake within Virgin 
and the extent of state-ownership. Virgin has also received cash injections – in 
November 2012 a $105 million share placement to Singapore Airlines and in 
November 2013 $350 million in equity. –The Qantas CEO used these arguments to 
justify Qantas’ worsening market position and demands a ‘free-market’ and ‘free-
competition’ without distortion from foreign state-owned enterprises. It is a claim for 
a ‘neoliberal absenteeism’ and Qantas’ CEO is using the accounting discourse to 
manifest his claims. Yet it will become apparent from the analysis below that 
accounting hides the actual role of the Australian government in filling ‘functional 
gaps in the market’ and propping up Qantas.  
Other than in the international market context, Qantas does not mention its cost 
situation. Even though it faces 19% higher domestic unit costs compared to Virgin, 
its revenue per domestic seat kilometre is about one third higher than Virgin’s. As 
such, Qantas has a clear advantage and a higher domestic operating margin. Over the 
last two years there was an increase in air travel capacity – measured in available seat 
kilometres – within the domestic market of 12%. While Qantas’ capacity increased 
more than Virgin’s in absolute terms, its domestic unit revenues did not decline as 
much as Virgin’s, which fell by 8% last year. Therefore, Virgin pays a high price for 
its increased market share, and Qantas with its target of retaining 65% market share 
has a reduced return of assets within the domestic market which is now only 6%. 
That is, Qantas achieved only $57 million underlying EBIT as a half-year result as of 
31 December 2013 compared to $218 million in the previous year (Ergas, 2014). 
However, as Virgin Australia’s chief executive John Borghetti put it: 
Qantas is three to four times bigger than us [Virgin]. It has … almost $3 billion 
in cash … It has dominant positions in every single sector of the domestic 
market; it is hell bent, and by their own words by the way, of adding two aircraft 
for every aircraft that we add irrespective, irrespective of the financial outcome, 
so I think it’s a bit rich turning that around. (Grimson, 2014, p.1) 
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Qantas highlights the perceived market distortion which results from government-
backed airlines which own around 90% of Virgin and the consequential 
disadvantages for itself to further arguments for the Australian government to pursue 
a free market and to free competition with an even playing field. Qantas here has 
constructed a crisis in the form of unfair competition for its domestic operation while 
the reasons for the actual decline in profitability also lie in management decisions 
and especially the capacity ‘war’ with the Qantas obsession that they need to have 
65% of the domestic market share. Accounting discourse deliberately hides ‘the 
golden pot of gold’ on which Qantas is sitting but uses the crisis for purposes that 
will be explained below.  
6.3.1.3 Australian Actions against Climate Change  
On 1 July 2012 the Australian government introduced as part of its promise to the 
Australian electorate the Australian Carbon Pricing Scheme. Qantas used their 
disclosure to depict this event either as opportunity or cost. First, Qantas highlights 
its voluntary commitment to reduce its “environmental impact and [to] have a 
comprehensive strategy for doing so, in line [with] the global industry goals 
established by the International Air Transport Association” (Qantas, 2011c, p.1)  
In the 2007 election, which was won by Kevin Rudd, there was a significant 
momentum for climate change action. As an Australian icon, Qantas had to take this 
mobilisation for action on board if it were to comply with societal values and 
maintain its legitimacy. At this point in time climate change threats were a ‘mobilizer 
for actions’ (Beck). In the wake of the introduction of the Carbon Pricing Scheme, 
Qantas saw the opportunity to request support from the government for its own 
actions. Contrary to a neoliberal ideology and state absenteeism, Qantas invited 
funding under the “Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) to advance the 
commercialisation and deployment of clean technologies” (Qantas, 2011c, p.1). Also 
in the interests of Qantas, the Australian government signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the US to facilitate the development of biofuels and to create 
additional investment opportunities for (Australian) capital; this can also be seen as a 
new form of cooperation and solidarity which goes beyond (insufficient) actions 
within national boundaries. Biofuels, if cost effective, would help Qantas reduce 
exposure to ‘costly’ payments for carbon permits under any ETS and thus reduce its 
financial burdens. Second, prior to the introduction of the AU ETS Qantas mentioned 
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it would face additional costs of $110 to $115 million. The ‘carbon tax’ imposed on 
airlines was in the form of an increased levy on aviation fuel. One the one hand, 
Qantas used this to justify total levies up to $60 in domestic and international fares as 
a result of a price on carbon. Even though Qantas claimed for increased costs, the 
overall financial effect depends on the cost pass through to customers. On the other 
hand, Qantas expressed its hope to join emission trading “to purchase market-based 
carbon credits, which is available to other industries, [which] will allow the Qantas 
Group to manage its cost of carbon through all available abatement measures within 
the broader carbon scheme” (Qantas, 2011c, p.2). The commodity of carbon permits 
could be purchased at very low cost on an international level, and thus delay 
emissions abatement investments. Currently, Qantas argues for economic burdens, a 
reinforcement of its economic crisis and uses the price on carbon as a legitimate 
reason to increase its fares, while the Australian government’s action regarding a 
price on carbon was legitimised by the people’s will for climate action.  
Even though Qantas intensified its disclosure on environmental activities (see below 
examples on biofuels, trigeneration and the voluntary offset program), the economic 
pressure to reduce aviation fuel consumption has been constantly present since it is 
the highest cost factor, apart from labour. Other than the labour market, Qantas has 
no power to ‘suppress’ this commodity market but the price of fuel is rather imposed 
on it from international markets. In order to reduce these costs Qantas introduced the 
BeGreen program to encourage its staff to identify fuel-saving opportunities. At this 
stage, measures for CO2 reduction are implemented in the light of the ‘economic 
crisis’ faced by Qantas without any threat of legitimation. On the contrary, Qantas 
was questioned for its decision to reject the purchase of B777 aircraft as replacement 
for older, less fuel-efficient aircraft. There would have been a financial outlet, yet the 
fuel consumption and environmental impact would have been lowered. In the wake 
of its loss announcement in the international business for the financial year ending 
June 2012, Qantas also cancelled orders for 35 290-seat Boing 787-9s. This decision 
will worsen Qantas’ position in the international marketplace for long-haul flights, 
and increased fuel costs will further contribute to an economic downward spiral since 
Qantas is already among the worst performers in terms of environmental, CO2-e 
related efficiency (Arjomandi and Seufert 2014). The implicit aim to secure Qantas’ 
‘above junk’ credit rating and to avoid financing costs associated with the purchase 
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of new planes might be the main driver behind these decisions. The economic 
imperatives superseded Qantas’ commitments to an increased fuel efficiency and 
more environmental conduct (the economic and CO2-e impact of such a decision can 
be illustrated with a MACC). The Australian government leaves these capital 
investment decisions to the market as long as its own rationality and legitimation is 
not under threat. 
On a global stage, the 191 members of ICAO endorsed at the 38th assembly at the 
end of 2013 that a cap and trade market-based mechanism for the aviation sector 
would be introduced by 2020 and that the next assembly would specify the steps for 
its implementation. This implies that Qantas necessarily faces a price on its CO2-e 
emissions from 2020 onwards (ICAO, 2013). The ICAO as a supranational 
organisation makes decisions that impact on nations’ policies without facing direct 
needs for legitimation; yet deficit of legitimation can result for nation states if their 
electorates withdraw their support as the result of a motivation crisis.  
For Qantas to keep a green image, annual reports and SEAR are actively used in the 
following examples. 
6.3.1.3.1 Biofuels 
We need to get ready for a future that is not based on traditional jet fuel or 
frankly we don’t have a future. (AAP, 2012, p.1) 
Qantas conducted Australia’s first ‘sustainable aviation fuel’ powered flight on 12 
April 2012. This flight was to raise awareness for the viability of ‘sustainable 
aviation fuel’ in commercial aviation. During a period when Australians were 
supportive of climate change actions, this initiative improved Qantas’ image as an 
environmentally sound company, which was also reflected in increased disclosure 
about this flight and other ‘green actions’. The term ‘sustainable aviation fuel’ hides 
the fact that 40% to 60% of the CO2-e emissions captured by plants and released by 
the combustion of biofuel is additionally caused during the manufacturing process, 
notwithstanding the emissions caused during the process of planting, harvesting and 
transporting the input. Yet the Australian Carbon Pricing Scheme benefits biofuels 
by excluding all of their emissions and those from their production process. Given a 
price of $23 per tCO2-e the subsidy would be $9.20 and $13.80 (40% or 60% CO2-e 
emissions from the production process), respectively. In Habermas’ terms the 
Australian government is attempting to fill a functional gap of capitalism, that is, to 
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curb some of the environmental and adverse climate effects of production in the 
provision of aviation services, which otherwise would not have taken place. At the 
same time additional investment opportunities for excess capital is provided. The 
government, through the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) provided 
$575,000 of a total project value of $950,000 (ARENA, 2013) to Qantas, Shell and 
other partners to conduct a study into the viability of Australian-based biofuel 
production. While it is technically feasible to operate a biofuel production plant with 
a capacity of 1.1 billion litres per year, the report identifies three obstacles. First, the 
price and volume of feedstock available in Australia is not sufficient, thus 
“investment, research and development in production of emerging feedstocks” 
(Qantas, 2013e, p.1) is suggested. Second, the infrastructure for the refinery process 
would require additional capital costs. And finally, an extension of the bio-diesel 
grant to bio-aviation fuel is demanded.  
A Qantas source claims: 
But until it [bio-jet fuel] is produced … at a competitive price, the industry will 
not be able to realise its true benefits. [Also, n]o single player can make this 
happen: it needs support from government, private sector investment, access to 
infrastructure and market demand. (Qantas, 2012f) 
The above highlights two interrelated issues. First, the economic considerations of 
cost, investment and extent of government support limit environmental investments. 
The government needs to fill the market gap, create investment opportunities, or 
otherwise cope with the environmental impact of capitalist production, while it 
cannot restrict or force the naturally developing capital flows to fill this gap. Second, 
the government support illustrates the ‘neoliberal coalition’ between capital and state 
even if it is not overturning the existing ‘order’, as Beck claims. Qantas’ discourse 
reveals presentism through the sole focus on cost, market prices and financial 
viability. Accounting figures in such a sense build a ‘watershed’ demarcating the 
important economic from the ‘other’, illustrating the temporal dilemma of climate 
action cited by Beck: the current generation will have to assume greater burdens to 
benefit subsequent generations.  
6.3.1.3.2 Sydney Airport’s Trigeneration Plant 
GridX invested $21 million under a BOOM arrangement with Qantas to install two 
trigeneration plants with a capacity of 11.9 megawatts or 95,000MW/h output per 
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year, which reduces about 40% or 14,000 tonnes of CO2 emissions every year. 
Construction began in late 2011 and operations commenced in April 2012. These 
power plants are noted as being 80% energy efficient compared to the 35% energy 
efficiency of conventional coal-fired power plants: 
The tri-generation facility would use natural gas, the most common fuel for tri-
generation due to its relatively low cost, ease of transport (via pipeline), wide 
availability and lower greenhouse intensity per unit of energy. (Qantas, 2012c, 
p.1)  
Qantas claims this plant is part of their commitment to ‘reducing our energy use and 
carbon emissions on the ground as well as in the air, and trigeneration is a big step 
forward for us in Sydney’ (Qantas, 2013g, p.1). Yet the environmental impact has to 
be put into context. First, emissions from non-flight activities are only 3% of Qantas’ 
total GHG emissions. A reduction of 14,000 tCO2 per year compared to 12 billion 
tonnes a year of total emission from Qantas sets the figure in a different perspective. 
Second, a MACC could show far more extensive CO2-e abatement opportunities (see 
Chapter 7) and their respective costs. Finally, there is a cost consideration in this 
arrangement, such as cost savings from lower electricity and energy bills, 
independence from the electricity supply and even benefits from selling excess 
electricity to the grid. Electricity prices were continuously increasing within 
Australia and the CPS was meant to accelerate the price surge. All of this casts doubt 
over Qantas’ true intentions: this attempt to benefit the environment and depict itself 
in annual reports and public media as a ‘green’ company also enables Qantas to 
legitimise itself.  
6.3.1.3.3 Voluntary Offset Program  
Qantas started its voluntary offset initiative late in 2007 to allow Qantas and Jetstar 
passengers to purchase offsets for their share of emissions on a flight. By mid-2008 
Jetstar had collected payments of $600,000 accounting for 12% of all passengers 
booking at jetstar.com in Australia. Qantas itself demonstrated its commitment to the 
program and offset all of its staff’s travel and emissions from the Group’s ground 
transport vehicles. On its ‘Fly Carbon Neutral Day’ Qantas offset emissions from 
950 international and domestic Qantas, QantasLink and Jetstar flights performed on 
this day.  
 
161 
On its webpage Qantas presents some of the projects and their respective amounts of 
CO2 abatement: 90,000 mallee eucalyptus trees (40,000 tonnes over a 30-year 
period); Fieldforce efficient light bulbs and water saving showerheads (140,000 
tonnes); Siam Cement biomass project (600,000 tonnes/year); cook-stoves in 
Cambodia reducing GHG emissions (350,000/year); native forest protection project 
in Tasmania (90,000 tonnes/year); Hebei Kangbao Sanxiatian wind power in China 
(25,000 tonnes/year)36. According to the provider of these projects, the wind power 
project in China already required an initial investment of about RMB629 million 
(currently $109 million). The voluntary offset program illustrates that first, 
Australians have had the motivation to take actions to curb global warming and 
second, Qantas picked up on the trend to provide the means for its passengers to 
offset their carbon footprint. Like the trigeneration plant project mentioned 
previously, the above projects are not significant compared to Qantas’ total 
emissions, but are aimed towards legitimising its operation and reducing financial 
burdens imposed through the CPS during a time of high motivation for climate action 
in Australia. 
6.3.1.4 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
Under changes to the EU’s emissions trading scheme, Qantas would be forced to 
pay a tax on 15 per cent of its carbon emissions from its nearest port of call, the 
national carrier told a meeting of business leaders in Canberra this week. (AAP, 
2011 p.1) 
From 1 January 2012 flights that either depart and/or land within Europe are included 
in the EU ETS. Regarding emissions in the base year 2010 airlines received 85% free 
permits while 15% were auctioned. As a result, Qantas imposed additional charges of 
up to $3.50 on flights to and from London and Frankfurt to offset the estimated total 
cost of $2.3 million, which contributed to the economic crisis in Qantas’ 
international business sector. Apart from the fact that airlines might fulfil their 
requirements under the EU ETS by purchasing CERs (Ares, 2011) and consequently 
are likely to make a profit from participating (EC, 2014), the Australian media’s 
rhetoric exemplified by the above statement illustrates how the public was misled 
and an economic crisis was constructed. In Beck’s terms nation’s border function as 
watershed so that the European attempt to put a price on CO2 emissions from the 
                                                 
36 CO2 figures derived from http://www.climatefriendly.com.  
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aviation sector would be strongly opposed by Qantas. The (national) rhetoric of a 
‘tax’ imposed on ‘the national carrier’ is simply false and an attempt to undermine 
the actual idea of holding airlines accountable for their emissions and to trigger some 
behavioural change within airlines. Yet in the light of additional profits to airlines 
and Qantas, the EU ETS in the first place might be just another way to benefit 
‘capital’ in an international, global marketplace. Again the economic welfare of 
Qantas was put above actions against climate change. After the European 
Commission faced much criticism, the inclusion of aviation under the EU ETS has 
been largely suspended and is only applicable to flights that both start and land 
within the European Economic Area (EC, 2014). This is an illustration how the 
policy of a supranational body is undermined by the interests of other nations’ capital 
and policymakers.  
6.3.1.5 Fuel Costs and Depreciation  
Aviation fuel is essential for airlines and for Qantas it comprises 25% of total costs. 
Through combustion aviation fuel turns into CO2-e and other emissions, which are 
drivers of global warming. The price of aviation fuel is determined by international 
markets and has had the tendency to increase over time, thus imposing higher costs 
on airlines. Representatives of Qantas identified the surge of fuel prices as a reason 
for the economic crisis of Qantas and for the need to forward some of the additional 
costs to its passengers in the form of a fuel surcharge. Recently this cost pass-through 
was on some routes up to $60 per person each way. Since Qantas cannot control the 
price of this commodity or find substitutes, efficiency improvements are the only 
way to reduce fuel consumption under a given level of output. Qantas, when 
compared to the world’s major airlines, is in terms of fuel efficiency rather badly 
positioned (Arjomandi and Seufert, 2014), yet it mentioned a wide repertoire of 
strategies to improve its fuel efficiency. This accounting, cost-based rhetoric 
excludes the environmental implications of less fuel consumption indicating that, 
again, the economic supersedes the environmental.  
The economic and implicit environmental impact was in conflict with the financial, 
that is, the purchase of new, more fuel-efficient aircraft was suspended in the attempt 
to keep Qantas’ credit rating up and financing costs down. This decision, however, 
implied a sensitivity of costs to the volatility of fuel prices and negative impact on 
the financial and also ecological bottom line.  
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Qantas has, in terms of depreciation, disadvantages compared to its competition, 
which face much shorter depreciation periods. The Australian government might use 
longer depreciation to smooth its income from the aviation sector, ceteris paribus, 
lower depreciation means less tax-deductible expense and thus a higher tax base. 
Additionally, Qantas claims this circumstance contributes to its economic crisis and 
discourages it from buying new aircraft. Also, the price of airplanes is set by Boeing, 
Airbus or Bombardier and only marginally subject to variations.  
The internationalisation of both commodity markets illustrates the narrowed array of 
possible ‘market manipulations’ available to the Australian government and the ‘end 
of protectionism’. The entanglement of Australian and international trade is apparent. 
Since Qantas has to take both commodity prices of fuel and new aircraft as well as 
their deprecation cycles as given, it has to turn to labour (costs) to recover from its 
economic crisis – with the possibility of social erosion and challenged democratic 
stability. 
6.3.1.6 Labour  
You can't run an airline by declaring war on your own workforce.  
Sir Rod Eddington 
Labour expenses have been either the second or the biggest cost item on Qantas’ 
profit and loss statement. Although Qantas mentions on several occasions that its 
staff is its most valuable ‘asset’, employee relations and especially wage negotiations 
have shown Qantas’ drive for a regimentation of markets for labour. The 1989 labour 
dispute resulted in the destruction of the Pilots’ Federation and a general weakening 
of pilots’ bargaining power, which was of particular significance in the context of the 
planned privatisation within the Australian aviation sector. The government of the 
time supported the interests of capital in various ways (for details see Chapter 3). 
Nevertheless, Qantas took further measures to reduce the cost of labour as an attempt 
to curb its economic crisis. This included the closure of maintenance/IT facilities and 
outsourcing to other companies/nations; sourcing labour from other countries with 
lower labour costs such as the UK, Thailand and New Zealand; and cutting back on 
staff. The economic crisis legitimised, in spite of protest from some groups, the 
redundancy of employees and their weakened bargaining power. Yet Qantas’ 
legitimation was strongly challenged when its senior management decided to ground 
the fleet to force the Australian government to step in and stop labour unions’ 
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actions. The grounding left a vast number of passengers stranded and dissatisfied 
with their national carrier. Qantas’ verbal response included the urgent need to stop 
the costly wage fight and secure its future and competitiveness. This even justified 
the huge loss from the grounding of Qantas’ fleet and losing its customers’ 
confidence. The internationalisation of the aviation market and other (including 
labour) commodity markets exerted strong pressure on Qantas to cut costs, which 
was only possible by imposing a wage agreement favourable to the capitalist Qantas 
on them. Therefore, Habermas’ observation that, during wage negotiations, labour 
unions and employee representatives (‘wage-scale partners’) find a broad range of 
compromise as increased labour costs can be passed through into prices, does not 
apply here. Rather, the Australian government favouring capital’s interests interfered 
in wage negotiations and allowed Qantas to achieve an outcome that suppressed 
labour. At this point, the class structures and differences between labour and 
bourgeois capitalist interests were revealed, yet were kept latent and not further 
politicised. 
The argument of international competition as a driver to cut labour costs is also 
evident from Qantas’ practices, which faced allegations of employing international 
staff on the domestic arm of international flights in government hearings. This 
practice further cut costs since those international flight attendants were employed on 
lower wages, and replaced Australian employees. Qantas legitimised this wage 
discrimination on cost grounds, that it would otherwise be forced to stop these 
domestic operations. The Australian government had no other option then to 
compensate those made redundant by Qantas with social transfer payments or by 
creating alternative job opportunities. 
Jetstar employees belong to a lesser extent to labour unions and therefore the 
increased power of capital imposes wage conditions on them, resulting in a much 
lower ‘cost base’ compared to Qantas – one reason why some politicians suspect that 
capacity is transferred from Qantas to Jetstar. Undeniably, the capacity of both 
international and domestic Jetstar flights was increasing while that of Qantas 
Airways was decreasing, although Qantas officials argue for the co-existence of both 
airlines. Interestingly, the same phenomenon Beck suggested for the borders of 
nations applies to the organisational boundaries between entities. The difference in 
pay for staff between Qantas or Jetstar has not caused an outcry of injustice, nor have 
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there been demands for equality. The economic consideration of full-cost versus low-
cost carrier legitimises different wage levels and keeps social conflicts latent.  
6.3.1.7 Credit Rating  
Currently there are only three airlines with an ‘above junk’ credit rating. These are 
Lufthansa, Air New Zealand and Southwest Airlines. Qantas also belonged to this 
group until the end of 2013 but lost its rating first from Standard & Poor’s and then 
from Moody’s. Associated with this downgrading is the increase of costs for 
financing Qantas’ business. Qantas’ 2011/12 annual report mentions an average 
interest rate for Qantas of 7.2%. The average interest rate also includes financial 
leasing, unsecured bank and other loans besides ‘secured bank loans’, which were 
only 3.46% in 2006/07. The international integrated financial markets provide capital 
according to their rules emphasising short-term profit maximisation. However, the 
Qantas Sales Act 1992 provides the basis for Qantas’ status as a national icon and at 
the same time prevents its restrictions on foreign ownership and Qantas’ participation 
in global financial markets in the search for ‘cheap’ equity. Therefore, this creates a 
competitive disadvantage, an uneven playing field, distorting the marketplace in 
which Qantas has to compete against competitors such as Virgin, thus contributing to 
Qantas’ economic crisis. 
In 2007, international investors Airline Partners Australia (APA) planned a takeover 
of Qantas using a corporate structure to match the ownership requirement imposed 
on Qantas by the Qantas Sales Act 1992. The investors’ drive for short-term profit 
maximisation included higher leverage of Qantas associated with substantial 
financial risks. The Australian government at this time could not take direct action 
against the planned takeover, even though an economic crisis within Qantas was 
expected in the wake of the take-over and financing arrangements. The financial 
market demanded state absenteeism, a reduction in regulation and diminished 
protectionism – the neoliberal logic followed by the Australian government. The 
takeover did not take place since APA was not able to acquire enough shares during 
the period of its offer. 
Contrary to this attempt to obtain a majority of Qantas shares within the ‘free’ 
market, there was a public discussion to level the ‘uneven playing field’ by providing 
Qantas with a government guarantee until the burdens of the Qantas Sale Act could 
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be lifted. Such a measure contradicts the free market ideology and state absenteeism 
perpetuated by financial capitalism. Yet the government and Qantas’ senior 
management used the ‘levelling of the uneven playing field’ metaphor to legitimise 
the potential use of public (taxpayers’) resources to curb Qantas’ economic crisis 
associated with limitations imposed upon it through the Qantas Sale Act.  
6.3.2 Rationality Crisis 
The Australian government (administrative system) collects taxes on income and 
profits and is expected to spend them in a rational and efficient way. This includes 
ways to prevent crises and secure growth in the economic system. The prioritisation 
of some groups such as Qantas in the redistribution of income, and the selective 
taxation of some groups, has to take place in the legitimised boundaries of the 
administrative system. The following will illustrate the Australian government’s 
actions in the form of taxation and/or redistribution of income to support and benefit 
Qantas, thereby curbing its economic crisis.  
The government is entangled with Qantas’ provision of services in the form of 
aviation services in an internationalised environment. Internationalisation restrained 
the array of interventions available to the government. Although the neoliberal 
ideology of the free market and state absenteeism further diminishes the 
government’s ability to impact the economic system, it is nevertheless the state that 
secures the prerequisites of the economic system’s/Qantas’ functioning. The state 
fulfils imperatives of the economic system and especially fills market gaps while 
such actions have to remain legitimised by its electorate. In order to remain 
legitimised, the state can chose to hide by supporting controversial accounting 
actions or it can advertise them like capitalists.  
6.3.2.1 Support through the Australian Government  
The government’s administrative system’s attempt to rectify market failures and to 
prevent economic crisis particularly for Qantas has resulted in some entanglement 
with the economic process which can then cause a crisis of rationality if the 
redistribution and actions are not in line with Australians’ expectations, thus leading 
to a legitimation crisis. The following will outline the support and thus the ground on 
which the Australian government can face rationality crises, which, when 
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contradicting the motivations of Australians (motivation crisis), could lead to 
legitimation crisis.  
6.3.2.1.1 Governmental Air Travel 
In the House of Representative it was noted (Parliament of Australia, 2003) that 
governmental air travel is a significant part of travel to regional areas and can 
influence airlines to serve particular routes or markets for regional air travel. Qantas 
Airways is a beneficiary of State and Commonwealth government travels. Qantas 
Business Travel, as a wholly owned subsidiary of Qantas, provides broker services to 
those governments to serve the ‘best offer a day’ policy. Qantas has been awarded 
contracts with several departments, while the actual benefits and rationality of those 
decisions have been questioned by politicians and public media. 
The Australian Tax Authority entered into a $60 million contract with Qantas and 
Qantas Business Travel, where Qantas Airways was to receive 90% of the contract 
volume ($54 million) and Qantas Business Travel the right to determine where the 
other $6 million would be spent to provide a discounted airfare rate. Yet it was not 
disclosed how much the discount was and/or what was the original airfare rate from 
which the discount was provided. Another example that was widely discussed in the 
media was the contract between Qantas and the Defence Department for its travel. 
This contract was awarded to Qantas Business Travel for five years and $900 million 
without undergoing a competitive tendering process. Furthermore, in 2004/05 only 
2.5% of Defence travel was performed by Virgin and Rex, obviously benefiting 
Qantas above all the other airlines in Australia (McPhedran, 2007). The government 
drew on rhetoric around the ‘best of the day rule’ claiming that the best fares of the 
day were provided by Qantas, in order to underpin its ‘rational’ use of tax-payers’ 
money. Additionally, the government set a quota of ‘non-Qantas’ flights at 25%. Yet 
the quota was, from most government departments, rejected on the grounds that 
Qantas would provide more timely, suitable flights which then would save the 
government costs in employees not having to wait. Again, cost considerations 
determined a discourse that legitimised spending and supported the government’s 




6.3.2.1.2 Defence Contracts for Maintenance and Administration 
The operations of the RAAF are tightly geared to Qantas Defence Services (QDS), 
which provides mechanical and engineering services. QDS was formed in 1999 to 
support air defence capacity with skills and labour, including Australian-based 
aircraft maintenance engineering resources, training of apprentices and development 
of its workforce’s skills. This branch of Qantas employs about 500 staff, also to 
assist the Defence department in the procurement and refurbishment of new planes 
such as a fleet of A330 Multi Role Tanker aircraft. In May 2010, for example, QDS 
was awarded a three-year contract which involved a $136 million extension to the 
maintenance and support contract for the Australian government’s fleet of 12 
Lockheed Martin C130H aircraft (Qantas Defence Services, 2010). As Habermas 
mentioned, the state provides investment opportunities to private capital through its 
consumption of non-productive goods such as military equipment. Yet those 
expenses are not subject to public criticism, nor is about $5.7 million spent on 
transportation of Defence Cargo by Qantas (Parliament of Australia, 2005). 
However, military expenses and beneficiaries such as Qantas are not reasons for 
citizens to criticise or challenge the Australian government’s rationality.  
Their rationality was threatened when the government decided to withdraw from 
those investments to retire the C-130H military aircraft earlier and thus put 250 QDS 
employees based at RAAF Base, Richmond at risk. This illustrates the degree to 
which the government has become interwoven with the activities of Qantas, apart 
from the fact that the government was expected to ‘compensate’ for the social 
consequences of Qantas’ individual capitalist’s decisions.  
6.3.2.1.3 Rejecting Singapore Airlines’ Entrance to the Australia–US ‘Pacific Route’ 
SIA never had access to the Australia–US ‘Pacific route’, and at the beginning of 
2006 the Australian government renewed its previous decision and denied access to 
SIA to this route again. In its decision it relied on the ‘efficient market hypothesis’, 
claiming that the market would already have sufficient competitors from the US, 
Australia and New Zealand to provide enough competition and a fair price. Another 
justification was the protection of the ‘national interest’, the support for Virgin to 
establish its flights finally there are forgone benefit for Australian economy of $10 to 
$45 million a year, according to the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics 
(BITRE) (Webb, 2006). Other sources mention Qantas’ fares being almost 40% 
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higher than on comparable more competitive routes, which results in foregoing 
revenues of $114 million annually in the tourist sector (Webb, 2006).  
The Australian government in the context of internationalisation and globalisation 
still find arguments to protect its own interest using the BITRE as an expert group 
and the ‘national interest’ as a means to justify its decision. The government 
prioritised Qantas as a local capitalist over the overall benefit to society. Yet the 
government used a neoliberal discourse to highlight competition within the market 
and national interest without facing any challenge to the rationality of its decisions.  
6.3.2.1.4 Qantas Airways Limited (Loan Guarantee) Act 1979 
This Act enables Treasury to provide up to US$94 million to Qantas in support of its 
expenditure in regard to the acquisition of two Boeing 747 aircraft, related spare 
parts and equipment as well as the payment of interest on amounts borrowed. The 
loan is given under the conditions that the Treasurer is satisfied with the terms and 
conditions of the loan agreement; sufficient securities are provided; the aircrafts are 
not sold or used as security for other mortgages; and the aircrafts are insured. The 
Act was assented to and commenced in June 1979 (Qantas Airways Limited (Loan 
Guarantee) Act 1979) (Commonwealth of Australia, 1979). This Act contradicts the 
neoliberal ideas of free market and state absenteeism in two ways, First, the 
government guarantee allows Qantas to borrow money at a low rate. Second, even 
Qantas has not received any direct loan yet. The existing Act could easily be 
amended to be used for other aircraft, which would benefit Qantas over its 
competitors and is again an example of state absenteeism. To some extent the 
Australian government could ‘level the playing field’ by improving Qantas’ position 
though lower financing costs. This could be an attempt to curb Qantas’ economic 
crisis and to fill market gaps imposed through the internationalisation of aviation 
services. The Act itself had not received any public attention during the period of 
research. Therefore, there was no challenge to the government’s rationality. 
6.3.2.1.5 Support of Regional Routes 
The government’s support of regional routes takes place in multiple forms. First, 
there are payment schemes in place that directly support routes to regional airports. 
The ‘Payment Scheme for Airservices Enroute Charges’, the ‘Remote Air Services 
Subsidy (RASS) ($44.7 million over four years), the Remote Aerodrome Inspection 
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(RAI) Program, the Remote Aerodrome Safety Program (RASP) ($20 million over 
four years) and the Remote Aviation Infrastructure Fund (RAIF) ($3 million in 
2009/10) (Australian Dept. of Infrastructure Transport Regional Development, 2009, 
p.14). Second, the Commonwealth and State governments rely on Qantas Business 
Travel for the purchase of regional flights, which strengthen Qantas’ market share of 
regional aviation services. That is, government travel contributes a significant 
portion of services to regional areas and it impacts upon the decision of airlines to 
enter the market. Since the collapse of Ansett, Qantas has had a monopolistic 
position on many regional routes, benefiting from government travel (Parliament of 
Australia, 2004), a first-mover advantage. Airlines such as Virgin can simply not 
serve certain airports and are forced to collaborate with Rex Regional Express to 
serve regional airports and beyond (Parliament of Australia, 2003). The government 
supports Qantas and its regional flights, and boosts its sales on those routes as well as 
protecting its dominant monopolistic role. The importance for regional flights to the 
local communities and tourism justifies Qantas’ dominance over other competitors. 
Therefore, the government does not face any public scrutiny over its rationale for 
using of tax-payers’ money to financially assist Qantas to remain economically 
viable and prevent an economic crisis.  
With its subsidies the government also took over the steering mechanism of the 
market, filling the market gap which otherwise would exist to make airlines drop out 
of certain ‘marginal’ routes. The resulting lack of transportation to those regional 
areas and the impact on the local community represents a challenge to the 
government to rationalise its use of tax-payers’ money and could lead to a 
legitimation crisis. Therefore, the government became involved in the production 
process, of aviation services to regional areas by preventing Qantas' withdrawal.  
6.3.2.1.6 Advertising Contracts 
The Australian government using Tourism Australia and State governments invested 
in joint marketing or direct subsidies for routes with certain local destinations. For 
example, from 2008/09 to 2011/12 Tourism Australia’s direct marketing investments 
ranged from between $7.4 to $17 million (Parliament of Australia, 2012d) and the 
Queensland government awarded in 2010 $12 million over a three-year period for 
marketing efforts (Tourism and Events Queensland, 2013). The government’s 
reasoning behind the investment is that it is in the national interest, there are benefits 
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to the Australian tourism sector and it provides employment for many people.. 
Additionally, as outlined in Subsections 6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2, the majority of domestic 
flights and a large portion of international flights are delivered by Qantas; therefore it 
is one of the major beneficiaries. The rationale of the Queensland government was 
questioned by the public media when Qantas decided to cut jobs at local facilities. 
However, the political leaders argued for the additional benefits to the local economy 
in the form of more tourists as a counter-argument to the loss of jobs in order to 
restore their rationality in regard to the use of tax-payers’ money. 
6.3.2.2 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
With the introduction of the EU ETS, the Australian government faced a challenge to 
its rationality by protecting its national icon, Qantas, from the (symbolic) impact on 
its cost-base as a result of being subject to the EU ETS and any subsequent financial 
burdens. The Australian government’s protectionism to curb the economic crisis with 
Qantas was a trigger for criticism of the unilateral policy measures enforced by the 
EU. As part of the opposing rhetoric, the EU ETS was reduced to a mere tax imposed 
on Qantas with severe financial implications (whilst e.g. Anger and Köhler,(2010) 
suggested minimal impacts) and harm to Australia as a tourist destination. As such, 
the EU ETS was reduced from a ‘market’ mechanism to a supra-national body 
imposing a tax that was alien to the market, did not fit the neoliberal ideology, and 
thus undesirable. In the context of internationalisation, the Australian government 
protected the national interest over the idea of reducing emissions and curbing global 
warming. Instead, the Australian government aimed to curb the ecological crisis by 
imposing an AU ETS on a fixed-price base itself. Also to fill the functional gaps in 
the market for CO2 emissions, which were not considered in the pricing and 
investment decisions of corporations. In this context, the Australian government 
received criticism for refusing to join the nations that decided to sign a declaration 
against the EU ETS’ inclusion of airlines. Yet such a decision would have forced the 
government into a possible legitimation crisis since the majority of voters were 
supportive of the AU ETS (Parliament of Australia, 2012a; 2012b).  
National borders work as watersheds keeping climate action for aviation local and 
more importantly making sure financial outflows such as carbon taxes or revenues 
from emissions trading remain within the nation’s boundaries, yet somehow losing 
the big picture of the global, inter-temporal effect of global warming. Although the 
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threat of global warming mobilised the Australian people to vote for actions against 
climate change, the government still faced the trade-off between supra-national 
actions such as the EU ETS and curbing the economic crisis of its national airline 
Qantas.  
6.3.2.3 Imposing the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme 
The implementation of the AU ETS has been part of Australia’s commitment under 
the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its national emissions. In the democratic process to 
introduce the ETS, the government faced strong political opposition aimed at 
challenging the rationality behind such a policy measure. The major thrust of the 
opposition was the cost implication on regional routes. That is, Qantas claimed to 
face costs of $110 to $115 million and Bindebella Airlines $600,000 to $700,000, 
which would be passed through to customers, thereby discouraging regional tourism. 
Arguments of injustice were brought forward: a flight to Bali was not subject to a 
price on carbon while flights from Sydney to Perth were. Basically, the costing 
argument was the major ‘weapon’ used to destabilise the government’s position, 
undermine its rationality and make Australians withdraw their motivation for such 
actions. The economic rationale of wealth and cost was used to combat climate 
change actions. The term ‘Emissions Trading Scheme with fixed price’ was falsely 
turned into the notion of a ‘carbon tax’ making it alien to the free-market ideology. 
This ‘tax’ was alleged to ignore the price-point sensitivity of the tourism market 
(Parliament of Australia, 2012c), and to distort the aviation market (Parliament of 
Australia, 2009). However, the very idea of free market was then contradicted by 
Qantas’ claim for two subsidies. First, Qantas and other airlines wanted to be 
recognised as Emission Intense Trade Exposed (EITE), implying that 94.5% for 
emissions permits would be allocated for free. This claim was made on the grounds 
that the aviation industry needs a transition time to lower its emissions. Effectively, 
recognition as EITE would be a subsidy as can be observed in the EU ETS, that is, 
even free permits are considered in setting consumer prices, thereby generating 
tremendous profits for heavy emitters such as energy facilities. In particular, the 
monopolistic or oligopolistic characteristics of the regional aviation markets allow 
Qantas to easily pass on any increase in cost to recover the additional costs of (free) 
carbon permits.  
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Second, Qantas mentioned to the Australian government its hope of receiving 
support in order to establish a renewable aviation fuel production facility within 
Australia. This would allow Qantas to substitute conventional with less carbon-
intensive biofuel and also would reduce the financial outlet for permits under any 
ETS – this is particularly important since the IATA set reduction targets of 50% until 
2050 and proposed the introduction of a global ETS from 2020 onwards.  
Although both subsidies contradict the neoliberal idea of state absenteeism, the 
establishment of a renewable aviation fuel industry would provide nationwide 
benefits and is in line with government’s actions against climate change, one reason 
why the government funded a study by Shell and Qantas and research by universities 
into renewable aviation fuels. The threat of climate change also furthered a 
collaborative approach among nations so that Australia collaborated with the US; at 
the same time filling a market gap so that externalities were not curbed.  
6.3.2.4 Qantas Sale Act 
The Qantas Sale Act placed restrictions on Qantas’ ownership and principal place of 
operations causing continuous complaints by its management about an unfair, uneven 
playfield. The very nature of this Act illustrates that ‘Qantas is a strategic national 
asset and not just another company’ (Parliament of Australia, 2007b). Neoliberal 
forces, the idea of a ‘free’ market and state absenteeism place certain challenges on 
the government’s rationality. The restriction on Qantas to seek foreign capital 
sources for shareholding caused a public debate. Should the Government provide 
debt guarantees for Qantas to lower its financing costs especially in the wake of the 
credit-rating downgrading until the ban on foreign ownership was lifted? This 
resulted in opposition from two parties. First, the Labour Party opposed the idea of 
loosening the equity requirements for Qantas to remain Australian-owned, and 
second, Virgin, Qantas’ competitor demanded a similar debt guarantee to maintain a 
fair market. The idea of interfering in the market and Virgin’s criticism forced the 
government to withdraw from such plans.  
Another challenge to the government’s rationality came with the observation that 
Qantas seemed to be in danger of being cannibalised by its subsidiary, the low-cost 
carrier, Jetstar. In both the Upper and Lower House it was reported that aircraft lease, 
lounge arrangements and cross subsidies from Qantas to Jetstar had taken place. 
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Jetstar is not subject to the Qantas Sale Act: it can be sold to foreign investors and it 
has more flexibility in where to locate operations. Attempts were made to include 
Qantas’ subsidies under the Qantas Sale Act, but the economic imperatives of cost 
considerations, flexibility, competitiveness and growth prevented this from 
happening. Yet the government kept this issue outside the debate so that the 
electorate was not actively informed to prevent the Government’s rationality to be 
challenged.  
The most significant threat to the state’s rationality in regard to the Qantas Sale Act 
was the planned takeover of Qantas by APA, a foreign investment group led by 
Australian Macquarie Bank. The corporate structure of the consortium was set up to 
fulfil the requirements of the Qantas Sale Act. In the parliamentary inquiry it became 
obvious that international capitalist interests would be able to succeed. A survey 
conducted among Australians showed that 79% of those polled opposed the sale of 
Qantas; 66% considered the sale of Qantas was not in Australia’s national interest; 
75% believed that the takeover of Qantas implied services to regional areas would 
suffer; 70% believed that jobs would be cut and employee conditions would worsen; 
and 64% believed there was a greater chance of safety being comprised after the 
takeover (Parliament of Australia, 2007a). The Foreign Investment Review Board 
testified that the takeover would be in line with existing regulations. This ‘expert 
group’ was to support the government’s laissez faire attitude towards the 
international streams of capital and the possible sale of the national icon. Perhaps to 
the government’s advantage, the takeover did not take place so it did not face a 
rationality or legitimation crisis from Australian citizens withdrawing their support 
for the government.  
6.3.2.5 Grounding of the Fleet and Other Labour Issues 
Similar to the issues around the Qantas Sale Act the Australian government faced a 
temporary rationality crisis round the pilots’ dispute of 1989 and grounding of its 
fleet in 2011. In both cases, the government had options to intervene and foster 
negotiations over actions rather than let labour (the workforce) be suppressed in the 
wage negotiations. Wages make up a large portion of airlines’ annual costs (for 
Qantas 24%–27% of total costs) and the economic imperative of cost minimisation 
led to a weakening of labour’s position. The rhetoric around competiveness, lowering 
the cost base and profitability was to support capital’s (Qantas’) actions and 
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eventually provided the rationality for the government’s biased stance during these 
issues: to avoid a legitimation crisis.  
In a similar vein, the increased lay-offs and outsourcing of Qantas’ staff, especially 
after the announcement of huge losses in 2014, is legitimised through the economic 
crisis faced by Qantas. The government faced no direct rationality crisis since it is 
was able to compensate the laid off Qantas staff with social welfare or 
reemployment. Again, it is economic imperatives that legitimise the actions that 
benefit capital over labour interests. The same capitalist forces also keep Alan Joyce 
and the board of directors in their positions to manage Qantas. 
6.3.3 Legitimation and Motivation Crises 
Legitimation crises arise when the electorate, also called the societal system, 
withdraws its motivation (motivation crisis) and thus does not see the rationality of 
the state’s actions as given. As motivation crises are a prerequisite for legitimation 
crises both will be discussed concurrently.  
6.3.3.1 Australian Emissions Trading Scheme 
The Australian electorate was, in 2007, very supportive of the idea of climate action 
to curb global warming. The Rudd government managed to illustrate the catastrophic 
aftereffects of inaction as a reason to take action to reduce greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. The threat of climate change became a mobiliser for the Australian 
people and the Australian government, which later signed the Kyoto Protocol and 
prepared the introduction of the AU ETS in July 2012. During this time, the 
motivation of the majority of Australians for climate action to curb the ecological 
crisis weighed in stronger than the economic crisis that could be caused, for example, 
for companies like Qantas. As such the ‘Sinn’ behind the government’s actions 
temporarily replaced the drive for ‘value’ creation. ‘Sinn’ was driven by Australians’ 
desire to take action against global warming and the political implications were a 
legitimation of ‘painful’ economic aftereffects. The threat of climate change for other 
nations and future generations provided ‘Sinn’.  
Putting a price on CO2-e meant increases in electricity, the cost of living and the cost 
of travelling, as highlighted by the opposition. The Australian government placed its 
approach in the international context of the EU ETS, the NZ ETS and other national 
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actions against CO2 emissions to legitimise its actions. However, companies, 
including Qantas, and the political opposition drew on rhetoric of increased costs, 
harm to the national economy and a comparatively high price on carbon. 
Furthermore, the AU ETS was soon labelled a ‘carbon tax’, which further 
undermined the confidence of Australians in the climate actions of the government. 
Even when the government drew on expert opinions to explain the cost implications, 
the motivation of the electorate had been diminished and during the next election the 
government failed to win a majority. Since its introduction, the AU ETS has been 
used as a reason for companies such as Qantas to explain their economic crisis, 
further undermining the actual idea behind the policy instrument: to curb global 
warming. Economic imperatives and accounting-led discourse ‘colonised’ the 
motivations of some Australians to withdraw their support and motivation for action 
against climate change.  
The Australian government kept all its involvements in the economic matter of 
Qantas in regard to climate change actions latent. The active management of the 
prerequisites of Qantas’ production processes by the government was kept out of the 
public debate, also the subsidies for biofuel studies and research by universities into 
biofuel. When such a use of taxpayer money (value) becomes public, it poses a risk 
to the government’s rationality, and requires substitution with ‘Sinn’. That is, ‘Sinn’ 
was inherent in the government’s actions to prevent an economic crisis within Qantas 
and to support the national carrier and icon. 
6.3.3.2 Grounding of Qantas’ Fleet 
Qantas’ grounding of its fleet posed a direct threat to government’s legitimation. The 
public questioned if the state had done enough to prevent the grounding and called 
for immediate action. Soon the ‘costs’ of this event to travellers, the economy and 
Qantas were revealed. A parliamentary inquiry took place to shed light on the actions 
of the government. Fair Trading determined the labour actions and forced a solution 
on the employees of Qantas. The government, in its attempt to mediate between the 
supreme capitalist, the individual capitalist and the general interest, gave higher 
priority to Qantas’ shareholders and management than its labour. This illustrates that 
the state became entangled in Qantas’ processes rather than just securing the 
prerequisites of Qantas’ businesses.  
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6.3.3.3 Planned Takeover by APA 
The takeover presented not only a rationality crisis but also a threat to legitimation. 
First, Qantas is a national icon and has been the national carrier for decades, and 
Australians did not want a takeover. Second, Qantas was involved with the military, 
in particular the RAAF, so there was the risk of having such services provided by an 
effectively foreign company. Third, APA planned to finance most of the takeover 
with the debt to be shouldered by Qantas. This would have put higher financial 
burdens on Qantas and might have threatened the very existence of the national 
carrier. Finally, there was the public fear that employees would be laid off, jobs 
reallocated overseas and the skills base within Australia eroded. Although the 
Australian government, with the backing of the Foreign Investment Review Board, 
confirmed that the takeover was in line with existing legislation and that APA would 
sign a deed to keep jobs in Australia, the economic imperatives of the transaction 
could not be legitimised. Thus, the takeover did not take place and the legitimation 
threat to the government vanished. 
6.3.3.4 Preventing SIA from Serving the Pacific Route  
The decision to reject SIA’s access to the Pacific route between Australia and the US 
revealed the Australian government’s protectionism of Qantas and caused a public 
debate around the negative effects of this decision. Claims that there would be losses 
to the tourism industry, higher airfares and diminished competition attracted some 
public attention. In order to prevent this rationality crisis from turning into a 
legitimation crisis, the government referred to higher competition through the market 
entrance of other competitors such as Virgin and Air Canada. This was an attempt to 
retain the neoliberal idea of the free market and to minimise the impression that 
Qantas benefited from the government’s decisions. There was no attempt to replace 
the economic value and the loss to society with ‘Sinn’, but to strengthen the 
impression of a free market economy. Furthermore, national borders had the effect of 






This section shed light on the nature of the relationship between the Australian 
government and Qantas’ production processes, and the social integration that can 
explain the occurrence of crises in the context of globalised industry relations and the 
ecological crisis. The analysis highlighted the political economy setting of Australia, 
the role accounting plays and the accountability relations that prevent, silence or 
foster crises.  
Crises are continuous occurrences that do not necessarily trigger replacement of the 
state or the capitalist political economy. The economic crises within Qantas are 
understood and communicated through accounting numbers and concepts. These 
figures hide the state’s involvement, its protectionism and the indirect benefits 
Qantas receives as a result of its economic crises being curbed. Some of these crises 
are seemingly imposed through the government’s actions against climate change. At 
the same time, the government has used taxpayers’ money to fill functional market 
gaps and to curb Qantas crises with some of these supports creating a crisis of 
rationality. Not only are accounting and accounting concepts the trigger for those 
crises and the way they are perceived, but also the responses and rhetoric around 
them is determined by accounting. The rationality of the government is often 
established through reference to national benefits, cost reduction and competition. 
When rationality and motivational crises converge, the government faces a 
legitimation crisis. It was through reference to costs, losses and financial burdens that 
the motivation of Australians to support the actions of the government to curb the 
ecological crisis was undermined and resulted in a withdrawal of legitimacy.  
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7 THE MARGINAL ABABATEMENT COST CURVE – A 
CONTRIBUTION TO CURBING THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the marginal abatement investment opportunities available to 
Qantas at their respective benefit or cost. It will be shown how the MACC can assist 
behavioural change within Qantas and in the context of the broader political 
economy.  
Section 7.2 introduces the method and general assumptions upon which Qantas’ 
MACC is based. These include Qantas’ current and future fuel consumption, fuel 
prices, and price implications of the international and national CPS (Carbon Pricing 
Scheme) aviation activities. The following sections elaborate on the abatement 
opportunities related to technology, processes, aircraft replacement, and biofuels and 
trigeneration. Section 7.7 outlines the implications of the MACC for Qantas while 
Section 7.8 locates Qantas’ MACC within the bigger political arena in regard to 
behavioural change. Section 7.9 provides a summary of this chapter.  
7.2 METHOD AND GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Qantas’ MACC was modelled on a bottom-up approach to identify and assess 
potential abatement opportunities with their respective abatable CO2-e amount and 
costs as of July 2012. This approach enables consideration of diverse opportunities 
including substituting normal fuels with biofuels, and procedural and technology-
related efficiency improvements. The choice of such reduction measures was based 
on Qantas’ individual specifications of fleet, processes and deployed technology, as 
well as key determinants set by the Australian government and Australian aviation 
market. 
The following graph (Figure 7-1) combines all the abatement investment 
opportunities. This graph summarizes the underlying cost-benefit-analyses in a very 
compelling way compared to sections 7.3-7.6 and the containing tables which outline 





Figure 7-1: Qantas’ MACC  
Each bar represents an abatement opportunity. The x-axis depicts the amount of CO2-e that can be saved while the y-axis provides the benefits/costs per ton CO2-e. The 




The graph above shows that the first thirteen changes (from ‘1. Less Tankering’ to 
’13. Replacement of Boeing 747-400 by 787-8/9’) to the structure of the airline's 
operations have both cost savings and emissions reduction potential and these should 
all be adopted as the airline would increase its operating efficiency and at the same 
time reduce its emissions. The last ten options (from ’14. Buy-Option 
Hydrodeoxygenation’ to ’23. Re-engineering of 10 years old aircraft’) involve extra 
cost to reduce emissions on a sliding scale, with the cost of the last emissions 
reduction strategy being totally exorbitant. The costs of each change and the 
assumptions made to arrive at an estimate in some cases are all set out in the 
following tables within this chapter. The technology improvements referred to in this 
study are already available today and workable. This excludes aircraft powered by 
nuclear or solar power, which bears risks to passengers or has not reached the stage 
of commercialisation, respectively. 
It is assumed that operating expenses besides CO2-e abatement benefits are identical 
for ‘old’ and ‘new’ technologies (unless otherwise stated); thus they are not 
considered in the cost–benefit analyses. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
introduction of technology takes place immediately; this simplifies an otherwise 
incremental introduction with learning curves and gradual implementation. It is also 
assumed that: Qantas will use straight-line depreciation for the life span mentioned 
for each project; Qantas is subject to a 30% income tax rate; a tax shield from losses 
can be offset against Qantas’ profits; and no additional disposal expense for new 
technology compared to old technology will occur.  
The abatement amount of CO2-e is calculated as the difference between ‘old 
technology’ (the current emissions of the Qantas Group) and respectively newer, 
more efficient or alternative technology with less CO2-e output replacing the older 
technology. Each of the respective categories will be explained in Section 7.3.  
Crucial to any NPV calculation is the discount rate. For Qantas, secured bank loans 
have an interest rate of close to 4%. In order to take inflation, risk and a higher beta 
(1.85 compared to an industry beta of 1.04) into account a 7% discount rate was 
chosen. It needs to be highlighted that on some occasions, such as the visibility study 
into biofuels, Qantas’ underlying ‘base scenario’ discount rate was 15%, and under 
alternative scenarios was based on 7% to 20% discount rates. For abatement 
investment opportunities with higher benefits in the future a higher discount rate 
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implies a smaller NPV, and thus lower benefits. On the contrary, those abatement 
options with benefits occurring soon after the investment provide maximum benefit.  
Another important assumption to make concerns the development of aviation fuel 
costs and consumption either nationally or internationally. That is, the benefits from 
CO2-e abatements stem from the costs saved, which would be otherwise spent on 
aviation fuel. The cost per barrel for Qantas in 2011/10 is calculated as the total cost 
of fuel divided by total consumption. Comparing emissions from Qantas’ Australian 
national flights with Qantas’ total emissions shows the share of domestic flights and 
their fuel consumption/CO2-e emissions with regard to total emissions (see  
Table 7-1). 
 
Table 7-1: Fuel consumption and costs 
  2011/10 2010/09 2009/08 2008/07 
Kerosene (000 litre) (1)+(2) 4,790,143 4,570,556 4,695,383 4,849,430 
CO2-e emissions (000ton) (1)+(2) 12,270 11,708 12,027 12,422 
ration (A4/A3) 2.562 2.562 2.562 2.562 
CO2 emissions Australia (000ton) (3) 4,255 3,914 3,963  
% CO2 emissions Australia 34.68% 33.44% 32.95%  
CO2 emiss’s rest of the world (000ton) (3) 8,014 7,793 8,064  
Cost (million $) (4) 3,627 3,283 3,602 3,701 
Cost per litre  0.7572 0.7183 0.7671  
Cost per barrel (5) 120.39 114.21 121.97  
 
(1) Qantas AR-2011/10, p.114 (2011/10+2010/09) (4) Qantas Data Book 2011, p.26 
(2) Qantas AR-2009/08, p.153 (2009/08+2008/07) (5) BP (2006, p.44) – conversion factor 159 
(3) Qantas Data Book 2011, p.72      
 
The costs and thus the abatement benefits are also related to the price on CO2(-e) 
emissions which, in Australia, is different to other jurisdictions such as the EU. For 
this purpose it is necessary to divide the fuel consumption/CO2-e emissions into 
domestic and international. Qantas discloses its Australian emissions under the 
NGER 2007 Act and reports the total amount of CO2-e emissions in its annual report.  
In Australia, the introduction of the carbon pricing scheme (CPS) from July 2012 
onwards costs $23 per emitted tonne of CO2-e; this will increase annually by 4% 
until the end of June 2015 when emissions trading moves from the fixed price period 
to an ETS with a price ceiling and floor. Therefore, the price of Australian aviation 
fuel increases per litre by the levy imposed through the environmental policy 
measure. After the fixed price period an annual increase of 5% is assumed; the same 
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rate by which the price ceiling of the AU ETS increases. In addition to the direct 
costs associated with the combustion of aviation fuel through Qantas, there is also a 
surcharge imposed through refineries that have to face a price on carbon on the 
emissions created throughout the refinement from crude oil to aviation fuel. This 
surcharge is assumed to increase by 4% during the fixed price period and thereafter 
by 5%. 
 
Table 7-2: CPS – Price on CO2 – Domestic fuels 





















Growth surplus on 
aviation (1)    5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Surplus on aviation 
kerosene (2) 5.98 6.27 6.60 6.93 7.28 7.64 8.03 8.43 8.85 9.29 9.76 
Growth surcharge by 
refinery (3) 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Surcharge by refinery (4) 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.80 
Total surcharge  6.49 6.81 7.15 7.51 7.88 8.28 8.69 9.12 9.58 10.06 10.56 
(1) Growth rate follows the increase in price ceiling according to Australian Government (2011) 
Sections 100(1) and 122(6) of the Clean Energy Act (2015/16–2018/19). 
(2) Clean Energy Future (2012) – Transport fuel (2012/13–2014/15). 
(3) Assuming that surcharge will increase proportionate to increase in carbon price by 4% p.a. until 
2014/15; thereafter growth will be 5% p.a. 
(4) Estimation: 8.5% inefficiency (Stratton et al. 2010, p.19) times the ‘surplus on aviation kerosene’. 
The range of inefficiency is 6.5–14%. 
 
As Table 7-2 illustrates, the total surcharge for fuel is expected to rise from 6.49c 
litre in 2012/13 to 10.56c litre in 2022/23. In order to estimate the total additional 
costs for aviation fuel the assumption that there will be an annual 2% growth rate of 
aviation fuel consumption is made. The total fuel consumption is divided into foreign 
and domestic, while the domestic share is multiplied by the above-mentioned 





























Growth rate of fuel 
consumption (1) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Fuel consumption mill. l (2) 4,984  5,083  5,185  5,289  5,394  5,502  5,612  5,725  5,839  5,956  6,075  
% of domestic fuel 
consumption (3) 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 
Consumption domestic 
market mill. l 1,744  1,779  1,815  1,851  1,888  1,926  1,964  2,004  2,044  2,085  2,126  
Additional cost (mill. $) (4) 113  121  130  139  149  159  171  183  196  210  225  
(1) Assumption – Graham et al. (2011, p.28) refers to sources that suggest aviation sector will grow 
between by 4–5.1%. 
(2) Kerosene amount 2010/11 growth by 2% p.a. 
(3) Derived from Table 7-1. 
(4) ‘Total surcharge’ from Table 7-2 times ‘consumption domestic market’. 
 
The estimate of expected, additional costs to Qantas is $113 million (2012/13), 
within the range of Qantas’ publicly announced $110–115 million, up to 
$225 million in 2022/23. In addition to the cost on carbon, Qantas’ ‘fuel bill’ 
increased annually by about 2% and this growth in aviation fuel prices imposed 
through international markets is carried forward until 2022/23. In order to calculate 
the total expected costs (excluding the impact of a carbon price), the expected fuel 
consumption is multiplied by the price per litre or barrel derived from Table 7-1 
(total fuel cost divided by total fuel consumption). 























Growth rate in fuel price (1) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Cost of fuel per litre (2) 0.788 0.804 0.820 0.836 0.853 0.870 0.887 0.905 0.923 0.941 0.960 
Absolute cost (excl CPS) M$ (3) 3,926 4,085 4,250 4,421 4,600 4,786 4,979 5,180 5,390 5,607 5,834 
Total cost M$ (4) 4,039 4,206 4,379 4,560 4,749 4,945 5,150 5,363 5,585 5,817 6,058 
 
(1) Assumption. 
(2) Litre price (2010/11) extracted from Table 7-1 times ‘growth rate in fuel price’. 
(3) ‘Cost of fuel per litre’ times ‘Fuel consumption’ (Table 7-2). 
(4) ‘Absolute cost’ times 1 minus 35% (Table 7-3), plus ‘AUS. (incl. CPS)’ (Table 7-5) 
 
The estimated absolute fuel costs for Qantas excluding the impact of the AU ETS is 
$3,926 million for 2012/13 and will increase to $5,834 million in 2022/23. After 
arriving at the total costs, excluding price on carbon, the costs from the CPS (see 
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Table 7-3) are added to arrive at the total cost. These are $4,039 million for 2012/13 
and will increase to $6,058 million in 2022/23.  
The abatement amount is measured in tCO2-e and for this purpose it is necessary to 
calculate per litre or per barrel costs for either domestic or international flights to 
assign costs to each abatement option. For domestic flights 35% of the total aviation 
fuel costs from the absolute cost (excluding CPS) are taken, the total costs for 
participation in CPS are added and the total of these numbers is divided by the total 
litre of aviation fuel for domestic flights.  
 
Table 7-5: New fuel cost – Australia (including CPS) 
 






















AUS. (incl. CPS) (1) 1,487 1,551 1,617 1,686 1,759 1,834 1,913 1,996 2,082 2,172 2,266 
Per litre (incl. CPS) (2) 0.85 0.87 0.891 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.01 1.04 1.06 
Cost per barrel 135 138 141 144 148 151 154 158 161 165 169 
 
(1) ‘Absolute cost’ (Table 7-4) times minus 35% (Table F1.3) plus ‘Additional Cost’ (Table 7-3). 
(2) ‘AUS. (incl. CPS)’ divided by 35% total fuel consumption times (Table 7-3). 
(3) ‘Per litre (incl. CPS)’ multiplied by 159. 
 
The cost of one litre of aviation fuel is estimated at ct85 in 2012/13 and forecasted at 
ct107 in 2022/23. This translates into an aviation fuel cost per barrel of $135.57 in 
2012/13 and $169.48 in 2022/23. 
For the rest of the world an assumption is made that the carbon price is zero. This is 
currently true for international flights to Europe since the European Commission, 
after strong opposition from the US, Russia and China reduced the scope of the EU 
ETS to only those flights that take off and land within Europe. To the author’s 
knowledge, Qantas does not or only in very insignificant amounts operate such 
flights; it is more likely that Emirates as an international partner of Qantas serves 
intra-European flights. The jurisdictions Qantas serves, including China, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and the US have not yet developed or concretised prices on carbon 
or even the inclusion of airlines within a potential ETS. In the light of the IATA’s 
decision to launch its own worldwide ETS for the aviation industry, the inclusion of 
airlines into future national ETSs is unlikely.  
The total aviation fuel costs for international flights is 65% (one minus 35% 
domestic flights) of the total aviation fuel costs excluding CPS impact. To calculate 
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per barrel or per litre costs, the cost for international aviation fuel is divided by the 
litres/barrels consumed in Qantas’ international business; because no surcharge is 
assumed to occur for international flights, no additional levy is added.  























Fuel cost (excl. CPS) 2,552 2,655 2,762 2,874 2,990 3,111 3,236 3,367 3,503 3,645 3,792 
International carbon price 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fuel cost (incl. CO2 price) 2,552 2,655 2,762 2,874 2,990 3,111 3,236 3,367 3,503 3,645 3,792 
Cost per litre 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 
Cost per barrel 125 127 130 132 135 138 141 143 146 149 152 
 
The cost of one litre of aviation fuel is estimated at ct79 in 2012/13 and forecasted at 
ct96 in 2022/23. This translates into an aviation fuel cost per barrel of $125.26 in 
2012/13 and $152.69 in 2022/23. 
The above estimates are crucial to calculate the potential abatement benefits from 
investment opportunities into more advanced technology, process, fleet or alternative 
fuels.  
7.3 TECHNOLOGY-RELATED ABATEMENTS 
The following subsections will explain improvements in technology and the 
additional assumptions that have to be made to determine abatement costs. The 
calculations of the respective technology related abatement can be found in 
Appendix A1. 
Winglets 
Winglets, also called ‘wingtip devices’, are designed to reduce aircraft drag by the 
partial recovery of tip vortex energy whilst improving handling characteristics and 
enhancing safety. Such devices increase the wingspan, lower the lift-induced drag 
caused by wingtip vortices, but increase the parasitic drag by smoothing the airflow 
across the upper wing near the tip-boosting weight and strength of the wing. This 
increases the lift-to-drag ratio and improves the fuel efficiency of the aircraft (Farries 
and Eyers, 2008). 
The following assumptions are made for this abatement investment opportunity: a 
useful life of 11 years, with the underlying fuel savings applying to international 
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flights only; potentially 1.5% in fuel savings; the cost to upgrade existing aircraft is 
$506,500 each; 263 aircraft are to be upgraded and newly acquired aircraft come 
with winglets, therefore they are not considered additional abatement opportunities. 
It is assumed Qantas will use straight-line depreciation and is subject to a 30% 
income tax rate.  
Table 7-7: Winglets – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
(Inter) national fuel savings 1 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 1.5% 
Cost per aircraft (1) 506.5 
Number of Planes by 2013 263 
Depreciation Straight line 
Income tax rate 30% 
 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.103) – Increased 
efficiency by 1–2%. 
 
Winglets installed on Qantas aircraft can save 191,496tCO2-e per year or 
2,106,457tCO2-e over their useful life whilst contributing to a benefit of $125 per 
tCO2-e. In the absence of more in-depth data, it is not possible to calculate the ratio 
of national or international flights to total CO2-e-savings. Yet the number will 
increase when the domestic aviation business is considered due to higher domestic 
CO2-e-costs. 
Riblets 
Riblets are drag-reducing devices that can be produced at low cost and are easily 
maintained. They can be installed on the wings of an aircraft and their shapes can 
vary. Farries and Eyers (2008, p.103) note that implementation of these devices is 
possible from 2015 onwards. It is assumed that only aircraft acquired before 2015 
have to be upgraded with riblets; aircraft acquired thereafter will include riblets. 
Improvement in efficiency in terms of fuel consumption is 1.5% and the number of 
aircraft to be upgraded is 287 at a cost of $127,000 each, and $36,360,000 in total. 
Implementation is to take place by the end of 2014 to have benefits realised for the 




Table 7-8: Riblets – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
(Inter) national fuel savings 1 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 1.5% 
Cost per aircraft (1) 127 
Number of planes by 2014 (2) 287 
Depreciation Straight line 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2015 onwards 
 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.103) – increased 
efficiency by 1–2%. 
(2) According to Farries and Eyers (2008, p.103), costs 
are between $3k and $250k – Average assumed. 
 
These riblet devices can save 156,679tCO2-e per year totalling 1,723,465tCO2-e over 
their useful life. The benefit per tCO2-e is $152 under the assumption that all benefits 
derive from Qantas’ international business. The benefit would increase when the 
domestic aviation business with higher domestic CO2-e costs are taken into 
consideration. 
Airframe Component Replacement 
Airframe component replacement includes modifications to the body of the aircraft 
to improve lift and drag characteristics or to reduce the airframe weight as well as the 
replacement of engines. The expected fuel savings are quite significant, 3.5%. The 
replacement costs of engines could make up to 25% of the capital outlay of a new 
aircraft; more significant changes could cost between 25% and 50% of a new 
aircraft. This would imply minimum capital outlays between $9 and $85 million 
depending on aircraft type (Farries and Eyers, 2008). 
Farries and Eyers (2008, p.106), assert that the replacement of airframe components 
is possible from 2012 onwards. Only aircraft acquired before 2012 will be considered 
for replacement, and aircraft obtained by Qantas after 2012 will be assumed to have 
those efficient features already. The improvement in efficiency in terms of fuel 
consumption is 3.5% and the number of aircraft to be upgraded is 263 at a cost of 
$65,000,000 each, totalling $17,095,000,000. 
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Table 7-9: Airframe component replacement – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
(Inter) national fuel savings 1 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 3.50% 
Costs per aircraft (1) 65,000k 
Number of Planes by 2012 (2) 263 
Depreciation Straight line 
Implementation 2012 
 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.103) – increased efficiency by 2–5%. 
(2) According to Farries and Eyers (2008, p.103), costs are between $40 
and $90m – average assumed. 
 
Airframe component replacements can save 446,824tCO2-e per year totalling 
4,915,066tCO2-e over their useful life. The cost per tCO2-e is $2,594 assuming that 
all fuel and CO2-e savings result from Qantas’ international business. The costs 
would decrease when the domestic aviation business with higher domestic CO2-e 
costs are taken into consideration. 
Module Replacement 
This option involves the replacement or upgrade of certain engine and module 
components. The efficiency improvements that come with such a modification range 
from 0.5% to 1%, yet module replacements and engine upgrades are less costly than 
changing the whole engine, including software and certification. Also, module 
replacements or upgrades can be scheduled as part of day-to-day operations.  
The costs for replacement or upgrades of certain engine components is $900,000 for 
each aircraft and is applicable to all Qantas aircraft acquired before 2012. 
Implementing this for 263 airplanes totals an investment of $237,000,000.  
 Table 7-10: Module replacement – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
(Inter) national fuel savings 1 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 0.75% 
Costs per aircraft (1) 900k 
Number of planes by 2014 (2) 263 
Depreciation Straight line 
Implementation 2012 
 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.106) – increased efficiency 
by 0.5–1%. 
(2) According to Farries and Eyers (2008, p.106), costs are 




This investment can achieve abatements of 95,748tCO2-e per year totalling 
1,053,228tCO2-e over its useful life. The cost per tCO2-e is $21.55, assuming that all 
fuel and CO2-e savings result from Qantas’ international business. The costs would 
decrease when the domestic aviation business with higher domestic CO2-e costs is 
taken into consideration. 
Re-engineering of 10-year-old Aircraft 
Commonly used airframes can last between 25 to 30 years and during their useful 
life three to four engine replacements can take place. This means the useful life of an 
engine is between seven to eight years. Technically there are no reasons why a 
substitution with more efficient engines could not take place in the due process of a 
scheduled refit. Such an overhaul requires minor changes to the airframe (e.g., pylon, 
electronics, software) and a shakedown test flight. The age of the aircraft determines 
the potential gains from engine renewables and these can range from 5% to 7.5% of 
efficiency improvements in terms of fuel burn to typically 2% to 3%. It should be 
noted that a retrofit will not be as efficient as a new aircraft, for example, lower fuel 
consumption requires smaller fuel tanks which allow the aircraft to be lighter, 
allowing even lower fuel consumption (snowball effect) (Farries and Eyers, 2008). 
The cost for re-engineering aircraft older than 10 years is $24,500,000for each 
aircraft and is applicable to all Qantas aircraft that reached the age of 10 or older 
before 2012. Implementing this for 53 airplanes totals an investment of 
$1,298,500,000.  
Table 7-11: Re-engineering of 10-year-old 
aircraft – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
(Inter) national fuel savings 1 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 2.50% 
Costs per aircraft (1) $ 24,500,000 
Number of planes by 2013 (2) 53 
Depreciation Straight line 
Implementation 2012 
 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.106) – increased 
efficiency by 2–3%. 
(2) According to Farries and Eyers (2008, p.106), 




Re-engineering of aircraft older than 10 years can result in abatements of 
78,677tCO2-e per year totalling 865,443tCO2-e over the useful life of the aircraft. 
Assuming that all fuel and CO2-e savings result from Qantas’ international business, 
the cost per tCO2-e is $1,018.26. It is also assumed that no aircraft will be retired 
before the end of its useful life and that re-engineering brings the same efficiency 
increase to every aircraft type. 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) – Investment by Qantas Solely and 
Internationally 
The growth of air traffic requires more efficient air traffic management (ATM) just 
to cope with the increasing number of flights. Inefficient ATM can significantly 
increase the amount of fuel burned. Inefficiencies can occur in the form of delays at 
airports with aircraft queuing for take-off, climbing and cruising at inefficient speeds 
or altitudes and descent involving level flights. Also, the number of gate delays can 
increase and might even result in flight cancellations. All these externalities cause 
more CO2-e to be burned (Farries and Eyers, 2008). The inefficiency can be reduced 
from 11.70% in 2007 to 10.60% in 2012 and 8.80% by 2020. This assumption is 
applied to Australia and its aviation sector. Qantas is unlikely to drive a change in the 
international aviation market or impact on foreign governments or authorities to 
implement more advanced ATM.  
Table 7-12: Efficiency savings from ATM 
In % 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Growth rate (1) –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 –3.99 
Inefficiency rate 11.70 11.23 10.79 10.36 9.94 9.55 9.17 8.80 8.45 8.11 7.79 
Saving from 
efficiency  0.00 0.47 0.91 1.34 1.76 2.15 2.53 2.90 3.25 3.59 3.91 
(1) Calculation of growth rate given a starting point of value in 2012 and expected amount in 2020. 
 
The savings from efficiency are 0.47% in 2014 increasing to 3.91% in 2023. The cost 
of newly developed ATM is about $660 million and the cost to upgrade the fleet 
would be about $177 million, all payable upfront. Owing to a lack of further 
information, the benefits of fewer delays and higher customer satisfaction cannot be 




Table 7-13: Investment by Qantas solely – Increase in 
fuel efficiency 
Useful life of investment 11 
Depreciation Straight line 
Income tax rate 30% 
Fuel savings National 
Inefficiency level 2012 11.7 
Inefficiency level 2020 8.8 
Investment upfront (1) $ 660,000,000  
Investment add (2) $ 177,000,000  
 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.66).  
(2) SESAR (2011, p.18). 
 
An improvement in Australia-wide ATM efficiency would assist Qantas abate 
106,362tCO2-e per year totalling 1,169,984tCO2-e over its useful life. The cost per 
tCO2-e is $441 assuming that all fuel and CO2-e savings result from Qantas’ national 
Australian business. These marginal abatement costs would decrease if the 
government or other participants in the Australian aviation market were to share the 
investment costs.  
In the international aviation sector Qantas might benefit from efforts by European 
and American authorities if they were to install new and more efficient ATM to cope 





Table 7-14: Investment (R&D) covered by third party 
Useful life of investment 11 
Depreciation Straight line 
Income tax rate 30% 
Fuel savings International 
Inefficiency level 2012 11.7% 
Inefficiency level 2020 8.8% 
Investment upfront (1) $ 0  
Investment add (2) $177,000,000  
 
(1) Costs covered by third party. 
(2) SESAR (2011, p.18). 
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Assuming that no such costs are passed through and Qantas is just covering the 
initial upgrade costs of $117 million, Qantas could abate 303,892tCO2-e per year 
totalling, 3,342,810tCO2-e over 11 years at a marginal abatement benefit of 
$117 per tCO2-e. 
Aircraft Towing 
In order to save CO2-e from aircraft taxiing from the airport gate to the runway, 
towing provides a possible abatement opportunity. Some airports already tow aircraft 
to maintenance bays or main taxiways. Yet it is not common for aircraft to be towed 
to runways. There are concerns about safety, additional and more regular 
maintenance of landing gear and schedule timing. The replacement of landing gear 
could cost between $1 and $2 million and increase initial maintenance intervals. 
Existing towing vehicles are able to perform longer tows and do not require 
additional modifications. In December 2006 Virgin Atlantic conducted a trial B747-
400 at London airports and achieved a 2% reduction in fuel burn, whilst no time or 
scheduling issues were experienced (BBC, 2006).  
Table 7-15: Towing – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Depreciation Straight line 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
No. of planes by 2011 215 
No. of planes by 2018 384 
Investment upfront (1) $100,000,000 
Cost per aircraft (2) $1,500,000 
Efficiency level 2012 (2) 2% 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.113).  
(2) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.66).  
 
In order to determine the saving to be gained from towing it is necessary to estimate 
the growth of Qantas’ fleet. Beginning with 263 airplanes in 2013 and assuming a 
growth rate of 24 airplanes per year, totals 505 aircraft in 2023. The initial R&D cost 
to bring towing to a commercially feasible stage is $100 million and the upgrade per 
aircraft is initially $1.5 million. It is assumed that even new aircraft have to be 
upgraded to allow them to be towed to the runway. 
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Table 7-16: Implementation of towing 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
No. of airplanes 263 287 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 481 505 
Additional 
airplanes 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Saving by 
efficiency (1) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.113).  
 
If towing were to be implemented in all international destinations served by Qantas, 
Qantas would abate 282,456tCO2-e per year totalling 3,107,015tCO2-e abatements 
over a total lifetime. The marginal abatement cost of $165 per tCO2-e would 
decrease if other airlines, aircraft developers or governments were to support the 
R&D process. Also, it is possible that changes to landing gear for new aircraft could 
be implemented by the major aircraft producers, Boeing and Airbus, to further 
reduce the initial cost. The additional cost for towing vehicles’ maintenance, fuel 
consumption, depreciation and acquisition are not considered owing to lack of data.  
Summary – Technology-related Abatements 
The above abatement opportunities can be summarised in a MACC showing the 
technology-related investment opportunities readily available to Qantas 
(see Figure 7-2). This graph shows that Qantas can save about 650,000tCO2-e with a 
net benefit for each of the three investments: riblets, winglets and an Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) system, which is assumed to be developed by a third party. For 
those abatement opportunities with net benefit, an updated ATM would provide the 
largest abatement amount – about 250,000tCO2-e. In addition, this abatement option 
would only require updated navigation systems on existing aircraft, but the major 
investment would come from states and airports that already experience congestion 
and limits to their capacity. A dialogue between Qantas and airports or the 
government could encourage investment into a newer ATM system, and the MACC, 
which shows the related benefits, could be supportive in this process. Additional 
benefits from less congestion, higher in-timer performance and therefore higher 
customer satisfaction would also play a role in the decision-making process. The 
MACC also shows that if Qantas were to invest in a new ATM on its own the cost of 
such investment with about $440 per tCO2-e would exceed the current price for 
carbon, which is $24.15 per tCO2-e. One must take into consideration the auxiliary 
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benefits to evaluate the worth of this investment on economic grounds. The 
government may need to make the initial investment since it faces the lowest interest 
rates and high solvency to stem such projects. Subsequently the government could 
increase the charge for airlines based on their abatement benefits resulting from 
ATM improvements. The government could also release technology standards for 
new aircraft to employ riblets and winglets. The benefits from such technology 
would quickly amortise the additional investments. In order to have older aircraft 
upgraded with new technology low interest loans could be offered.  
Qantas could save an additional 900,000t CO2-e from investments into abatement 
opportunities with net costs. The cheapest with $22t CO2-e of these options is the 
module replacement for older aircraft. It is also the only one of these options that 
remains under the current price for carbon permits under the AU ETS the other net 
costs per tonne CO2-e are ($164 towing, $440 ATM by Qantas, $1020 re-engineering 
of 10-year-old aircraft, and $2,600 airframe component replacement) that far exceed 
the price of carbon so that it would be unlikely for Qantas to conduct them, also the 
additional investment may be too costly. Rather than choosing those investment 
opportunities, Qantas is more likely to invest in new aircraft since even re-worked 
aircraft could not achieve the desired efficiency level. These relationships are 






Figure 7-2: Qantas’ MACC for technology-related investments 
Each bar represents an abatement opportunity. The x-axis depicts the amount of CO2-e that can be saved while the y-axis provides the benefits/costs per ton CO2-e. The 
abatement options from left (highest benefit) to right (most costly): 1. Riblet (cheapest), 2. Winglets, 3.ATM-Investment covered by 3rd party, 4. Module replacement, 




7.4 PROCESS-RELATED ABATEMENTS 
Process-related abatements come from operational or mechanical adjustments during 
maintenance. Each of the measures available to Qantas will be discussed in the 
following subsections. The calculations of the respective process-related abatement 
can be found in Appendix A1. 
Taxiing with Fewer Engines 
Taxiing refers to the movement of an aircraft on the ground using its own power. 
Normally, taxiing takes place from the terminal/gateway to the runway or vice versa. 
The fuel burn while taxiing can be reduced by 20% to 40% when two instead of four 
engines are used. In its 2011 trial, Iberia, with a four-engine Airbus A340 aircraft at 
airport O’Hare, saved 352 pounds (160 kilograms) of fuel on the A340-300 model 
and 524 pounds (238 kilograms) of fuel on the A340-600 model per flight when the 
pilot switched off two engines immediately after leaving the runway (Kar, et al., 
2010).  
Table 7-17: Taxiing with fewer engines 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 0.4% 
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.55).  
 
This abatement opportunity can be implemented without any additional costs. It 
could save Qantas 56,491tCO2-e per year and 621,403tCO2-e abatements over 11 
years at an abatement benefit of $174.  
Queue Management and Controlled Pushback 
Aircrafts queuing for take-off due to congestion impact negatively on aircrafts’ 
taxiing times and fuel consumption. In Europe aircrafts spend about 10% to 30% of 
their flight time on taxiing, and a short and medium range A320 spends as much as 
5% to 10% of its fuel on the ground (Cros and Frings, 2008). In order to minimise 
congestion, Boston Logan International Airport trialled a system that takes into 
account times for taxiing, pushback and take-off. In 2011, for only eight four-hour 
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periods, fuel consumption was reduced by 9 US tons, and the average taxi time for an 
aircraft decreased on average by 5.3 minutes for 144 flights, exemplifying the 
potential benefits such a congestion control strategy could yield. 
The implementation of a queue management system and controlled pushback is 
expected to save Qantas 2% of emissions from 2012 onwards for its international 
aviation activities. The costs of the new or updated systems are expected to be 
covered by airports. 
Table 7-18: Queue management and 
controlled pushback 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 2% 
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.55).  
 
Under the above assumption that Qantas will not share any of the costs for optimised 
queuing and pushback operations at airports, this abatement opportunity could save 
Qantas 282,456tCO2-e per year and 3,107,015tCO2-e abatements over 11 years at an 
abatement benefit of $174. Auxiliary unquantifiable benefits include less congestion, 
improved time scheduling and higher passenger satisfaction resulting from fewer 
delays.  
Continuous Descent Approaches 
Continuous descent approaches, also called optimised profile descent, optimise the 
landing of an aircraft. The aircraft would approach the airport prior to landing. 
Instead of using a stair-step descending, throttling down and requesting permission to 
descend to each new (lower) altitude, a continuous descent approach allows for a 
smooth, constant-angle descent to landing. This reduces fuel consumption and noise 
emissions compared to conventional descent approaches. Ideally, the continuous 
descent approach starts from the top of the descent such as at the cruise altitude and 
allows the aircraft to fly its individual optimal vertical profile down to the runway 
threshold.  
The increase in Qantas’ fuel efficiency using this approach is estimated at 1.5% for 
international flights. This assumption might ignore the inefficiency inherent in very 
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traffic-intense airports such Singapore, Hong Kong, London Heathrow, Dubai or 
others that might not allow a continuous decent approach. Inaccessible military zones 
such as those around Sydney Airport might further hinder the application of the 
continuous decent approach. Yet these inefficiencies cannot be quantified due to lack 
of information.  
Table 7-19: Continuous descent approaches 
– Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 1.5% 
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.55).  
 
Continuous decent could save Qantas 211,842tCO2-e per year and 2,330,261tCO2-e 
abatements over 11 years. The abatement benefits are $174 per tCO2-e and no initial 
investment is required. In addition, auxiliary and unquantifiable benefits come from 
fewer noise emissions.  
Less Tankering  
Fuel price is an important driver for airlines, and regional differences in fuel prices 
make tankering an option for short-range carriers to save fuel costs. Cost savings 
result not only from true variances in fuel prices between city pairs but also from 
discounts for volume purchases at particular airports. In addition to price benefits, 
tankering provides operational benefits in that turnaround times are faster owing to 
less time spent on refuelling. To stop tankering does not require a significant 
investment and the fuel saved would be 0.5%. Since tankering is only applied to 
short distance flights, fuel savings are assumed to be only for Qantas’ national 
aviation business.  
Table 7-20: Less tankering – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings National 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 0.5% 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.113).  
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Stopping tankering on national routes could save Qantas 24,715tCO2-e per year and 
271,864tCO2-e abatements over 11 years. The benefits of $189 per tCO2-e can be 
realised given the existing and forecasted price on carbon, without benefits it would 
decline to $174 per tCO2-e. In either case the operational and cost disadvantages of 
stopping tankering are not fed into the calculation due to the lack of available data. 
Reduce Cabin Dead Weight 
Goods such as duty-free or excessive beverage and food add weight to the aircraft 
and therefore increase fuel consumption. Reducing the duty-free goods allowance 
represents an economic trade-off between the forgone profit of the sale and the 
savings in fuel. The reduction of fuel burn is less than 1% and in the case of Qantas 
is assumed to be 0.9% for international flights.  
Table 7-21: Reduce cabin dead weight – 
Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 0.9% 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.113).  
 
Reducing dead weight can bring annual abatements of 127,105 tCO2-e and a total of 
1,398,157 tCO2-e at an abatement benefit of $174 per tCO2-e, while lost revenues 
from, for example, duty free, are not taken into account owing to lack of data. 
Load-factor Maximisation  
The passenger load factor is a measure of an aircraft’s utilisation of capacity. For 
example, assuming an aircraft has 100 seats and 60 seats are filled, the load factor is 
60%. The same applies to the freight load factor. In 2013 IATA reported an average 
worldwide passenger load factor of 79.5% (IATA, 2014). Although an increase in 
load factor to 85% or higher provides significant savings in CO2 emissions, it 




Table 7-22: Load-factor maximisation – 
Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 3.0% 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.113).  
 
Without any additional investment Qantas could reduce is annual tCO2-e emissions 
by 423,684 tonnes, which represents an abatement of 4,660,522 tonnes over 11 years 
at a benefit of $175 per tCO2-e. It is assumed that $1 million annually can be made in 
extra revenue and cost savings for Qantas’ international business.  
Engine Washing 
After an engine is washed the temperature within the turbine is reduced and fuel 
efficiency increases by 1.2%, which makes up about 330 tCO2-e efficiency gains per 
year for a wide-body aircraft. The operational costs are about 21.4% of the fuel 
savings when engine cleaning is conducted by a third party, in this case Pratt and 
Global Service Partners (2010). 
 
Table 7-23: Engine washing – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 1.2% 
Operational costs in % of fuel savings 21.43% 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.55).  
(2) Pratt and Whitney Global Service Partners (2010, p.3) 
estimate from graph – as percent from savings. 
 
Engine washing would not require Qantas to make additional investments and 
achieves annual tCO2-e emissions reductions of 423,684 tonnes and 4,660,522 tCO2-
e over 11 years at a benefit of $140 per tCO2-e. To what extent engine washing might 




Coat Airplanes with Ultra-thin Paint 
Ultra-thin coating is 100 times thinner than a human hair, smooths out the 
microscopic bumps and nicks on an aircraft’s surface and prevents the build-up of 
debris, which consequently reduces drag during the fight to ultimately save fuel. The 
coating process consists of two steps. First, the surface is cleaned with a special 
solution and then the main coating is applied. The efficiency improvements and fuel 
saving is 2% while the initial coating of Qantas’ whole fleet could be 1% of the fuel 
savings and 0.09% in the following years to coat newly acquired aircraft. There is an 
implicit assumption that coating every type of aircraft would cost the same 
(Sumberg, 2011).  
 
Table 7-24: Coat airplanes with ultra-thin paint – 
Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 2% 
Costs in % for initial painting of the whole fleet 1% 
Number of planes in 2011 215 
Number of planes in 2018 384 
(1) Sumberg (2011).  
 
Coating Qantas aircraft with ultra-thin paint could save 282,456tCO2-e per annum 
and 3,107,015tCO2-e over 11 years. Without any significant initial investment there 
would be an abatement benefit of $167 per tCO2-e. 
Polishing 
The polishing of an aircraft’s surface can result in 0.25% in fuel savings while 
additional costs are about $150 and therefore negligible. Any cost efficiency might 
be outweighed by the fact that an airline’s public image is vested in their paint 




Table 7-25: Polishing – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings International 
Efficiency level 2012 (1) 0.25% 
 
(1) Farries and Eyers (2008, p.113), Kar et al. (2010, 
p.55) suggest increased efficiency of 0.3–0.8%. 
 
The polishing of Qantas’ airlines could save 28,246tCO2-e annually and 
310,701tCO2-e over 11 years at abatement benefits of $174 per tCO2-e. 
Summary – Process-related Abatements 
Process-related abatement opportunities require investment and behavioural changes 
on the part of Qantas at net benefit. The option of less fuel tankering on national 
flights bears a net saving of $189t CO2-e. The magnitude of the benefit depends on 
the respective price differences for aviation fuel on city pairs. For example, for the 
Sydney to Melbourne route, which is one of the busiest worldwide, fuel prices can be 
expected to be similar, due to similar infrastructure (pipelines, tanks, etc.) and high 
demand. Yet regional airports such as Alice Springs do not have such facilities so it 
might be necessary for Qantas to tanker fuel to save on the cost of infrastructure. 
Also, to provide fuel at these smaller airports is costly owing to the huge distances 
over which aviation fuel must be transported. However, it would be possible for the 
Australian government to regulate tinkering, taking into consideration that average 
consumption per aircraft type and nautical mile already exists and airlines can 
provide cost data for existing fuel supply for the government to make a decision on 
such a regulation. 
The next abatement option with a benefit of $175t CO2-e is load factor maximisation, 
which has great potential, especially in light of the ongoing ‘capacity war’ between 
Qantas and Virgin Australia in the Australian domestic market in which Qantas 
generally adds two aircraft for each one Virgin adds to a route. When the number of 
flights and thus the capacity increase is over-proportional to the increase in demand, 
the load factor decreases. Qantas, with its aim of retaining 65% of market share and 
related expansion of capacity faces this issue of decreasing load factor on domestic 
flights. It would be a strategic decision on how much the existing capacity can be cut 
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back or how little increased while still keeping the desired market-share for Qantas. 
In light of environmental costs, the MACC provides useful insights into the benefits 
of load factor maximisation.  
The implementation of queue management and controlled pushback, as well as the 
continuous decent approach are measures that can only be achieved in collaboration 
with airports and/or ATM. This would require a dialogue about the costs and benefits 
beyond Qantas’ MACC to analyse the cost implications for those investments to 
airports. The MACC can be a means to communicate the respective costs and 
benefits for each player to find a solution leading to the eventual implementation of 
these abatement opportunities. For example, airports could be compensated for 
implementation and thus have a share of the benefits.  
The other process-related abatement options – reducing cabin dead weight, taxiing 
with fewer engines, polishing, coating airplanes with ultra-thin paint and engine 
washing – are at the discretion of Qantas. The reduction of cabin dead weight could 
be regulated by the government setting out the goods to be carried for each passenger 
to save CO2-e, yet it could reduce the gain Qantas makes from such sales. Apart from 
that, the implementation of these abatement opportunities would not require 





Figure 7-3: Qantas’ MACC for process-related investments 
Each bar represents an abatement opportunity. The x-axis depicts the amount of CO2-e that can be saved while the y-axis provides the benefits/costs per ton CO2-e. The 
abatement options from left (highest benefit) to right (most costly): 1. Less Tankering, 2. Load factor maximisation, 3. Implementation of Queue Management, 4. Reduced 




7.5 AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT 
This section outlines the abatement costs from the replacement of ‘old’ with ‘new’ 
aircraft, several options to either produce or obtain biofuels and the merits of Qantas’ 
trigeneration plants in Sydney. The calculations of the respective aircraft 
replacement-related abatement can be found in Appendix A1. 
Replacement of Boeing 747-400 with Boeing 787-8/9 
The Boeing 787 is one of the most fuel-efficient long-haul aircraft and about 20% 
more fuel efficient than the Boeing 747(see Appendix A1-Table Fleet4.1 - 
Replacement of Boeing 747-400 by 787-8/9- Assumptions). The following 
calculation compares the replacement of one Boeing 747-400 with one Boeing 787-
800. It is assumed that in one year, with 320 8,000 nautical mile flights, the residual 
value of the Boeing 747-400 is zero and a new Boeing 787-800 will cost $202 
million. The Boeing 747-400 has the capacity to carry 416 passengers, and the 
Boeing 787-800, 250 passengers. The net loss per passenger on a flight is assumed to 
be $100 while the reduction in maintenance costs for Boeing 787-800 compared to 
Boeing 747-400 is $10,000 per year while all other variable costs except for fuel 
consumption are assumed to be the same. The useful life of a new Boeing 787-800 is 
20 years, which is the time period for linear depreciation. Replacing a single aircraft 
would save Qantas 119,197tCO2-e annually or 1,311,167tCO2-e over 11 years at an 
abatement benefit of $10 per tCO2-e.  
Replacement of Boeing 767-300ER with Boeing 787-8/900 
Compared to the Boeing 767-300ER, the Boeing 787 is 20% more fuel-efficient (see 
Appendix A1 Table Fleet5.1 - Replacement of BOEING 767-300ER by BOEING 
787 - 8/9- Assumption). In order to compare Boeing 767-300ER with Boeing 787-
800, a flight length of 5,000 nautical miles flown on 320 days is assumed as well as 
no residual value for the Boeing 767-300ER and $202 million for the acquisition of a 
new Boeing 787-800. The seating capacity is 269 for the Boeing 767-300ER while it 
is 250 for the Boeing 787-800. The reduced seating capacity is taken into 
consideration with $100 per passenger seat each time the aircraft takes off. The 
decrease in maintenance costs for the lower aircraft is assumed to be $10,000 and 
other variable costs except fuel consumption are assumed to remain the same for 
both. If Qantas was to replace Boeing 767-300ER with Boeing 787-800 there would 
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be an abatement of 12,613tCO2-e annually and 138,742tCO2-e over 11 years at 
additional abatement cost of $627 per tCO2-e. 
Replacement of Boeing 737-400 with Airbus A320-200 
For flights with a distance of 1,500 nautical miles or more the Airbus A320-200 is 
about 8% more fuel efficient [(6.085 minus 5.433) Fuel kg/nm divided by 6.085 Fuel 
kg/nm]. There are 159 available seats on a Boeing 737-400 aircraft and on the Airbus 
A320-200 there are 148. The difference in seat capacity is recognised with $100 as 
forgone net benefit per seat per take-off. Both aircraft types are compared on a flight 
length of 2,000 nautical miles, on 320 days. A new Airbus A320-200 costs $201 
million and the residual value of the Boeing 737-400 is assumed to be zero. Decrease 
in maintenance efforts is considered with $10,000 each year and other variable 
expenses except fuel costs. The abatement from the replacement could yield to 
744tCO2-e per annum or 8,183tCO2-e over 11 years. However, the abatement costs 
for such a replacement are $12,015 per tCO2-e, which makes such an investment not 
economically viable. 
Replacement of Airbus A330-200 with Airbus A350-900 
The Airbus A350-900 provides 4% higher fuel efficiency compared to the Airbus 
A330-200. In addition, the Airbus A350-900 can transport 360 passengers while the 
Airbus A330-200 can only transport 295 passengers. A flight distance of 4,000 
nautical miles flown on 320 days is assumed to maximise the CO2-e abatement. 
Additional seats are assumed to bring $100 per passenger per take off which reduces 
the abatement costs. The initial investment for an A350-900 is $267,000 with a 
useful life of 20 years while the residual value of an Airbus A330-200 is assumed to 
be zero. The maintenance costs are assumed to be less annually: $10,000 less for 
A350-900 compared to an A330-200. Replacement can assist abatement of 
28,532tCO2-e per annum or 313,854tCO2-e over 11 years. The abatement costs per 
tCO2-e are $300.  
Summary – Aircraft Replacement 
The replacement of one Boeing 747-400 with a Boeing 787-8/900 would result in 
almost 120,000t CO2-e with an abatement benefit of $10t CO2-e. The replacement of 
an Airbus A330-200 with an Airbus A350-900 (29,000t CO2-e at $300 CO2-e), the 
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replacement of a Boeing 767-300ER with a Boeing 787-8/900 (13,000tCO2-e at 
$627 CO2-e) and the replacement of a Boeing 737-400 with an Airbus A320-200 
(about 1,000t CO2-e at $12,000tCO2-e) are both too expensive compared to a current 
carbon price of $24.15t CO2-e and too intensive in terms of capital access. The 
government could improve conditions with shorter depreciation cycles or by 
providing low interest funding to encourage investment. Yet the MACC illustrates 
that, except for the replacement of a Boeing 747-400 with a Boeing 787-8/900, other 
fleet-related investments would be rather expensive and not likely to be conducted 
except if there were other strategic considerations to be taken into account.  
7.6 BIOFUELS 
For the production of aviation biofuel additional assumptions have to be made in 
regard to current and future biofuel production. Bloomberg (2012) estimates about 
2% of Qantas’ domestic aviation fuel consumption can be substituted with biofuel in 
2012/13; that is 2% of 1,744.28 million litres of total domestic fuel consumption 
equals 34.89 million litres of available biofuel. Graham et al. (2011) forecast that by 
2020 7% (5.117 gigalitres) of Australian total fuel consumption (73.1 gigalitres) 
could come from biofuel. Fourteen percent of the total Australian fuel consumption 
relates to aviation activities, and it is assumed that 7% of aviation fuel consumption 
will also be substituted with biofuels (14% of 5.117 gigalitres equals 716.38 million 
litres of aviation biofuel). The total amount of aviation fuel from renewable sources 
within Australia would be 716.38 million litres and a share of 50% is assumed to be 
consumable by Qantas; Qantas’ current market share of the domestic aviation market 
is about 65%, so that a 50% share on biofuel is a careful estimate. From the current 
(2012) and future (2020) estimates, a production growth rate of aviation fuel from 
renewable sources of almost 40% per year can be assumed. This results in bio-
aviation-fuel production of 34.9 million litres in 2013 and 971.8 million litres in 
2023. 
Table 7-26: Growth in bio-fuel production 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Growth rate in % (1) 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 
Biofuels in ML (2) 34.9 48.7 67.9 94.7 132.0 184.1 256.8 358.2 499.6 696.8 971.8 
 
(1) Calculation of growth rate given a starting point of value in 2012 and expected amount in 2020. 
(2) It is assumed that a plant with a capacity of 400 million litres per annum is built (see Graham et 




Currently there are two alternative biofuel production methods available and their 
production is approved for commercial aviation. Both options can be considered 
either as an investment by Qantas or as a ‘buy-option’ from a third party. For both 
scenarios a maximum production of 400 million litres of bio-aviation fuel is 
assumed. A higher production at one plant is not economically viable owing to the 
increased transportation costs of additional feedstock (Graham et al., 2011). For 
aviation fuel from renewable sources there is an additional benefit of 4% less fuel 
consumption because this alternative fuel carries 4% more energy compared to 
conventional fuel. Yet the process of manufacturing aviation fuel bares CO2-e 
emissions. Taking this into account, the gasification/Fischer Tropsch method saves 
only 45% and hydrodeoxygenation 65% of CO2-e compared to conventional aviation 
fuel. Either 45% or 65% is taken into account for each of the calculation items 
‘Saving in fuel in kL’ and ‘Benefit fuel saving’ while ‘Benefit less CO2’ does not 
have to take the relative CO2-e savings into account since biofuel-related CO2-e 
emissions are fully exempt from the AU ETS. (The calculations of the respective 
biofuel-related abatement can be found in Appendix A1.) 
Gasification/Fischer Tropsch – Investment by Qantas 
In order to arrive at the annual operational, feedstock and transportation costs 
Graham et al.’s (2011) estimated cost per litre is multiplied with the possible 
production amount shown in Table 7-26 for each year of bio-aviation fuel output. 
The costs of capital are assumed to be fixed for the maximum output of 400 million 
litres, resulting in $320 million capital costs per year.  
Table 7-27: Gasification/Fischer Tropsch – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Income tax rate 30% 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings National 
Cost of capital (1) 0.78$/L 
Operational cost (1) 0.12$/L 
Feedstock cost (2) 0.28$/L 
Transport (2) 0.22$/L 
Capacity (3) 400 ML 
Efficiency (4) 45% 
 
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.21). 
(2) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.24). 
(3) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.18). 




The annual average abatement amount is 364,607.48tCO2-e and totals to 
4,010,682tCO2-e over 11 years. The marginal abatement costs are $592 per tCO2-e. 
Qantas’ current fuel consumption lies at approximately 4,790 million litres per year. 
To achieve this abatement would require investments into several such plants, which 
is not economically viable due to the huge demand on feedstock and geographical 
dispersion of such plants.  
Gasification/Fischer Tropsch – Buy Option 
Bloomberg (2012) estimates the costs of this sort of bio-aviation fuel to be 4.66$/L in 
2012, decreasing to 2.60$/L by year 2018. This shows a trend of an 11% decrease 
per year in the price per litre from 4.66$/L in 2012 to 1.45$/L in 2023. 
Table 7-28: Price of bio-fuel from gasification/Fischer Tropsch 
    2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Growth rate  –11% –11% –11% –11% –11% –11% –11% –11% –11% –11% –11% 
Cost per litre ($) 4.66 4.14 3.69 3.28 2.92 2.60 2.31 2.06 1.83 1.63 1.45 
 
Even if the alternative aviation fuel is purchased from a third party there would be 
the cost of storage (0.02$/L) and transportation (0.04$/L) to consider (Graham et al., 
2011 p.22). The annual abatement amount would be 401,068tCO2-e and 
4,010,682tCO2-e over 11 years at a cost of $476 per tCO2-e.  
Hydrodeoxygenation – Investment by Qantas 
The annual operational cost, feedstock cost and transportation cost provided by 
Graham et al. (2011), multiplied with the possible production amount shown in 
Table 7-26 for each year of bio-aviation fuel output totals to the annual costs of the 
respective cost category. The costs of capital are assumed to be fixed for the 
maximum output of 400 million litres, resulting in $40 million capital costs per year, 
which is far lower than that under the gasification Fischer/Tropsch method. Also, the 





Table 7-29: Gasification/Fischer Tropsch – Assumptions 
Useful life of investment 11 
Implementation 2012 
Fuel savings National 
Cost of capital (1) 0.1$/L 
Operational cost (1) 0.11$/L 
Feedstock cost (2) 0.75$/L 
Transport (2) 0.1$/L 
Capacity (3) 400 ML 
Efficiency (4) 65% 
 
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.21). 
(2) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.24). 
(3) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.18). 
(4) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.22). 
 
 
On average, 526,655tCO2-e could be abated annually and 5,793,208tCO2-e in total 
over 11 years. The marginal abatement costs are $103 per tCO2-e and significantly 
lower than under the Gasification Fischer/Tropsch method mainly because of lower 
capital costs and higher benefits from increased procedural efficiency. 
Hydrodeoxygenation – Buy Option 
Based on Bloomberg’s (2012) estimates, a decrease in the alternative aviation fuel 
price of 6.45% per annum can be calculated from the 2012 fuel price of 1.20$/L and 
0.86$/L in 2018. The price for a litre of fuel will almost halve from $1.20 in 2013 to 
$0.62 in 2023.  
Table 7-30: Price for bio-fuel from hydrodeoxygenation 
    2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Growth rate in % -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 -6.45 
Cost per litre 1.20 1.12 1.05 0.98 0.92 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.62 
 
Graham et al. (2011 p.22) estimate that, in addition, there will be costs for storage 
(0.02$/L) and transportation (0.04$/L). The annual abatement amount would be 
579,320.78CO2-e and 5,793,208tCO2-e over 11 years at a cost of $17 per tCO2-e.  
Trigeneration Plant 
Trigeneration, also called ‘combined cooling, heat and power’ produces electricity 
and at the same time allows heating and cooling from the combustion of a fuel, 
which, in the case of Qantas, is natural gas. Although the stand-alone significance of 
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Qantas’ trigeneration plant at Sydney Airport Terminal 3 is minimal (estimated 
1,700tCO2-e savings – see Appendix A1-Table E1.9), compared to Qantas’ total 
emissions (12 million tCO2-e) it is an example of Qantas’ efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions. Additionally, it provides investment price and supply security so that 
Qantas is not subject to peak rates and is independent of the electricity grid.  
Summary – Biofuels and Trigeneration 
The ‘cheapest’ option for Qantas is to buy for about $17 aviation biofuel from a third 
party that is using hydrodeoxygeneration. This abatement opportunity does not 
require any initial investment and provides the most flexibility to choose other, 
additional and currently more expensive abatement opportunities. This is of 
importance as new and more efficient technology in either different feedstock (third 
generation feedstock from algae or waste) or new production methods evolve.  
The decision to invest in a particular technology could cause technology-login effects 
so that a change to other options would not be easy. For example, a shift from 
hydrodeoxygenation to gasification Fischer/Tropsch is not possible without 
modifications to property, plant and equipment.  
The production of aviation biofuel requires more refinement and thus involves more 
costs than the production of biodiesel. This increases the price for aviation biofuel 
and producers might opt for biodiesel production instead. Also, the subsidy under the 
AU ETS for biofuels, which is the exemption of the CO2-e emissions as a by-product 
of fuel production, applies to both biodiesel and bioaviation fuel, but favours the 
former. This disadvantage in regard to costs makes it less likely for refining 
companies to opt in their production for bioaviation fuels rather than biodiesel.  
Generally speaking, hydrodeoxygenation either acquired from a third party or 
produced by Qantas’ own refinery is more favourable then gasification 





Figure 7-4: Qantas’ MACC for bioaviation fuel 
Each bar represents an abatement opportunity. The x-axis depicts the amount of CO2-e that can be saved while the y-axis provides the benefits/costs per ton CO2-e. The 
abatement options from left (highest benefit) to right (most costly): 1. Buy-Option Hydrodeoxygenation, 2. Hydrodeoxygenation, 3. Buy-Option Gasification/Fischer Tropsch, 




7.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR QANTAS 
There has been a wide debate about the cost of CO2 abatement opportunities, which 
hamper their adoption and implementation. Qantas has repeatedly demanded a 
transition time for the aviation sector as has been granted to other Emissions 
Intensive Trade Exposed corporations. The MACC shows that 2.4 million tCO2-e 
could be abated with an abatement benefit. These are 13 different abatement 
opportunities that could effectively save Qantas costs while saving CO2-e; another 10 
investment options that incur additional costs to Qantas are available. Of these 10 
only two are available below the existing $23 tCO2-e prevailing carbon price.  
The above results show the huge potential of process- and technology-related 
abatement opportunities. It is important to bring these abatements to the awareness of 
Qantas and policymakers. Even though these measures jointly have a significant 
potential, implementation might require the support of other players such as airports, 
air navigation authorities and governments. The MACC in this regard can be a 
powerful and useful tool to easily communicate the advantages of process-related 
savings and their negative costs in one graph.  
Furthermore, the MACC can be used for internal decision-making within Qantas. A 
sensitivity analysis as provided in Appendix A1 can further contribute to the 
robustness of findings and encourage a dialogue to achieve change in behaviour and 
CO2-e reductions. The MACC certainly alerts Qantas to the possibility of choosing 
abatements with net benefit and how these benefits can be achieved. The government 
can encourage Qantas to take on this ‘low hanging fruit’ with grants or other 
monetary incentives.  
7.8 IS THERE AN ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, RATIONALITY AND 
LEGITIMATION CRISIS? 
Qantas has shown enough interest in the ecological impact of its activities to have 
entered into a 15-year BOOM arrangement with GridX for two power plants to serve 
Qantas’ Sydney headquarters, aircraft maintenance facilities, catering centre and T3 
domestic terminal. This agreement has been widely communicated through Qantas’ 
annual reports in a similar way to the first Australian biofuel powered flight 
conducted in 2012, which received much media attention. However, contrary to its 
environmental orientation and initial drive towards climate change actions, Qantas 
criticised the introduction of the AU ETS for adding $110–115 million to its existing 
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financial burdens. Qantas also complained that it was not included among the EITE 
in full corporations that receive transitional support for 94.5% of their required 
carbon permits to be surrendered in 2012/13 for free. In Beck’s terms the borders of 
the economic realm act like a watershed to the environmental one; the economic 
crisis and financial considerations are prioritised and highlighted over the potential 
threat and possible solutions to global warming. That is, measures to abate CO2-e 
with even net benefits have not been pursued by Qantas yet, even though their 
potential is far more significant than, for example, the two trigeneration plants in 
Sydney.  
As Habermas notes, the capitalist investment decision-making process is natural and 
follows its own logic: emissions trading and the availability of Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER) might contribute to some of the inertia because they provide 
convenient and in the case of CERs, ‘cheap’ solutions with no uncertainty attached. 
Additionally, the purchase and surrender of carbon permits is perfectly in line with 
the neoliberal idea that the market guides its ‘rational’ actors, which also legitimates 
Qantas inertia. 
Qantas draws on the subjective and subjectively experienced nature of crises and in 
particular its own economic crisis and the worsening of economic conditions owing 
to the introduction of the AU ETS. It is unknown to what extent the price on carbon 
can be passed on to Qantas passengers, but in the duopolistic Australian aviation 
market it is even more likely that airlines have the opportunity to pass on costs, since 
passengers are price takers. Therefore, it is the intention of Qantas to receive transfer 
payments from the government to assist it in times of its ‘economic crisis’. As such, 
the climate change actions by the Australian government have not been a mobiliser 
for Qantas to implement CO2-e abatement investments but have rather reinforced 
Qantas’ call for government support and Qantas’ inertia. 
The Australian government keeps the inertia of market participants and that of 
Qantas latent, and its rationality is not challenged as long as no obvious wrong-doing 
damages the impressions that the government is fulfilling its role as assigned from 
the economic system. Part of this role is to keep the actual inherent threats of climate 
change and its catastrophic potential latent so that the government’s own rationality 
and eventually its legitimacy is not threatened. An expected sea-level rise of one 
metre or more would have a significant economic and social impact on coastal cities. 
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Yet the MACC as illustrated for Qantas provides potential investment abatement 
opportunities to at least reduce the magnitude of future climate events if it was to be 
used by the government and other stakeholders to drive behavioural change. 
However, the government has so far kept the conflict between the state, supreme and 
individual capitalists’ interests inherent in the build-up of GHGs and actions against 
climate change successfully latent and is in favour of individual capitalist’s interest. 
Current climate change actions are not significant enough to curb the environmental 
crisis and the Liberal government, simultaneously with the withdrawal of 
Australians’ motivation, is moving in the reverse direction to support economic and 
individual capitalist’s interest at the expense of the environment.  
The macroeconomic aim of the CPS to bring about behavioural change triggered by a 
price on CO2-e emissions has so far not been reached. Rather than using this top-
town policy approach, the MACC can foster behavioural change within a company. 
The MACC conflates the economic and environmental perspective to suggest 
abatement opportunities that can assist, within the neoliberal paradigm, to maximise 
shareholder value and simultaneously reduce CO2-e. Within Qantas such a MACC 
can address the prevailing economic crisis whilst providing rational grounds for 
actions against climate change. As an investment decision-making tool, the MACC 
provides at a glance abatement options that can be achieved at a benefit or for low 
cost. This powerful tool provides rational grounds against inertia and for actions 
against climate change within Qantas, and thus has the potential to bring about 
behavioural change.  
The government’s rationale of collecting and redistributing tax payer money in the 
context of support for Qantas could be challenged if Australians were to see Qantas’ 
MACC in the light of actions against climate change. The inertia of Qantas combined 
with the government’s financial support has been keep latent by the government and 
hidden in SEAR; exposed it highlights the prioritisation of Qantas’ (individual 
capitalist) economic interest. As Appendix (A1) shows, a MACC can be easily 
manipulated, reduce benefits and increase costs when the interest rate is varied from 
7% to 20%. Accounting then provides a tool for legitimation: Qantas to justify 
inertia, and the government to follow a market-imposed price on CO2 rather than 
fostering direct behavioural change within Qantas and the industry as a whole.  
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Finally, the MACC can be part of global actions to curb global warming and ideally 
used as a tool against the ‘collective look-away’. The ease with which the MACC 
can be comprehended means that the MACC can be a mobiliser for those interested 
in climate change actions. In the case of Qantas it is justifiable to ask why 2.4million 
tCO2-e have not yet been abated even though there would be a benefit in doing so. 
Even shareholders could challenge Qantas’ management rationality that the 
economic crisis is not simultaneously addressed with abatements of GHGs, thus 
driving management to change its behaviour and increase awareness of its climate 
impact inside Qantas. This could be implemented in a similar way as the Be Green 
program, which asked and rewarded employees for operational improvements. 
7.9 SUMMARY 
The costs and abatement amounts of Qantas’ investment opportunities vary widely 
from those measures that can bring a net benefit to those far beyond stand-alone 
economic feasibility. The MACC shows that Qantas has 13 abatement opportunities 
available, and if implemented, could bring a net benefit and in total abate about 2.4 
million tCO2-e per year. Most of these measures are located within procedural 
arrangements and the MACC can be a means to start a debate about how to harvest 
these ‘low hanging fruit’ and how to lower the cost for the more expensive 
abatement opportunities such as biofuel generation within Qantas. Ideally, 
behavioural change would be created through an enhanced awareness of the 
environment.  
As Qantas undergoes economic crisis, cost-saving opportunities are valuable and 
ought to be pursued. Yet the political environment with the CPS has rather 
encouraged inertia. The MACC can trigger change from the bottom up, with 
companies achieving global climate action. The MACC draws on the economic 
imperative of profit maximisation and combines the interests of supreme and 
individual capitalists, in this case the Australian government and Qantas. It is 
essential that the government remains rational to avoid Australians withdrawing their 
motivation and allowing the government to enter into a legitimation crisis. The 
government has been able to keep the conflicts of different capitalists’ interests and 
Qantas’ inaction latent. Yet the MACC can be mobiliser for those interested in 










This section must be considered in the context of Australia’s action to curb the 
build-up of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere and to prevent the severe 
aftereffects of global warming. The momentum gathered among the Australian 
people supported the introduction of the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme (AU 
ETS), a first step towards behavioural change. This chapter draws on theories and 
empirics from the previous seven chapters to conclude this thesis. 
Section 8.2 briefly summarises this study’s motivation and scope, followed by the 
theories on which this thesis draws (Section 8.3) and the research design employed 
within this study (Section 8.4). The subsequent sections illustrate the findings 
(Section 8.6), key contributions in regard to theory, empirical findings and their 
synthesis (Section 8.7). Thereafter, the implications of this thesis are outlined 
(Section 8.6), as are its limitations (Section 8.7) and opportunities for future research 
(Section 8.8). The last section (Section 8.9) sums up the agnostic voice of this thesis. 
8.2 MOTIVATION AND SCOPE  
The introduction of the AU ETS was a move by the Australian government as part of 
its international commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce GHG emissions. 
The Australian icon Qantas faced a price on its carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) 
emissions at the same time as it was confronting other economic crises. The role of 
accounting in these circumstances is the broad gap this thesis attempts to fill. 
First, there is an urgent need for accounting researchers to engage in theories and 
world views other than mainstream positivist accounting research to shed light on the 
relationship of accounting and the macroeconomic and political context which it 
shapes and through which it is shaped (Sikka, et al., 1995). Accounting practice, 
rather than being a neutral objective measure, facilitates the distribution of income 
between social classes (Cooper, 1995; Tinker and Neimark, 1987) and facilitates the 
generation and allocation of resources (Cooper, 1980; Sikka, et al., 1995). This 
research is the first to consider, in an Australian industrial context, the threat of 
climate change and the company’s actions as the macro-economic, political context 
in which accounting operates.  
 
220 
Second, in order to understand the interplay of the economic, administrative, social 
and ecological realms, this study drew on Habermas’ legitimation crisis and Beck’s 
work on the ecological crisis. This combined and updated view has not previously 
been introduced into the accounting literature and this research adds to the theoretical 
discussion to explain social and environmental accounting research (SEAR) in its 
broader context.  
The extension of Habermas’ work is unique and so is its application to the case of 
Qantas. Qantas as a national icon has specific features and a special position within 
the Australian economy and culture, which provides a unique opportunity to 
introduce the marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) as an alternative accounting 
tool to emphasise abatement investment opportunities and its potential for 
behavioural change in the wake of the introduction of the AU ETS. The MACC is an 
easy to comprehend consolidation of net present value (NPV) calculations, and a 
useful, graphical investment decision-making tool that has not yet been introduced 
into the accounting literature.  
The main objective of this research was to investigate how we can understand Qantas 
in a late capitalist, ecological crisis context, especially after the introduction of the 
Australian Carbon Pricing Scheme and the role of Qantas’ MACC. To approach this 
issue, the following guiding questions were developed: 
1. The Australian government appears to provide a range of subsidies that will 
help to prevent Qantas from failing. Is there any financial or other 
accountability for these subsidies? And what has the Australian government 
done to support Qantas as Australia’s national carrier and to prevent an 
economic or financial failure by Qantas while attempting to resolve the 
ecological crisis? 
2. Which economic crises has Qantas faced? And how can the MACC be used 
to illustrate the economic prudence of investment decisions (to prevent 
economic crises) in relation to the introduction of the Australian Carbon 
Pricing Scheme? 
3. What are the contributions of the MACC to social and environmental 
accounting and what are its implications for Qantas in particular? 
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8.3 THEORY  
This study draws on middle range thinking (MRT), which considers the role of 
theory for the observer and the interpretation of empirics to be iterative. That is, 
theory equips the observer with a lens with which to investigate the subject matter, 
while empirics flash out the skeleton of theory with details. This study conflates 
Habermas’ ‘legitimation crisis’ with Beck’s work on the ecological crisis, and links 
the macro view of the Australian economic, administrative, social and ecological 
context to the micro sphere of Qantas. Prior to this endeavour the work on 
‘legitimation crisis’ was brought up to date with existing crisis literature and views 
on neoliberalism. This helps understand the role of SEAR in the construction of 
crises and possible solutions in the form of the MACC for Qantas, and the Australian 
economic, state and social realms in the context of the ecological crisis (global 
warming).  
8.4 RESEARCH DESIGN  
In order to address the three guiding questions, and in line with the MRT approach, a 
single case study of Qantas was undertaken. The purpose of this study was to 
investigate the role of accounting and SEAR in communicating or creating, crises as 
well as the construction of the MACC as a means to guide carbon abatement 
investment decisions to ultimately achieve behavioural change. Consequently, a 
qualitative study was most appropriate. This qualitative case study relied on a variety 
of data sources.  
For the purpose of establishing Qantas’ MACC, the study drew on data from Qantas 
to establish its current amount of CO2-e emissions, costs for aviation fuel, fleet size 
and other Qantas-specific information relevant to the modelling. The abatement 
opportunities available to an airliner were derived from publicly available reports 
developed by and in conjunction with aviation stakeholders, and these reports’ 
findings were compared with one another to assess the reliability of data.  
This research design enables the author to understand Qantas in the context of late 
capitalism, the ecological crisis and the role of the MACC, including the historical 
development of Qantas, its relationship with the state, the social and ecological 




8.5.1 Making Sense of Australian Aviation History: From Habermas and 
Beck’s Perspective 
Sections 3 and 6 outlined the history of the global and Australian aviation industries 
and then provided an analysis that drew on the Habermas’ legitimation crisis and 
Beck’s ecological crisis.  
The growth of aviation sectors is and will be huge even though airlines go through 
profit cycles and face increasingly high oil prices. This situation does not only put 
airlines into economic crisis but also leads to a market consolidation/concentration 
on a national and international level. Yet the importance of airlines for nations makes 
this market place highly regulated in terms of potential foreign investor ownership, 
which challenges the government to continue to serve the neoliberal ideology of free 
markets and state absenteeism.  
States exert strong protectionism regarding their carriers, which also applies to the 
case of Qantas. Accounting and SEAR discourse was found to play a vital role in the 
entangled relationship between the Australian government and Qantas in the context 
of global warming and actions to combat this problem.  
Qantas actively employs accounting concepts and disclosure to create, silence or 
foster its economic crises, including in regard to the ecological crisis. Accounting 
reports hide Australian state and federal governments’ support for Qantas and the 
actual protectionism in place. That is, Qantas receives benefits through favourable 
contracts with the government, which also underpins Qantas’ dominant position in 
the Australian domestic aviation market. While Qantas regards its inclusion in the 
AU ETS as an additional economic crisis there are actual benefits to Qantas such as 
the cheap solutions of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). Yet while there was 
momentum among Australians demanding actions against global warming, neither 
Qantas nor the government could withdraw and had to take action; accounting and 
disclosure by Qantas was actively used to manage its legitimation.  
Accounting concepts and rhetoric around national benefits, cost reduction and 
competition provided rationality for the government’s actions against climate 
change. Yet when both rationality and motivational crises came together, the 
government faced a legitimation crises. Accounting concepts such as costs, losses 
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and financial burdens contributed to the diminishing motivation of Australians to 
support the actions of the government to curb the ecological crisis. This then 
undermined the action and resulted in the withdrawal of some government 
legitimation in the attempt to foster necessary behavioural change to curb global 
warming. 
8.5.2 Contribution of the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve to Social and 
Environmental Accounting 
Section 2 introduced the MACC into the area of SEAR, management information 
systems (MISs), management and behavioural change. It fills a gap within the 
accounting literature by introducing and conceptually evaluating the MACC and set 
out its requirements in terms of data necessary to model the MACC. Additionally, it 
outlines potential behavioural change associated with the introduction of the MACC 
for organisations, including Qantas.  
To establish a MACC there are requirements on the cost accounting system, and the 
analysis showed that different systems have smaller or bigger deficits to fulfil the 
data’s needs. Limitations of present or past-oriented cost accounting systems to end-
of-pipe solutions provided further restrictions to adopt a MACC. Legal obligations 
under an ETS or reporting act demand CO2-e data, and information needs for the 
existing management of emissions might overlap with those for a MACC. That is, for 
a company to make future (investment or pricing) decisions, relevant opportunity 
costs have to be determined. Investment decision tools that emphasise the short term 
such as the payback period are not suitable for environmental investments with 
relatively longer payback periods.  
The political nature of budgeting and resource allocation could subject the MACC to 
misuse (Burchell et al., 1980), as is the deed of putting a number on nature for the 
wrong purpose; one which does not aim to reduce emissions or reduce pollution but 
rather to legitimise inertia on the grounds of cost (Hines, 1991). In contrast, the 
MACC can be seen as a practice on the margin of accounting (Miller, 1998) which 
could one day become central to it, so that CO2-e emissions are accounted for and 
included in internal investment decision-making. 
To model a MACC requires a MIS in full that provides sufficient data; some of this 
is already available under the Australian National Greenhouse Energy Reporting 
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(NGER) Act 2007 and other reporting obligations. The MIS is also a prerequisite for 
communicating the abatement amounts and their costs of implementation for 
divisions, departments or plants.  
The normative function of accounting to set performance goals as outlined by the 
MACC can trigger behavioural change. The MACC can reveal abatement 
opportunities and their costs, and thus create visibility for CO2-e emissions 
abatement opportunities which otherwise remain hidden (Hines, 1988, 1991; 
Hopwood, 1987, 1992; Llewellyn, 1994, 1998). Behavioural change resulting from 
the introduction of a MACC also depends on changes in management practice and its 
integration into management control systems (MCSs). 
8.5.3 The Marginal Abatement Cost Curve – A Contribution to Curb the 
Ecological Crisis 
Qantas’ MACC reveals the costs and abatement amounts for process-, technology-, 
replacement- and biofuel-related investments. The MACC shows that Qantas has 13 
abatement opportunities with net benefits available, and most of these are related to 
process and behavioural changes. These abatement opportunities could save Qantas 
about 2.4 million tCO2-e a year from the reduced combustion of aviation fuel. The 
results illustrate a huge CO2-e abatement potential, and while no one of those 
measures could be ‘the’ solution they together form part of one solution to reduce 
GHG emissions. The importance of behavioural change in general and for Qantas in 
particular is highlighted by the process-related abatement opportunities that provide 
‘low hanging fruit’ with net benefits per abated tonne of CO2-e. Ideally, behavioural 
change would be created through an enhanced awareness of the environment. 
The political nature of climate action from either Qantas or the government can be 
explained by Habermas’ legitimation crisis and Beck’s ecological crisis. Qantas 
criticised the AU ETS for adding to the economic crisis that already existed.  
The MACC can trigger behavioural change within companies to achieve overall 
global actions against climate change, combining the economic imperative of profit 
maximisation with the interests of supreme and individual capitalists. Yet a MACC 
can be a mobiliser for those interested in climate action to question the current 
political arrangements and prioritisation of individual capitalists’ interests over 
curbing global warming. 
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8.6 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS 
In section 1.7, expected contributions of this study were stated. Following are the 
major contributions of this study. 
8.6.1 On Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis 
This study draws on Habermas’ work on ‘legitimation crisis’, which has been 
updated with contemporary research on crises and the impact of neoliberalism. That 
is, the ideologies of ‘free market’ and ‘state absenteeism’ further restrain the ability 
of the state in its attempts to prevent economic and rationality crises, as does 
increased internationalisation and the surging power of global capitalism.  
Integrating Ulrich Beck’s work on the ecological crisis with Habermas’ work on 
legitimation crisis is another contribution of this study. It fills the environmental gap 
in Habermas’ work and the issue of global warming with its potentially catastrophic 
economic, social and political consequences. As such, the ecological crisis as an 
aftereffect of global warming can trigger each of Habermas’ crises. The economic 
crisis results from climate catastrophes such as the rise in sea level, and the 
increasing frequency of storms and other weather abnormalities. The government 
will be exposed to challenges to prevent economic crisis, yet it will reveal its past 
preference for the individual capitalist’s interest over the common interest if climate 
change actions are not strongly pursued. The threat to peoples’ habitat could make 
them withdraw from their motivation and consequently trigger a legitimation crisis 
for the government. 
The threat could be either a mobiliser for joint/global actions against climate change, 
uniting nations and forming supranational alliances, or a cause of barbarisation. The 
role of sociology (also examined in this study) is to bring the ‘future future’ to the 
present, alerting us to the future threat of global warming and filling the gap between 
present and ‘future future’. Beck recognised the features of nations’ borders as 
watersheds that allow for inequality among nations and hampering the awareness of 
people around the bigger issues of climate change. This influence of nations’ borders 
to the perception of people is important to Habermas’ legitimation crisis. It also 




This theoretical contribution extends our understanding of the interplay between the 
economic, state, societal and ecological systems and the potential crises. It adds to 
existing theories – legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional – to explain SEAR and 
accounting in general in the socio-political context in which they exist and which 
they shape. The case of Qantas draws on these theoretical insights and fleshes out the 
theoretical skeleton. 
Qantas is a unique case within the Australian setting as it is the national carrier and 
an icon deeply embedded in the Australia culture and the national identity. Previous 
studies have not drawn on Habermas’ legitimation crisis to investigate a single 
company, nor have they considered ‘social integration’ and the social nature of crisis. 
Accounting and SEAR reveal accounting's very nature to create hide, or reinforce 
crises. The discursive practices of Qantas and the Australian government around 
accounting concepts were used to discharge accountability, the demand for money 
and legitimised actions or inertia. 
The momentum within the Australian electorate to support actions against climate 
change provided a new source of legitimation and the possibility of actions that 
would empower civic movements and government actions to also introduce a 
(controversial) price on carbon. Beck’s claim that a nation’s borders work as a 
watershed was supported in the EU ETS when Qantas was facing a carbon price for 
flights to and from Europe. Put simply, other nations did not want to pay for the 
climate actions of other nations. Yet the ‘borders’ did not just separate nations but 
were also between the economic and ecological realms. Qantas and other opponents 
of the AU ETS drew on accounting discourse to create a negative image of actions 
against climate change, and also referenced other nations’ inaction and state 
absenteeism. Although the Australian government maintains a market solution to 
climate change within the ‘neoliberal ideology’, the negative (accounting) discourse 
caused a motivation crisis and the withdrawal of government legitimacy in this area. 
The threat of climate change was not strong enough to foster disempowerment of 
national or even globalised capital through destabilised markets. In Habermas’ terms, 




The practical implications for current and future generation are immense. In the light 
of Qantas, business conduct was shown to be in the government’s own and the 
interest of Australians. There has been extensive support to Qantas by the Australian 
government to prevent a legitimation crises. As debt provider to Qantas it means: 
that loans are more or less secured even through legislation in some cases. For 
employees it holds that bargaining power is and will be undermined in the interest of 
capital (with the state compensating the unemployed) to maximise profit and 
personal income for management and shareholders. For Qantas’ management it 
implies that the status of the airline will be preserved by the Australia government 
through several means (contracts with the State, special treatment and customized 
legislation). The Australian electorate can expect its national icon to be protected 
against bankruptcy, competition and even against the legislation that is meant to 
combat climate change to protect the national interest. It holds that short-termism and 
financial interests act as watersheds against the attempt to reduce GHGs, 
compromising future generations’ needs. Though, the MACC provides an array of 
viable alternatives at company level to combat climate change. 
8.6.2 The Marginal Abatement Cost Curve 
This study introduced the MACC into SEAR literature as a valuable tool to support 
companies’ decision-making in relation to CO2-e abatement investments. For the 
internal implementation of the MACC within an organisation, MISs and management 
accounting systems need to provide appropriate information. Whether the MACC 
can act as a trigger for behavioural change depends on several contingencies that are 
not only technical but are also intra-organisational and power-related. 
The conceptual analysis reveals that the MACC will have implications for a 
company’s management accounting system. It will create awareness within a 
company’s cost accounting and investment decision processes for the respective 
costs and benefits of emissions reductions. Therefore, the MACC can trigger a 
change towards a more environmentally sensitive management accounting system 
and can support economically and environmentally sound management (investment) 
decisions. A prerequisite to establish a MACC is the prevalence of a MIS, which 
facilitates the availability of sufficient and reliable data. This can enhance a dialogue 
among departments involved in the collection of CO2-e data, and generally increase 
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the visibility of CO2-e and CO2-e abatement opportunities. In the context of 
sustainable development, the MACC has great potential as for inscribing complex 
NPV calculations in a simple manner to drive organisational and behavioural change 
within a company.  
This study is the first to develop a MACC for an industrial company, in this case, 
Qantas. Extensive and detailed investment opportunities related to technology, 
processes, aircraft replacement and biofuel were established. This allows us to plot 
the potential of CO2-e abatements options at their respective benefits and costs. 
Furthermore, it allowed a discussion of the potential obstacles that could hamper the 
implementation of CO2-e-reducing measures. Similar to Beaumont and Tinch’s 
(2004) findings, the implementation of certain behavioural abatement actions 
requires a dialogue among stakeholders. In this process MACC can be a means to 
mitigate costs and benefits to different parties associated with the respective 
abatement option, for example, implementation of a more efficient air-traffic 
management system. 
8.6.3 Synthesis of Contributions 
The MACC can bring the ‘future future’ of climate change into the ‘present future’, 
outlining abatement opportunities and their costs to curb future catastrophes from 
global warming graphically. This study provides the sociological base to analyse the 
current political, economic and social systems in the light of the ecological crisis and 
actions against climate change. Revealing the existing inter-linkages amongst those 
systems within an internationally acting capitalism, it provides the starting point for 
understanding the role of accounting and ‘new accounting’ such as the MACC in 
regard to behavioural change and actions to curb global warming. 
To be an efficient tool to inform investment decision-making, trigger behavioural 
change and ‘mobilise’, the MACC has certain prerequisites. The political economy 
and veil of neoliberal ideology has to be lifted. In the case of Qantas, this means the 
indirect subsidies, market and AU ETS arrangements that encourage certain 
behaviour or inertia in regard to actions against climate change. For the 
government’s actions against climate change to be effective, a true behavioural 
change among people and firms is required, not just symbolic action such as the 
establishment of Qantas’ trigeneration plant. 
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8.7 IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS 
This study highlights the political nature of accounting in shaping and being shaped 
through its context.  
The MACC, used for corporate, governmental or individual decision-making, can be 
a driver of behavioural change. The MACC was argued to be a useful decision-
making tool to assist companies to reduce their carbon footprint. For individuals, a 
MACC might be useful in the consideration of, for example, home renovation. The 
MACC could illustrate the cheapest solutions such as replacing conventional globes 
with energy-saving globes to more expensive options such as installing solar panels 
and a warm water converter on the roof. For local governments, the MACC would 
illustrate CO2-e reduction from landfill, building management, public transport, etc. 
Overall, the MACC has the potential to trigger CO2 abatements on all societal levels. 
Aggregated MACCs can help policy decision-making. The MACC creates visibility 
for abatement options and can trigger a dialogue among stakeholders on ways to 
abate GHGs. There will be no single solution to climate change; there will need to be 
behavioural change and a variety of actions to curb global warming to prevent the 
worst scenarios from eventuating.  
8.8 LIMITATIONS 
There are certain limitations to this study, and these are identified and elaborated on 
as follows. 
8.8.1 Case Study 
This case study provided a deep and rich description and analysis of Qantas. This 
restricted the focus to issues related to Qantas and its context for the years from 1978 
to 2014. It relied on publicly available documents, which did not allow for deep 
insights into Qantas’ internal processes or decision-making. The qualitative nature of 
this research and above-outlined constraints call for caution in generalising these 
findings and conclusions to other airlines or sectors. 
8.8.2 Modelling of the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve 
The process of modelling depends on the information available, assumptions made 
and robustness of forecasts. For this MACC, the abatement amounts were derived 
from existing reports. Although the abatement amounts were checked against each 
 
230 
other there might be unforeseeable errors that cannot be detected. Growth rates and 
prices were forecast according to historical developments, which might be subject to 
change in the future. The MACC was tested for its sensitivity to changes in the 
interest rate (7%, 10%, 15% and 20%, see Appendices A1) to determine changes in 
the actual marginal abatement costs. As expected, the benefits decrease while costs 
increase. Despite all of these limitations, which are inherent in any modelling, our 
results are robust. 
8.8.3 Drawing on Theory 
It is arguable that the interpretation arrived at through the chosen theoretical lens is 
subjective. Yet MRT allows methods of investigation to be theoretically defined, and 
at the same time allows the multiplicity of subjective perceptual power. As such, it is 
the role of the researcher to flesh out the theoretical skeleton with her/his 
interpretation from the analytical process.  
8.9 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on Habermas and Beck’s contributions to critical theory, as well as the 
MACC, the following research avenues can be identified.  
8.9.1 The Marginal Abatement Cost Curve in Different Settings  
The usefulness of the MACC could be further tested in other industries and nations. 
To implement the MACC within a company as part of an experiment or ethnographic 
research could provide further ideas and insights into how the implementation 
process of the MACC in a company takes place. Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
management accounting change framework or Laughlin’s (1991) organisational 
change model would be suitable theories to draw on. Of particular interest would be 
the ease of the MACC to communicate abatement opportunities. This could provide 
further insights into the obstacles of implementing abatement investment options and 
sharpen the possibility for dialogue so that the MACC would become a mobiliser for 
climate change action.  
Drawing on Habermas’ methodological approach suggested by Laughlin (1987) 
future research could engage in an iterative process to develop an understanding 
about the social and technical realms’ interconnections as well as the possibility to 
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change and develop both within a company. This could help to integrate and improve 
the MACC in an organisational setting.  
8.9.2 Accountability for Abatement Investment Opportunities  
Beyond the company level it would be of interest to investigate the potential of the 
MACC in a broader stakeholder dialogue. Drawing on Habermas’ ‘Communicative 
Action’ as well as ‘Deliberative Democracy’, such a study would aim to understand 
the MACC’s potential for human (and non-human) emancipation.  
The MACC was found to illustrate complex numerical and technical information in a 
simplified, graphical way in one glance. As such, it would be a powerful tool for 
interested stakeholders to challenge the state’s prioritisation of individual capitalist’s 
interest over the interest of the people and future generations, especially when taking 
the impact of global warming into consideration.  
In a similar vein, the potential of the MACC for stakeholders to hold companies 
accountable could be investigated if the MACC was to become a mobiliser for 
climate action.  
8.9.3 Drawing on Habermas and Beck to Understand Other Settings  
The theories of Habermas and Beck provide a model that could be fleshed out in 
other countries or supranational settings to understand the role of accounting in a 
political economy. The recent introduction of mandatory disclosure of at least seven 
GRI factors for major companies in Europe could be analysed through this 
theoretical lens. In this case a supranational body, the European Commission, 
released legislation impacting on the national accounting and disclosure standards. 
This would be a unique context in which to investigate the shift of power from a 
national to an international level and how it impacts on an individual states’ ability to 
keep its legitimacy. The work of Habermas on the ‘Europe crisis’ could further 
enhance this analysis and this asks for empirics to flesh out the theoretical skeleton.  
8.10 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This study provides a starting point for research into political economy and SEAR 
that can assist our economy, policy and society to become more aware of the 
environmental and climate change issues at stake. It is my conviction that accounting 
researchers ought to ‘stir the pot’ and strive to develop an enlightening and enabling 
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accounting. This is an accounting that is not obfuscating, hiding, mystifying or 
manipulating but one that can trigger a stakeholder dialogue to address climate 
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The following Appendix presents the calculations and graphs for the MACC under 
the assumption of a 7% discount-rate. In order to save space the MACCs for other 
interest rates (10%, 15% and 20%) are not attached but will be provided by the 
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2011/10 2010/09 2009/08 2008/07
Kerosene (000 litre) (1)+(2) 4,790,143 4,570,556 4,695,383 4,849,430
CO2-e emission Group (t) (1)+(2) 12,270,660 11,708,155 12,027,918 12,422,533
ration (A4/A3) 2.562 2.562 2.562 2.562
CO2 emission Australia (in t) (3) 4,255,706 3,914,871 3,963,472
% CO2 emission Aus. 34.68% 33.44% 32.95%
CO2 emission rest world (3) 8,014,954 7,793,284 8,064,446
Cost (million $) (4) 3,627 3,283 3,602 3,701
Cost per litre 0.7572 0.7183 0.7671
cost per barrel (5) 120.39 114.21 121.97
(1) Qantas AR-2011/10, p.114 (2011/10+2010/09) (4) Qantas Data Book 2011, p.26
(2) Qantas AR-2009/08, p.153 (2009/08+2008/07) (5) BP (2006, p.44) - convertion factor 159
(3) Qantas Data Book 2011, p.72 
cents per litre 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
Growth surplus on aviation (1) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Surplus on Aviation kerosene (2) 5.98 6.279 6.604 6.93 7.28 7.64 8.03 8.43 8.85 9.29 9.76 
current rate of excise on aviation (3.556 
ct/l) (2)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Growth surcharge by refinary (3) 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Surcharge by refinery (4) 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.80
Total surcharge 6.49 6.81 7.15 7.51 7.88 8.28 8.69 9.12 9.58 10.06 10.56
(1) Growth-rate follows the increase of price ceiling according to Australian Government (2011) Sections 100(1) and 122(6) of the Clean Energy Act (2015/16-2018/19)
(2) Clean Energy Future (2012) - Transport fuel (2012-13 - 2014-15)
(3) Assumption that surcharge will increase proportionate to increase in Carbon Price by 4% p.a. until 2014-15 thereafter growth will be 5% p.a.
(4) Estimation: 8.5% inefficiency  (Stratton et al. 2010, p.19) times the "surplus on aviation kerosene". The range of inefficiency is 6.5-14%.
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
Growth rate of fuel consumption (1) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Fuel consumption 000l (2) 4,983,665 5,083,338 5,185,005 5,288,705 5,394,479 5,502,369 5,612,416 5,724,664 5,839,158 5,955,941 6,075,060
% of domestic fuel consumption (3) 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
consumption domestic market 000l 1,744,283 1,779,168 1,814,752 1,851,047 1,888,068 1,925,829 1,964,346 2,003,633 2,043,705 2,084,579 2,126,271
Additional cost (in $) (4) 113,174,293 121,119,232 129,823,294 138,938,982 148,803,649 159,368,709 170,683,887 182,802,443 195,781,416 209,681,897 224,569,312
suggested by Qantas: 110-115$ mio
35% of total fuel consumpt. for domestic flights -int. exempted but EU-ETS
(1) Assumption - Graham et al. (2011, p.28) refers to sources that suggest aviation sector will grow between by 4-5.1% Kerosene amount x total surcharge
(2) Kerosene amount 2010/11 growth by 2% p.a.
(3) Derived from Table F1.1
(4) 'Total surcharge' from Table F1.2 times 'consumpton domestic market'
80% recovery from increase prices
80% price recovery 90,539,434        96,895,386        103,858,635      
20% add.l cash out-flow 22,634,859        24,223,846        25,964,659        
Table F1.1 - Fuel Consumption and Costs
Table F1.2 - CPS -Price on CO2 - Domestic Fuels
Table F1.3 - Estimation of Additional Fuel Cost
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MACC	‐	(fuel)
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
Growth rate in fuel price (1) 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Cost of fuel per litre (2) 0.788 0.804 0.820 0.836 0.853 0.870 0.887 0.905 0.923 0.941 0.960
Absolute cost (excl CPS) (3) 3,925,981,444 4,084,591,095 4,249,608,575 4,421,292,761 4,599,912,989 4,785,749,474 4,979,093,752 5,180,249,140 5,389,531,205 5,607,268,266 5,833,801,904
Total cost (4) 4,039,155,737 4,205,710,327 4,379,431,869 4,560,231,743 4,748,716,638 4,945,118,182 5,149,777,639 5,363,051,583 5,585,312,622 5,816,950,163 6,058,371,215
(1) Assumption
(2) Litre price (2010/11) extracted from Table F1.1 times "Growth rate in fuel price"
(3) 'Cost of Fuel per litre' times the 'Fuel consumption' (Table F1.2)
(4) 'Absolute cost' times, 1 minus 35% (Table F1.3), plus 'AUS. (incl CPS)' (Table F1.5)
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
AUS. (incl CPS) (1) 1,487,267,798 1,550,726,115 1,617,186,295 1,686,391,448 1,758,773,196 1,834,381,024 1,913,366,700 1,995,889,642 2,082,117,338 2,172,225,790 2,266,399,978
per litre (incl CPS) (2) 0.853 0.872 0.891 0.911 0.932 0.953 0.974 0.996 1.019 1.042 1.066
cost per barrel 135.57 138.58 141.69 144.86 148.11 151.45 154.87 158.39 161.99 165.69 169.48
(1) 'Absolute cost' (Table F1.4) times minus 35% (Table F1.3) plus 'Additional Cost' (Table F1.3)
(2) 'AUS. (incl CPS)'  divided by 35% total fuel consumption times (Table F1.3)
(3) 'per litre (incl CPS)'  muliplied by 159
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
Fuel Cost Rest of World (excl. CPS) 2,551,887,939 2,654,984,212 2,762,245,574 2,873,840,295 2,989,943,443 3,110,737,158 3,236,410,939 3,367,161,941 3,503,195,283 3,644,724,373 3,791,971,238
International Carbon Price 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fuel Cost Rest of World (incl. CO2-P) 2,551,887,939 2,654,984,212 2,762,245,574 2,873,840,295 2,989,943,443 3,110,737,158 3,236,410,939 3,367,161,941 3,503,195,283 3,644,724,373 3,791,971,238
per litre (excl CPS) 0.788 0.804 0.820 0.836 0.853 0.870 0.887 0.905 0.923 0.941 0.960
cost per barrel 125.26 127.76 130.32 132.92 135.58 138.29 141.06 143.88 146.76 149.69 152.69
Table F1.5 - New Fuel Cost - Australia (including CPS)
Table F1.6 - New Fuel Cost - Rest of the World (excluding CPS)
Table F1.4 - New Fuel Cost
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MACC	‐	(electricity)
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
231,763 234,989 242,410 252,097 251,841
-1.4% -3.1% -3.8% 0.1%
-2.0%
(1) Qantas Data Book (2011, p.72)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Decline rate (1) -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0% -2.0%
MWh (2) 227,026 222,386 217,841 246,945 241,898 236,954 232,111 227,367 222,720 218,168 213,710 209,342
(1) Derived from Table E1.1 - 'Average %'
(2) 'Consumption MWh 2010/11 (Table E1.1) times 'decline rate'
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
price - growth (1) 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
price $/kWh (2) 0.02758 0.02868 0.02983 0.03102 0.03257 0.03420 0.03591 0.03771 0.03960 0.04157 0.04365 0.04584
Total Cost 6,261,385 6,378,753 6,498,322 7,661,151 7,879,803 8,104,696 8,336,007 8,573,920 8,818,623 9,070,310 9,329,180 9,595,438
(1) According to Commonwealth of Australia. (2008), "Australia’s Low Pollution Future The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation", p.176 - range for NSW between 65-170% (2010-15) and 106-170% (2015-20)
(2) Australian Electricity Market Operator (AEMO, 2012)
(3) "MWh" (Table (E1.2) times 1,000 (transfer MWh to kWh) times "price $/kWh"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
price - growth (1) 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
price assumption $/GJ (2) 7
price $/kWh 0.0252 0.0262 0.0272 0.0283 0.0297 0.0312 0.0328 0.0344 0.0361 0.0380 0.0399 0.0418
(1) Growth rate Assumption- Growth-rate follows the increase of price ceiling according to Australian Government (2011) Sections 100(1) and 122(6) of the Clean Energy Act (2015/16-2018/19)
(2) According to Stratton et al. (2010, p.12) East coast gas existing long term contract for large industrial user = $A3.5/GJ and new long term contracts A$5-7/GJ; 1GJ = 277.77778 kWh.
(3) 1GJ = 278 kWh (Department of Climate Change 2010, p.58).
Table E1.2- Forecast of Electricity - consumption
Table E1.3- Forecast of Electricity - Price/ Cost
Table E1.4- Forecast Gas - Price








- Qantas Q Catering Building (1) 2 x 4.3 MW 8.6
- Terminal 3 (1) 2 x 1.5 MW 3.0
Total MW 11.6
(1) Building Services Engineers Pty Ltd. (2011)
Total Energy generate through 1 Year (1) 365 days 4,234           MWh
Gas consumption - ton (2) 3.52 t/kWh 1,202,841    t p.a
CO2 emission (3) 0.5 kg/kWh 2,117           t CO2
(1) I assume that 11.6 MWh can be produced per each day of the year
(3) According to Wheaton, N. and ESCO. (2010, p.5) 1kWh = 0.5 kg CO2
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
MWh (1) 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234
price $/kWh (2) 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.046
Total 116,774 121,445 126,302 131,355 137,922 144,818 152,059 159,662 167,645 176,028 184,829 194,071
kg CO2-e/kWh (3) 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
CO2-e (in t) (4) 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811 3,811
Growth in CO2-e Price (5) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
CPS-Price (6) 23.00 24.15 25.40 26.42 27.74 29.12 30.58 32.11 33.71 35.40 37.17 39.03
Add. Cost (7) 87,644 92,026 96,789 100,661 105,694 110,979 116,527 122,354 128,472 134,895 141,640 148,722
(1) From Table E.1.6
(2) From Table E.1.3
(3) According to the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (2010), 'National Greenhouse Accounts (NGA) Factors', the factor of 'scope 2' electricity within NSW is 0.90 kg CO2-e/kWh.
(4) MWh times kg CO2-e/kWh
(5) Assumption - Growth-rate follows the increase of price ceiling according to Australian Government (2011) Sections 100(1) and 122(6) of the Clean Energy Act (2015/16-2018/19).
(6) For period 2012/13-2014/15) - (Australian Government (2011) Sections 100(1)) - assumed pass-through-rate of 100%
(7) CO2-e (in t) times CPS-Price
(2) Davis (2009), "The building houses Australia's largest trigeneration plant, consisting of a 1,200 kW (341 ton) gas generator and absorption chiller." = 1 ton gas = 3.52 kW. 
      Annual consumption gas consumption: 4.234MWh x 1000 /3.52 kW
Table E1.5- Tri-generation 
Table E1.7 - Forecast of Electricity - cost
Table E1.6- Tri-generation - Assumptions
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MACC	‐	(electricity)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
MWh (1) 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234
price $/kWh (2) 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.042
Total 106,612 110,876 115,311 119,923 125,920 132,216 138,826 145,768 153,056 160,709 168,744 177,182
CO2-e (in t) (3) 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117 2,117
Growth in CO2-e Price (4) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
CPS-Price (5) 23.00 24.15 25.40 26.42 27.74 29.12 30.58 32.11 33.71 35.40 37.17 39.03
Add. Cost (6) 48,691 51,126 53,772 55,923 58,719 61,655 64,737 67,974 71,373 74,942 78,689 82,623
(1) From Table E.1.6
(2) From Table E.1.4
(3) From Table E.1.6
(4) Assumption - Growth-rate follows the increase of price ceiling according to Australian Government (2011) Sections 100(1) and 122(6) of the Clean Energy Act (2015/16-2018/19).
(5) For period 2012/13-2014/15) - (Australian Government (2011) Sections 100(1)) - assumed pass-through-rate of 100%
(6) CO2-e (in t) times CPS-Price
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
CO2-e absolute (in t) (1) 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694
CO2-e  % (2) 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44% 44%
Saving - less CO2 (3) 38,953 40,900 43,017 44,738 46,975 49,324 51,790 54,379 57,098 59,953 62,951 66,099
Saving - substitution (4) 10,162 10,569 10,991 11,431 12,003 12,603 13,233 13,895 14,589 15,319 16,085 16,889
Total Saving 49,115 51,469 54,009 56,169 58,978 61,927 65,023 68,274 71,688 75,272 79,036 82,988
(1) Table E.1.7 'CO2-e' minus Table E1.8 'CO2-e'
(2) 'CO2-e absolute in (t)' divided by  Table E1.7 'CO2-e'
(3) Table E.1.7 'Add. cost' minus Table E1.8 'Add. cost'
(4) Table E.1.7 'Total' minus Table E1.8 'Total'
Table E1.8 - Forecast of Electricity - cost
Table E1.9- Savings from Trigeneration Plant
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MACC	‐	(fleet‐CS)
Qantas Jetstar Order Total List P. USD
Airbus A380-800 10 - 4 14 375
Boeing B747-400ER 6 - 6
Boeing B747-400 20 - 20
Boeing B767-300ER 25 - 25 165
Boeing B737-800 46 - 23 69 81
Boeing B737-400 19 - 19
Airbus A330-200 8 9 3 20 201
Airbus A330-300 10 - 10 223
Airbus A320-200 - 56 56 85
Airbus A321-200 - 6 89 95 100








Derived from Qantas Data Book (2011, p,37)


















Airbus A380-800 853 644 525 15,400 20.125130 22.097100 470
Boeing B747-400ER - 524 416 14,205 19.792090 50.646880 416
Boeing B747-400 - 524 416 13,450 19.792090 50.646880 416
Boeing B767-300ER 350 269 218 11,070 9.921756 24.242480 269
Boeing B737-800 189 `162 - 5,765 5.772857 12.600000 162
Boeing B737-400 149 - 189 108 - 146 - 4,200–4,400 6.083815 12.825040 159
Airbus A330-200 380 293 253 13,430 12.660550 32.749280 293
Airbus A330-300 440 335 295 10,830 12.660550 32.749280 293
Airbus A320-200 164 150 5,900 5.432950 13.155120 148
Airbus A321-200 199 185 5,600 5.432950 13.155120 148
Boeing B787-8 210-250 14,200 to 15,200 (3) (3)
Boeing B787-9 250 to 291 14,800 to 15,751 (3) (3)
Boeing B777-200 440 400 305 9,700 14.369890 38.556640 305
Boeing B777-300 550 451 368 11,120 14.369890 38.556640 368
Boeing  - source Boeing webpage/ Airbus - source airbus webpage nm= nautical mile
(2) http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/environmental/transparent_noise/tnip_CC.aspx - data are provided for a range of distances
(3) 20 percent fewer than similarly sized airplanes - from Boeing webpage. - To which airplane do they refer to?
Table Fleet.3 - Aircrafts' capacity and Fuel/nm
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MACC	‐	(fleet‐CS)
Passenger: 416 increased Efficiency: 20%
passenger: 250
Distance From Distance To Fuel kg/nm AVG Fuel kg/nm AVG 20% of AVG
0 125 50.64688 40.517504
126 250 36.23304 43.44 28.986432 34.75 34.7520
251 500 26.80912 37.90 21.447296 30.32 30.3171
501 750 23.66781 34.34 18.934248 32.99 27.4714
751 1000 22.09716 31.89 17.677728 31.04 25.5126
1001 1500 20.61438 30.01 16.491504 29.51 24.0091
1501 2000 20.13334 28.60 16.106672 28.33 22.8802
2001 2500 19.79209 27.50 15.833672 27.38 21.9994
2501 3000 19.85896 26.65 15.887168 26.62 21.3202
3001 3500 19.96808 25.98 15.974464 26.00 20.7857
3501 4000 20.19731 25.46 16.157848 25.49 20.3650
4001 4500 20.44144 25.04 16.353152 25.08 20.0306
4501 5000 20.72228 24.71 16.577824 24.73 19.7650
5001 5500 21.00964 24.44 16.807712 24.44 19.5538
5501 6000 21.3618 24.24 17.08944 24.20 19.3895
6001 14000 21.73142 24.08 17.385136 24.00 19.2642
(1) http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/environmental/transparent_noise/tnip_CC.aspx -
Boeing 747-400 & 787-8/9 - Fuel kg/nm
BOEING 747-400 BOEING 787 - 8/9
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MACC	‐	(fleet‐CS)
Table Fleet.2 - Aircraft over 10yrs age in 2011
  Total FY 2001 FY11
Boeing 747-400 18 6 1 25 17 + 3 leased = 20
Boeing 747-300 6 – – 6 0
Boeing 747-200* 5 – – 4 0
Boeing 747SP 2 – – 2 0
Boeing 767-300ER 17 5 7 29 17 + 8 leased = 25
Boeing 767-200ER 7 – – 7 0
Boeing 737-400 21 – 1 22 19
Boeing 737-300 16 – – 16 0
Total Core Fleet 92 11 9 111 53 No. of Aircraft 10yrs or older
source: Annual Report-Qantas 2001, p.11
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MACC	‐	(B747vs787)
Table Fleet4.1 - Replacement of Boeing 747-400 by 787-8/9- Assumptions
Passenger: 416 (1) increased Efficiency: 20%
passenger: 250
Distance From Distance To
Fuel 
kg/nm AVG Fuel kg/nm AVG
20% of AVG 
(3)
0 125 50.647 19.394 0.000
126 250 36.233 43.44 13.777 16.585 34.752
251 500 26.809 37.90 10.376 14.516 30.317
501 750 23.668 34.34 9.243 13.197 27.471
751 1000 22.097 31.89 8.676 12.293 25.513
1001 1500 20.614 30.01 8.218 11.614 24.009
1501 2000 20.133 28.60 8.035 11.103 22.880
2001 2500 19.792 27.50 7.937 10.707 21.999
2501 3000 19.859 26.65 7.976 10.404 21.320
3001 3500 19.968 25.98 8.055 10.169 20.786
3501 4000 20.197 25.46 8.126 9.983 20.365
4001 4500 20.441 25.04 8.234 9.837 20.031
4501 5000 20.722 24.71 8.353 9.723 19.765
5001 5500 21.010 24.44 8.353 9.723 19.554
5501 6000 21.362 24.24 8.353 9.723 19.390
6001 14000 21.731 24.08 8.353 9.723 19.264
(1) Department of Infrastructure and Transport. (2011)
(2) 20 percent fewer than similarly sized airplanes (Boeing 2012)
(3) This raw calculates 20 percent less fuel consumption compared to the B747-400, while the previous raws refer to the B767 as reference




Table Fleet4.2 - Replacement of Boeing 747-400 by 787-8/9- Assumptions
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 20
add. benefit - fuel saving: 511,845 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 1,311,167
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
Net Benefit per pax 100 $
Distance to be flown: 8,000 nm Distance to be flown: 8,000 nm
Times distance flown 320 times
Fuel (kg/nm) 24.080 Fuel (kg/nm) 9.723
Fuel (kg) 192,642 Fuel (kg) 77,784
Fuel (l) 243,885 Fuel (l) 98,475
Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 7.328 Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 4.9237
Residual value (k$) (1) 0 Investment (in k$) 202,000
(1) Residual value is assumed to be zero / alternatively the discounted net cash-flows could be considered.







Table Fleet4.3 - Replacement of Boeing 747-400 by 787-8/9- Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (1): 202,000
Saving in fuel in kL: 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531 46,531
Benefit fuel sav.: 36,656 37,389 38,137 38,900 39,678 40,471 41,281 42,106 42,948 43,807 44,683
Benefit less CO2: 3,019 3,168 3,329 3,493 3,667 3,851 4,043 4,245 4,458 4,680 4,914
add. Benefit (2): 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
variable cost (3):
Less pax cap. (4) 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312 5,312
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: 24,273 25,155 26,064 26,990 27,943 28,920 29,922 30,950 32,004 33,086 34,196
income tax: 7,282 7,546 7,819 8,097 8,383 8,676 8,977 9,285 9,601 9,926 10,259
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 16,991 17,608 18,245 18,893 19,560 20,244 20,945 21,665 22,403 23,160 23,937
Depreciation: 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100
Net Cash Flow: 27,091 27,708 28,345 28,993 29,660 30,344 31,045 31,765 32,503 33,260 34,037
PV 25,319 24,202 23,138 22,119 21,147 20,219 19,333 18,487 17,679 16,908 16,171
NPV 22,722
MAC (5) -10
(1) Investment for Boeing 787 minus residual value
(2) Less maintenance - assumption
(3) Variable Cost exept "fuel" are assumed to be the same.
(4) Difference in passenger carrying capacity times "Net benefit per pax" time "Times Distance flown"
(5) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
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Passenger: 269 (1) increased Efficiency: 20%
passenger: 250
Distance From Distance To
Fuel 
kg/nm AVG Fuel kg/nm AVG 20% of AVG
0 125 24.242 19.394
126 250 17.221 20.73 13.777 16.585 16.585
251 500 12.970 18.14 10.376 14.516 14.516
501 750 11.554 16.50 9.243 13.197 13.197
751 1000 10.845 15.37 8.676 12.293 12.293
1001 1500 10.272 14.52 8.218 11.614 11.614
1501 2000 10.043 13.88 8.035 11.103 11.103
2001 2500 9.922 13.38 7.937 10.707 10.707
2501 3000 9.970 13.00 7.976 10.404 10.404
3001 3500 10.068 12.71 8.055 10.169 10.169
3501 4000 10.158 12.48 8.126 9.983 9.983
4001 4500 10.292 12.30 8.234 9.837 9.837
4501 5000 10.442 12.15 8.353 9.723 9.723
(1) Department of Infrastructure and Transport. (2011)
(2) 20 percent fewer than similarly sized airplanes - (Boeing, 2012).
Boeing 767-300ER & 787-8/9 - Fuel kg/nm
BOEING 767-300ER BOEING 787 - 8/9
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MACC	‐	(B767vs787)
Table Fleet5.1 - Replacement of BOEING 767-300ER by BOEING 787 - 8/9- Assumption
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 20
add. benefit - fuel saving: 54,161 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 138,742
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
Net Benefit per pax 100 $
Distance to be flown: 5,000 nm
Times distance flown 320 times
Fuel (kg/nm) 12.154 Fuel (kg/nm) 9.723
Fuel (kg) 60,769 Fuel (kg) 48,615
Fuel (l) 76,933 Fuel (l) 61,547
Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 5.720 Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 4.924
Residual value (k$) (1) 0 Investment (in k$) 202,000
(1) Residual value is assumed to be zero / alternatively the discounted net cash-flows could be considered.
(2) Average out of $186m and $218m





Table Fleet5.2 - Replacement of BOEING 767-300ER by BOEING 787 - 8/9- Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (1): 202,000
Saving in fuel in kL: 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924 4,924
Benefit fuel sav.: 3,879 3,956 4,035 4,116 4,199 4,282 4,368 4,455 4,545 4,635 4,728
Benefit less CO2: 319 335 352 370 388 407 428 449 472 495 520
add. Benefit (2): 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
variable cost (3):
Less pax cap. (4) 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -6,500 -6,406 -6,310 -6,212 -6,111 -6,008 -5,902 -5,793 -5,682 -5,567 -5,450
income tax: -1,950 -1,922 -1,893 -1,864 -1,833 -1,802 -1,771 -1,738 -1,705 -1,670 -1,635
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -4,550 -4,485 -4,417 -4,349 -4,278 -4,206 -4,131 -4,055 -3,977 -3,897 -3,815
Depreciation: 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100 10,100
Net Cash Flow: 5,550 5,615 5,683 5,751 5,822 5,894 5,969 6,045 6,123 6,203 6,285
PV 5,187 4,905 4,639 4,388 4,151 3,928 3,717 3,518 3,330 3,153 2,986
NPV -158,098
MAC (5) 627
(1) Investment for Boeing 787 minus residual value
(2) Less maintenance - assumption
(3) Variable Cost exept "fuel" are assumed to be the same.
(4) Difference in passenger carrying capacity times "Net benefit per pax" time "Times Distance flown"
(5) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
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MACC	‐	(B737vsA320‐200)
Boeing 737-400 & Airbus A320-200 Fuel kg/nm
Passenger: 159 passenger: 148
Distance From
Distance 
To Fuel kg/nm AVG Fuel kg/nm AVG
0 125 12.825 13.155
126 250 9.072 10.95 9.989 11.572
251 500 7.226 9.71 7.321 10.155
501 750 6.614 8.93 6.273 9.185
751 1000 6.303 8.41 6.027 8.553
1001 1500 6.125 8.03 5.555 8.053
1501 2000 6.084 7.75 5.433 7.679 0.083986
2001 2500 -- -- 5.377 7.391
Source: Department of Infrastructure and Transport. (2011)- AVG calculated
BOEING 737-400 AIRBUS A320-200
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MACC	‐	(B737vsA320‐200)
Table Fleet6.1 - Replacement of BOEING 737-400 by AIRBUS A320-200- Assumption
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 20
add. benefit - fuel saving: 3,194 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 8,183
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
Net Benefit per pax 100 $
Distance to be flown: 2,000 nm Distance to be flown: 2,000 nm
Times distance flown 320 times Times distance flown 320 times
Fuel (kg/nm) 7.750 Fuel (kg/nm) 7.391
Fuel (kg) 15,499 Fuel (kg) 14,783
Fuel (l) 19,622 Fuel (l) 18,715
Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 6.171 Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 6.323
Residual value (k$) (1) 0 Investment (in k$) 201,000
(1) Residual value is assumed to be zero / alternatively the discounted net cash-flows could be considered.





Table Fleet6.2 - Replacement of BOEING 737-400 by AIRBUS A320-200- Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (1): 201,000
Saving in fuel in kL: 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
Benefit fuel sav.: 229 233 238 243 248 253 258 263 268 273 279
Benefit less CO2: 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 29 31
add. Benefit (2): 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
variable cost (3):
Less pax cap. (4) 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -10,144 -10,139 -10,133 -10,127 -10,121 -10,115 -10,109 -10,103 -10,096 -10,089 -10,082
income tax: -3,043 -3,042 -3,040 -3,038 -3,036 -3,035 -3,033 -3,031 -3,029 -3,027 -3,025
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -7,101 -7,097 -7,093 -7,089 -7,085 -7,081 -7,076 -7,072 -7,067 -7,063 -7,058
Depreciation: 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050 10,050
Net Cash Flow: 2,949 2,953 2,957 2,961 2,965 2,969 2,974 2,978 2,983 2,987 2,992
PV 2,756 2,579 2,414 2,259 2,114 1,979 1,852 1,733 1,622 1,519 1,422
NPV -178,752
MAC (5) 12,015
(1) Investment for A320-200 minus residual value
(2) Less maintenance - assumption
(3) Variable Cost exept "fuel" are assumed to be the same.
(4) Difference in passenger carrying capacity times "Net benefit per pax" time "Times Distance flown"
(5) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
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MACC	‐	(A330‐200vsA350‐900)
Boeing 737-400 & Airbus A320-200 Fuel kg/nm
Passenger: 295 (2) passenger: 360
increased Efficiency(1): 4%
Distance From Distance To
Fuel 
kg/nm AVG Fuel kg/nm AVG
0 125 32.749 18.618
126 250 23.450 28.10 13.226 15.922
251 500 17.231 24.48 9.961 13.935
501 750 15.147 22.14 8.873 12.670
751 1000 14.122 20.54 8.329 11.801
1001 1500 13.194 19.32 7.889 11.149
1501 2000 12.817 18.39 7.713 10.659
2001 2500 12.686 17.67 7.620 10.279
2501 3000 12.681 17.12 7.657 9.987
3001 3500 12.661 16.67 7.732 9.762
3501 4000 12.751 16.32 7.801 9.584
4001 4500 7.904 9.444
4501 5000 8.019 9.334
5001 5500 8.019 9.240
5501 6000 8.019 9.159
6001 8100 8.019 9.088
(1) 4% higher efficiency than B787-900 (from Table Fleet4) - according to EADS (2006)
(2) Department of Infrastructure and Transport. (2011)
AIRBUS A330-200 AIRBUS A350-900
272
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Table Fleet7.1 - Replacement of AIRBUS A330-200 by AIRBUS A350-900- Assumption
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 20
add. benefit - fuel saving: 122,520 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 313,854
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
Net Benefit per pax 100 $
Distance to be flown: 4,000 nm Distance to be flown: 4,000 nm
Times distance flown 320 times Times distance flown 320 times
Fuel (kg/nm) 16.317 Fuel (kg/nm) 9.444
Fuel (kg) 65,268 Fuel (kg) 37,775
Fuel (l) 82,630 Fuel (l) 47,823
Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 7.003 Fuel (l) per pax/100nm 3.321
Residual value (k$) (1) 0 Investment (in k$) 267,000
(1) Residual value is assumed to be zero / alternatively the discounted net cash-flows could be considered.
(2) According to aviainform (2012) cathay pacific was paying $ 1.6b for 6 A350-900.





Table Fleet7.2 - Replacement of AIRBUS A330-200 by AIRBUS A350-900- Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (1): 267,000
Saving in fuel in kL: 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138 11,138
Benefit fuel sav.: 8,774 8,950 9,129 9,311 9,498 9,688 9,881 10,079 10,281 10,486 10,696
Benefit less CO2: 723 758 797 836 878 922 968 1,016 1,067 1,120 1,176
add. Benefit (2): 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
variable cost (3):
Less pax cap. -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080 -2,080
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -1,763 -1,552 -1,334 -1,113 -885 -651 -411 -165 88 347 612
income tax: -529 -466 -400 -334 -265 -195 -123 -49 26 104 184
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -1,234 -1,086 -934 -779 -619 -455 -288 -115 61 243 429
Depreciation: 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350 13,350
Net Cash Flow: 12,116 12,264 12,416 12,571 12,731 12,895 13,062 13,235 13,411 13,593 13,779
PV 11,323 10,712 10,135 9,591 9,077 8,592 8,135 7,703 7,295 6,910 6,546
NPV -170,983
MAC (4) 300
(1) Investment for A320-200 minus residual value
(2) Less maintenance - assumption
(3) Variable Cost exept "fuel" are assumed to be the same.
(4) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
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MACC	‐	(Bio‐fuel‐CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,565,664 depreciation: straight line
(tons fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 4,010,682
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
Additional Assumptions:
By 2020
14% of Australia's fuel consumption relates to aviation (1)
7% of 73.1 GL total Australian fuel consumption could be from biofuels by 2020 (2)
Biofuel: 5.117 GL (3)
14% out of 5.117 GL can be used for aviation
share aviat. biofuel: 716.38         ML
Qantas' bio-fuel  (4): 50% = 358.2 ML
By 2012/3
Fuel consumpt. (domestic) (5) : 1,744.28      ML
2% availability of bio fuels (6) : 34.89           ML
(1) Graham et al. (2011, p.12)
(2) Graham et al. (2011, p.16)
(3) This amount of bio-fuel, according to Graham et al. (2011) is feasible, amounts above are not realistic by 2020.
(4) Assumption - this  neglect fuel contracts in EU and other countries
(5) Extracted from 'Table F1.3 - Estimation of Additional Fuel Cost'
(6) Assumption from Bloomberg (2012)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Growth rate (1) 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47% 39.47%
Bio-fuels in ML (2) 34.9 48.7 67.9 94.7 132.0 184.1 256.8 358.2 499.6 696.8 971.8
(1) Calculation of Growth rate given a starting point of value in 2012 and expected amount in 2020
(2) It is assumed that plant with the capacity of 400 ML pa is built (see Graham et al. 2011, p.18) and that the capacity is not fully utilized due to lacking feedstock.
see below
364,607.48                         
Table BF1.1 - Growth in Bio-Fuel Production
Investment calculation - Bio-Fuels  (Gasification/ Fischer Tropsch)
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MACC	‐	(Bio‐fuel‐CS)
cost of capital (1) 0.78 $/L capacity (3): 400 ML/p.a
operational cost (1) 0.12 $/L efficiency (4): 45%
feedstock cost (2) 0.28 $/L
transport (2) 0.22 $/L
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.21) (3) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.18)
(2) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.24) (4) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.22)
Value in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Cost of capital (1): 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000 312,000
Saving in fuel in kL(2): 16,326 22,771 31,760 44,297 61,784 86,173 120,189 167,633 233,805 326,099 454,826
Benefit fuel saving (3): 12,367 17,594 25,029 35,608 50,657 72,067 102,525 145,857 207,502 295,201 419,965
Benefit less CO2 (4): 2,263 3,312 4,855 7,105 10,405 15,237 22,315 32,680 47,859 70,088 102,643
add. Benefit:  (5) 1,190 1,696 2,419 3,449 4,919 7,015 10,006 14,272 20,359 29,044 41,436
variable cost:
Operational/maint.: 4,186 5,839 8,144 11,358 15,842 22,096 30,818 42,983 59,950 83,615 116,622
feedstock cost: 9,768 13,624 19,002 26,503 36,965 51,556 71,908 100,293 139,884 195,102 272,118
transport cost: 7,675 10,704 14,930 20,824 29,044 40,508 56,499 78,802 109,909 153,295 213,807
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -34,173 -35,928 -38,136 -40,887 -44,233 -48,204 -52,742 -57,633 -62,386 -66,043 -66,866
income tax: -10,252 -10,779 -11,441 -12,266 -13,270 -14,461 -15,823 -17,290 -18,716 -19,813 -20,060
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -23,921 -25,150 -26,695 -28,621 -30,963 -33,743 -36,919 -40,343 -43,670 -46,230 -46,807
Depreciation: 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364 28,364
Net Cash Flow: -307,557 -308,786 -310,332 -312,257 -314,600 -317,379 -320,556 -323,979 -327,307 -329,866 -330,443
PV -287,437 -269,706 -253,323 -238,219 -224,305 -211,483 -199,626 -188,559 -178,033 -167,687 -156,991
NPV -2,375,370
MAC (6) 592
(1) "cost of captial ($/litre)" times "capacity" (ML/p.a.).
(2) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times 1.04 (saving) times efficiency (45%).
(3) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times efficiency (45%) time ct/L fuel from Table F1.3.
(4) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2)
(6) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved.
Table BF2.1 - Gasification/ Fischer Tropsch
(5) There is a 4% higher efficiency - 4% less fuel consumption from biofuels: "Synthetic Paraffinic Kerosene (SPK) fuels, which can be created via Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) synthesis or the hydroprocessing of renewable oils to 
a Hydroprocessed Renewable Jet, HRJ, fuel have similar molecular composition to conventional jet fuel. The combustion of SPK fuels results in about 4% lower CO2 emissions (per unit mass of fuel) as compared to 
conventional jet fuel (ICAO, 2009, p.1). ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2) times 4%
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MACC	‐	(Bio‐fuel‐CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 2,261,514 depreciation: straight line
(tons fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 5,793,208
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
cost of capital (1) 0.1 $/L capacity (3): 400 ML/p.a
operational cost (1) 0.11 $/L efficiency (4): 65%
feedstock cost (2) 0.75 $/L
transport (2) 0.1 $/L
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.21) (3) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.18)
(2) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.24) (4) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.22)
Table BF2.2 - Hydrodeoxygenation
see below
526,655.25                         
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MACC	‐	(Bio‐fuel‐CS)
Value in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
cost of capital (1): 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Saving in fuel in kL (2): 23,583 32,892 45,876 63,985 89,243 124,471 173,606 242,136 337,719 471,032 656,970
Benefit fuel saving (3): 17,863 25,413 36,154 51,433 73,171 104,097 148,092 210,682 299,725 426,401 606,616
Benefit less CO2 (4): 2,263 3,312 4,855 7,105 10,405 15,237 22,315 32,680 47,859 70,088 102,643
add. Benefit:  (5) 1,190 1,696 2,419 3,449 4,919 7,015 10,006 14,272 20,359 29,044 41,436
variable cost:
Operational/maint.: 3,837 5,352 7,465 10,412 14,522 20,254 28,250 39,401 54,954 76,647 106,903
feedstock cost: 26,164 36,492 50,898 70,989 99,012 138,097 192,610 268,643 374,688 522,595 728,887
transport cost: 3,489 4,866 6,786 9,465 13,202 18,413 25,681 35,819 49,958 69,679 97,185
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -15,810 -19,925 -25,358 -32,515 -41,877 -54,051 -69,765 -89,865 -115,295 -147,025 -185,917
income tax: -4,743 -5,978 -7,607 -9,755 -12,563 -16,215 -20,929 -26,959 -34,588 -44,107 -55,775
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -11,067 -13,948 -17,751 -22,761 -29,314 -37,836 -48,835 -62,905 -80,706 -102,917 -130,142
Depreciation: 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636 3,636
Net Cash Flow: -47,431 -50,311 -54,114 -59,124 -65,678 -74,199 -85,199 -99,269 -117,070 -139,281 -166,506
PV -44,328 -43,944 -44,173 -45,106 -46,827 -49,442 -53,058 -57,775 -63,678 -70,803 -79,106
NPV -598,240
MAC (6) 103
(1) "cost of captial ($/litre)" times "capacity" (ML/p.a.).
(2) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times 1.04 (saving) times efficiency (45%)
(3) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times 1.04 (saving) times efficiency (45%) time ct/L fuel from Table F1.3
(4) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2)
(6) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa
(5) There is a 4% higher efficiency - 4% less fuel consumption from biofuels: "Synthetic Paraffinic Kerosene (SPK) fuels, which can be created via Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) synthesis or the hydroprocessing of renewable 
       oils to a Hydroprocessed Renewable Jet, HRJ, fuel have similar molecular composition to conventional jet fuel. The combustion of SPK fuels results in about 4% lower CO2 emissions (per unit mass of fuel) as 
       compared to conventional jet fuel (ICAO, 2009, p.1). 
       ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2) times 4%
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MACC	‐	(Bio‐fuel‐CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 2,261,514 depreciation: straight line
(tons fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 5,793,208
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
capacity (1): 400 ML/p.a
efficiency (2): 65%
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.18)
(2) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.22)
cost per litre 2012 (1) 1.2 $/L
cost per litre 2018 (1) 0.86 $/L
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Growth rate (2) -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45% -6.45%
Cost per litre 1.20 1.12 1.05 0.98 0.92 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.62
(1) source: Bloomberg (2012).
(2) Calculation of Growth rate given a starting point of value in 2012 and expected amount in 2018.
Table BF3.1 - Buy-Option Hydrodeoxygenation
see below
579,320.78                         
Table BF3.1.1 - Price for Bio-Fuel from Hydrodeoxygenation
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MACC	‐	(Bio‐fuel‐CS)
Cost of Storage (1) 0.02 $/L
Cost of Transport. (1) 0.04 $/L
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.22)
Value in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
cost of capital (1): 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saving in fuel in kL (2): 23,583 32,892 45,876 63,985 89,243 124,471 173,606 242,136 337,719 471,032 656,970
Benefit fuel saving (3): 17,863 25,413 36,154 51,433 73,171 104,097 148,092 210,682 299,725 426,401 606,616
Benefit less CO2 (3): 2,263 3,312 4,855 7,105 10,405 15,237 22,315 32,680 47,859 70,088 102,643
add. Benefit:  (4) 1,190 1,696 2,419 3,449 4,919 7,015 10,006 14,272 20,359 29,044 41,436
variable cost:
cost per litre 41,863 54,624 71,276 93,005 121,356 158,351 206,624 269,612 351,801 459,046 598,983
storage cost 698 973 1,357 1,893 2,640 3,683 5,136 7,164 9,992 13,936 19,437
transport cost: 1,395 1,946 2,715 3,786 5,281 7,365 10,273 14,328 19,983 27,872 38,874
Profit bef. Tax: -22,639 -27,122 -31,921 -36,696 -40,782 -43,050 -41,620 -33,469 -13,834 24,680 93,401
income tax: -6,792 -8,137 -9,576 -11,009 -12,235 -12,915 -12,486 -10,041 -4,150 7,404 28,020
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -15,848 -18,985 -22,345 -25,687 -28,548 -30,135 -29,134 -23,428 -9,684 17,276 65,380
Net Cash Flow: -15,848 -18,985 -22,345 -25,687 -28,548 -30,135 -29,134 -23,428 -9,684 17,276 65,380
PV -14,811 -16,583 -18,240 -19,597 -20,354 -20,080 -18,143 -13,636 -5,267 8,782 31,062
NPV -106,866
MAC (5) 17
(1) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times 1.04 (saving) times efficiency (45%)
(2) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times 1.04 (saving) times efficiency (45%) time ct/L fuel from Table F1.3
(3) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2)
(5) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa
Table BF3.1.2 - Price development in Bio-Fuel
(4) There is a 4% higher efficiency - 4% less fuel consumption from biofuels: "Synthetic Paraffinic Kerosene (SPK) fuels, which can be created via Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) synthesis or the hydroprocessing of renewable 
       oils to a Hydroprocessed Renewable Jet, HRJ, fuel have similar molecular composition to conventional jet fuel. The combustion of SPK fuels results in about 4% lower CO2 emissions (per unit mass of fuel) as 
       compared to conventional jet fuel (ICAO, 2009, p.1). 
       ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2) times 4%
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MACC	‐	(Bio‐fuel‐CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,565,664 depreciation: straight line
(tons fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 4,010,682
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
capacity (1): 400 ML/p.a
efficiency (2): 45%
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.18)
(2) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.22)
Table BF3.2.1 - Price of Bio-Fuel from Gasification/ Fischer Tropsch
cost per litre 2012 (1) 4.66 $/L
cost per litre 2018 (2) 2.60 $/L
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Growth rate (2) -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00% -11.00%
Cost per litre 4.66 4.14 3.69 3.28 2.92 2.60 2.31 2.06 1.83 1.63 1.45
(1) Results from $17 per gallon for bio-fuel divided by 3.14 $ per gallon normal fuel times $ 0.86 per litre for normal jet fuel.
(2) source: Bloomberg (2012)
(3) Calculation of Growth rate given a starting point of value in 2012 and expected amount in 2018
401,068.23                         




Cost of Storage (1) 0.02 $/L
Cost of Transport. (1) 0.04 $/L
(1) Assumptions according to Graham et al. (2011 p.22)
Value in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
cost of capital (1): 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saving in fuel in kL (2): 16,326 22,771 31,760 44,297 61,784 86,173 120,189 167,633 233,805 326,099 454,826
Benefit fuel saving (3): 12,367 17,594 25,029 35,608 50,657 72,067 102,525 145,857 207,502 295,201 419,965
Benefit less CO2 (3): 2,263 3,312 4,855 7,105 10,405 15,237 22,315 32,680 47,859 70,088 102,643
add. Benefit:  (4) 1,190 1,696 2,419 3,449 4,919 7,015 10,006 14,272 20,359 29,044 41,436
variable cost:
cost per litre 162,429 201,628 250,286 310,687 385,665 478,736 594,268 737,682 915,705 1,136,689 1,411,004
storage cost 698 973 1,357 1,893 2,640 3,683 5,136 7,164 9,992 13,936 19,437
transport cost: 1,395 1,946 2,715 3,786 5,281 7,365 10,273 14,328 19,983 27,872 38,874
Profit bef. Tax: -148,702 -181,945 -222,055 -270,205 -327,605 -395,464 -474,831 -566,365 -669,960 -784,164 -905,271
income tax: -44,611 -54,584 -66,617 -81,061 -98,282 -118,639 -142,449 -169,909 -200,988 -235,249 -271,581
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -104,092 -127,362 -155,439 -189,143 -229,324 -276,825 -332,382 -396,455 -468,972 -548,915 -633,689
Net Cash Flow: -104,092 -127,362 -155,439 -189,143 -229,324 -276,825 -332,382 -396,455 -468,972 -548,915 -633,689
PV -97,282 -111,243 -126,884 -144,297 -163,505 -184,460 -206,991 -230,741 -255,090 -279,040 -301,061
NPV -2,100,593
MAC (5) 476
(1) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times 1.04 (saving) times efficiency (45%)
(2) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times 1.04 (saving) times efficiency (45%) time ct/L fuel from Table F1.3
(3) ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2)
(5) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa
(4) There is a 4% higher efficiency - 4% less fuel consumption from biofuels: "Synthetic Paraffinic Kerosene (SPK) fuels, which can be created via Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) synthesis or the 
      hydroprocessing of renewable oils to a Hydroprocessed Renewable Jet, HRJ, fuel have similar molecular composition to conventional jet fuel. The combustion of SPK fuels results in
      about 4% lower CO2 emissions (per unit mass of fuel) as compared to conventional jet fuel (ICAO, 2009, p.1). 
       ML biofuel from Table BF1.1 times 1,000 (conversion from ML to kL) times conversion rate (Assumptions General) times additional cost per L fuel (Table F1.2) times 4%
Table BF3.2.2 - Price development in Bio-Fuel 
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MACC	‐	(New	technology‐CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 822,305 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 2,106,457
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 1.5%
Costs per aircraft (1) 506.5 k $
No of Planes by 2011 (2): 215
No of Planes by 2018 (2): 384
Average p.a. 24
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
No. of airplanes 263 287 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 481 505
Additional airplanes 263 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Investment (3) 133,354
Saving by Efficiency 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.103) - increased efficieny by 1-2%
(2) No. of aircraft at 2010/11 and 2018 from Table Fleet1.
(3) No. of airplanes (263 k$) times the costs per aircraft - it is assumed that airplanes aquired after 2013 will have winglets.





Table NT1.2 - Winglets - Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D) (1): 133,354
Saving in fuel in kL (2): 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755
Benefit fuel sav.: 58,890 60,068 61,269 62,494 63,744 65,019 66,319 67,646 68,999 70,379 71,786
Benefit less CO2: 4,850 5,089 5,348 5,611 5,892 6,186 6,496 6,820 7,161 7,519 7,895
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: 51,617 53,033 54,494 55,982 57,513 59,082 60,692 62,343 64,037 65,775 67,558
income tax: 15,485 15,910 16,348 16,795 17,254 17,725 18,208 18,703 19,211 19,732 20,268
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 36,132 37,123 38,145 39,188 40,259 41,357 42,484 43,640 44,826 46,042 47,291
Depreciation: 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123 12,123
Net Cash Flow: 48,255 49,247 50,269 51,311 52,382 53,481 54,607 55,763 56,949 58,166 59,414
PV 45,098 43,014 41,034 39,145 37,348 35,636 34,007 32,455 30,976 29,568 28,227
NPV 263,154
MAC (3) -125
(1) See Table NT1.1
(3) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
(2) It is assumed that the Saving in fuel remains the same. This implies that no 'old' aircraft will be retired and that new aircrafts' savings are included in BAU.
      Saving (1.5%) refer to the overall fuel consumption (Table F1.3
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MACC	‐	(New	technology‐CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 672,795 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 1,723,465
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2015 (1): 1.5%
Costs per aircraft (2) 127 k $
No of Planes by 2011 (2): 215
No of Planes by 2018 (2): 384
Average p.a. 24
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
No. of airplanes 263 287 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 481 505
Additional airplanes 263 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Cost (3) - 36,360
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.103) - increased efficieny by 1-2%
(2) According to  Farries & Eyers (2008, p.103), cost are between 3k and 250k Pound- Average assumed
(3) According to  Farries & Eyers (2008, p.103), implementation is possible in 2015-2021 - Assumption that only aircraft aquired before 2015 have to implement riblets.
156,679




in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D) (1): 0 36,360
Saving in fuel in kL (2): 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755 74,755
Benefit fuel sav.: 61,269 62,494 63,744 65,019 66,319 67,646 68,999 70,379 71,786
Benefit less CO2: 5,348 5,611 5,892 6,186 6,496 6,820 7,161 7,519 7,895
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: 63,311 64,800 66,330 67,900 69,509 71,161 72,855 74,593 76,376
income tax: 18,993 19,440 19,899 20,370 20,853 21,348 21,856 22,378 22,913
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 0 0 44,318 45,360 46,431 47,530 48,657 49,812 50,998 52,215 53,463
Depreciation: 0 0 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305
Net Cash Flow: 0 0 47,623 48,665 49,737 50,835 51,962 53,118 54,304 55,520 56,769
PV 0 0 38,875 37,127 35,462 33,874 32,359 30,915 29,538 28,224 26,970
NPV 261,585
MAC (3) -152
(1) Only the cost of retrofit are considered, R&D costs of >$10m (Farries & Eyers 2008, p.103) are neglected.
(2) It is assumed that the Saving in fuel remains the same. This implies that no 'old' aircraft will be retired and that new aircrafts' savings are included in BAU.
(3) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved.
Table NT2.2 - Riblets - Calculation
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Table NT3.1 - Airframe component replacement - Assumptions
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,918,711 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 4,915,066
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 3.5%
Costs per aircraft (2) 65,000 k $
No of Planes by 2011: 215
No of Planes by 2018: 384
Average p.a. 24
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
No. of airplanes 263 287 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 481 505
Additional airplanes 263 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Investm. (M Pound) (3) 17,114
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.50%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.103) - increased efficieny by 2-5%.
(2) According to  Farries & Eyers (2008, p.103), cost are between $40 and $90m - Average assumed.





in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 17,113,571
Saving in fuel in kL: 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428 174,428
Benefit fuel sav.: 137,409 140,158 142,961 145,820 148,736 151,711 154,745 157,840 160,997 164,217 167,501
Benefit less CO2: 11,317 11,874 12,478 13,093 13,747 14,435 15,156 15,914 16,710 17,545 18,423
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -1,407,052 -1,403,747 -1,400,340 -1,396,867 -1,393,296 -1,389,634 -1,385,878 -1,382,025 -1,378,073 -1,374,017 -1,369,855
income tax: -422,116 -421,124 -420,102 -419,060 -417,989 -416,890 -415,763 -414,608 -413,422 -412,205 -410,957
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -984,937 -982,623 -980,238 -977,807 -975,307 -972,744 -970,114 -967,418 -964,651 -961,812 -958,899
Depreciation: 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779 1,555,779
Net Cash Flow: 570,843 573,156 575,541 577,972 580,472 583,036 585,665 588,362 591,128 593,967 596,880
PV 533,498 500,617 469,813 440,932 413,869 388,501 364,723 342,432 321,535 301,943 283,574
NPV -12,752,136
MAC (1) 2,594
(1) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
Table NT3.2 - Airframe component replacement - Calculation
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Table NT4.1 -Module replacement - Assumptions
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 411,152 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 1,053,228
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 0.75%
Costs per aircraft (2) 900 k $
No of Planes by 2011: 215
No of Planes by 2018: 384
Average p.a. 24
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
No. of airplanes 263 287 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 481 505
Additional airplanes 263 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Cost (M Pound) (3) 236,957
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.106) - increased efficieny by 0.5-1%.
(2) According to  Farries & Eyers (2008, p.106), cost are below $1m.





in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 236,957
Saving in fuel in kL: 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377 37,377
Benefit fuel sav.: 29,445 30,034 30,634 31,247 31,872 32,510 33,160 33,823 34,499 35,189 35,893
Benefit less CO2: 2,425 2,545 2,674 2,806 2,946 3,093 3,248 3,410 3,581 3,760 3,948
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: 10,328 11,037 11,767 12,511 13,276 14,061 14,866 15,691 16,538 17,407 18,299
income tax: 3,099 3,311 3,530 3,753 3,983 4,218 4,460 4,707 4,962 5,222 5,490
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 7,230 7,726 8,237 8,758 9,293 9,843 10,406 10,984 11,577 12,185 12,809
Depreciation: 21,542 0 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542 21,542
Net Cash Flow: 28,771 7,726 29,778 30,299 30,835 31,384 31,948 32,526 33,118 33,727 34,351
PV 26,889 6,748 24,308 23,115 21,985 20,913 19,895 18,930 18,014 17,145 16,320
NPV -22,694
MAC (1) 21.55
(1) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
Table NT4.2 - Module replacement - Calculation
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Table NT5.1 -Re-engineering of 10yrs old aircrafts - Assumptions
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 337,846 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 865,443
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 2.5%
Costs per aircraft (2) 24,500 k $
Planes >10yrs 2011 (3): 53
Total Planes 2011: 215
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
No. of airplanes 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Cost (M Pound) (4) 1,298,500
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.106) - increased efficieny by 2-3%
(2) According to  Farries & Eyers (2008, p.106), cost are between $9 and $40m 
(3) According to  Farries & Eyers (2008, p.106), implementation is currently possilbe - Assumption that no aircraft will be retired/sold before 2023





Table NT5.2 - Re-engineering of 10yrs old aircrafts - Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 1,298,500
Saving in fuel in kL (1): 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713 30,713
Benefit fuel sav.: 24,195 24,679 25,172 25,676 26,189 26,713 27,248 27,792 28,348 28,915 29,494
Benefit less CO2: 1,993 2,091 2,197 2,305 2,421 2,542 2,669 2,802 2,942 3,089 3,244
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -91,858 -91,276 -90,676 -90,064 -89,435 -88,791 -88,129 -87,451 -86,755 -86,041 -85,308
income tax: -27,557 -27,383 -27,203 -27,019 -26,831 -26,637 -26,439 -26,235 -26,026 -25,812 -25,592
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -64,300 -63,893 -63,473 -63,045 -62,605 -62,153 -61,690 -61,216 -60,728 -60,229 -59,716
Depreciation: 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045 118,045
Net Cash Flow: 53,745 54,152 54,572 55,001 55,441 55,892 56,355 56,830 57,317 57,817 58,330
PV 50,229 47,299 44,547 41,960 39,528 37,243 35,095 33,075 31,177 29,391 27,712
NPV -881,243
MAC (2) 1,018.26
(1) For Fuel consumption a ration of 53 (no of planes >10yrs old as of 2011) divided by 215 (total no of planes as of 2011).
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved.
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Table ATM1.1 -Investment by Qantas solely - Increase in Fuel efficiency
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 456,730 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 1,169,984
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 0 (0-national; 1 international)
Inefficiency level 2012: 11.7%
Inefficiency level 2020: 8.8%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Growth rate (1) -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99%
Inefficiency rate 11.70% 11.23% 10.79% 10.36% 9.94% 9.55% 9.17% 8.80% 8.45% 8.11% 7.79%
Saving from Efficiency 0.00% 0.47% 0.91% 1.34% 1.76% 2.15% 2.53% 2.90% 3.25% 3.59% 3.91%
(1) Calculation of Growth rate given a starting point of value in 2012 and expected amount in 2020





Investment upfront (1): 660 million$
Investment add (2): 177 million$
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p66)
(2) SESAR. (2011, p.18): Sum of benefit fuel saving time 15 divided by 35
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment: 660,000
Investment add (1): 177,000
Saving in fuel in kL: 8,300 16,595 24,888 33,182 41,480 49,787 58,105 66,439 74,790 83,164
Benefit fuel sav.: 6,670 13,601 20,806 28,294 36,078 44,169 52,580 61,323 70,412 79,861
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -60,000 -52,765 -45,212 -37,326 -29,091 -20,489 -11,505 -2,119 7,687 17,935 28,645
income tax: -18,000 -15,830 -13,563 -11,198 -8,727 -6,147 -3,452 -636 2,306 5,381 8,593
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -42,000 -36,936 -31,648 -26,128 -20,363 -14,343 -8,054 -1,483 5,381 12,555 20,051
Depreciation: 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
Net Cash Flow: 18,000 23,064 28,352 33,872 39,637 45,657 51,946 58,517 65,381 72,555 80,051
PV 16,822 20,145 23,144 25,841 28,260 30,423 32,350 34,057 35,563 36,883 38,032
NPV -515,480
MAC (2) 441
(1) Additional ATM equipment investment
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa
Table ATM1.2 - Investment by Qantas solely - Calculation
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Table ATM2.1 - Investment (R&D) covered by 3rd party
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,304,944 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 3,342,810
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012: 11.7%
Efficiency level 2020: 8.8%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Growth rate (1) -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99% -3.99%
Inefficiency rate 11.70% 11.23% 10.79% 10.36% 9.94% 9.55% 9.17% 8.80% 8.45% 8.11% 7.79%
Saving from Efficiency 0.00% 0.47% 0.91% 1.34% 1.76% 2.15% 2.53% 2.90% 3.25% 3.59% 3.91%





Investment add (1): 177 million$
(1) SESAR. (2011, p.18): Sum of benefit fuel saving time 15 divided by 35
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment add (1): 177,000
Saving in fuel in kL: 23,715 47,415 71,108 94,805 118,515 142,249 166,015 189,825 213,687 237,612
Benefit fuel sav.: 19,056 38,861 59,445 80,841 103,080 126,197 150,227 175,208 201,177 228,175
Benefit less CO2: 1,614 3,392 5,337 7,472 9,808 12,360 15,146 18,185 21,494 25,096
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: -16,091 4,579 26,162 48,692 72,221 96,796 122,466 149,283 177,302 206,581 237,180
income tax: -4,827 1,374 7,849 14,607 21,666 29,039 36,740 44,785 53,191 61,974 71,154
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: -11,264 3,206 18,313 34,084 50,555 67,757 85,726 104,498 124,111 144,606 166,026
Depreciation: 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091 16,091
Net Cash Flow: 4,827 19,296 34,404 50,175 66,646 83,848 101,817 120,589 140,202 160,697 182,117
PV 4,511 16,854 28,084 38,278 47,518 55,872 63,407 70,184 76,261 81,690 86,522
NPV 392,181
MAC (2) -117
(1) Additional ATM equipment investment.
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa
Table ATM2.2 - Investment (R&D) covered by 3rd party - Calc
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Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,212,896 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 3,107,015
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 2.0%
No of Planes by 2011: 215
No of Planes by 2018: 384
Average p.a. 24
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
No. of airplanes 263 287 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 481 505
Additional airplanes 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Saving by Efficiency  (2) 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.113),
(2) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.113),
Investment upfront (1): 100 million$
Cost per aircraft(1): 1.5 million$
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p66)
Table T1.1 - Investment calculation - Towing
110,263
282,456
Table T1.1 - Towing-Assumptions
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in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 100,000
Installation 431,143 36,214 36,214 36,214 36,214 36,214 36,214 36,214 36,214 36,214 36,214
Saving in fuel in kL (1): 99,673 101,667 103,700 105,774 107,890 110,047 112,248 114,493 116,783 119,119 121,501
Benefit fuel sav.: 78,520 81,692 84,992 88,426 91,998 95,715 99,582 103,605 107,791 112,145 116,676
Benefit less CO2: 6,467 6,921 7,418 7,939 8,503 9,107 9,753 10,446 11,188 11,982 12,833
Fixed cost:
Depreciation: 39,195 42,487 45,779 49,071 52,364 55,656 58,948 62,240 65,532 68,825 72,117
Interest:
Profit bef. Tax: 45,792 46,126 46,631 47,294 48,138 49,166 50,387 51,811 53,446 55,303 57,392
income tax: 13,738 13,838 13,989 14,188 14,441 14,750 15,116 15,543 16,034 16,591 17,218
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 32,054 32,288 32,642 33,106 33,696 34,416 35,271 36,267 37,412 38,712 40,174
Depreciation: 39,195 42,487 45,779 49,071 52,364 55,656 58,948 62,240 65,532 68,825 72,117
Net Cash Flow: -359,894 38,561 42,207 45,963 49,846 53,858 58,005 62,293 66,730 71,322 76,077
PV -336,349 33,681 34,453 35,065 35,539 35,888 36,122 36,255 36,297 36,257 36,144
NPV -511,792
MAC (2) 165
(1) Assumption at towing technology will be used at every (worldwide) destination airport.
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved.
Table T1.2 - Towing-Calculation
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Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 242,579 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 621,403
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 0.4%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40%
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.55),
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 19,935 20,333 20,740 21,155 21,578 22,009 22,450 22,899 23,357 23,824 24,300
Benefit fuel sav.: 15,704 16,338 16,998 17,685 18,400 19,143 19,916 20,721 21,558 22,429 23,335
Benefit less CO2: 1,293 1,384 1,484 1,588 1,701 1,821 1,951 2,089 2,238 2,396 2,567
Profit bef. Tax: 16,997 17,723 18,482 19,273 20,100 20,964 21,867 22,810 23,796 24,825 25,902
income tax: 5,099 5,317 5,545 5,782 6,030 6,289 6,560 6,843 7,139 7,448 7,771
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 11,898 12,406 12,937 13,491 14,070 14,675 15,307 15,967 16,657 17,378 18,131
Net Cash Flow: 11,898 12,406 12,937 13,491 14,070 14,675 15,307 15,967 16,657 17,378 18,131
PV 11,120 10,836 10,561 10,292 10,032 9,779 9,532 9,293 9,060 8,834 8,614
NPV 107,953
MAC (1) -174
(1) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved.
Table T2.1 - Taxiing with less engines





Table T3.1 - Implement Queue Management and controlled pushback
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,212,896 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 3,107,015
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 2.0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.55),
Table T3.2 - Implement Queue Management and controlled pushback - Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D) (1): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 99,673 101,667 103,700 105,774 107,890 110,047 112,248 114,493 116,783 119,119 121,501
Benefit fuel sav.: 78,520 81,692 84,992 88,426 91,998 95,715 99,582 103,605 107,791 112,145 116,676
Benefit less CO2: 6,467 6,921 7,418 7,939 8,503 9,107 9,753 10,446 11,188 11,982 12,833
Profit bef. Tax: 84,987 88,613 92,411 96,365 100,501 104,822 109,335 114,051 118,978 124,127 129,509
income tax: 25,496 26,584 27,723 28,910 30,150 31,447 32,801 34,215 35,693 37,238 38,853
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 59,491 62,029 64,687 67,456 70,351 73,375 76,535 79,836 83,285 86,889 90,656
Net Cash Flow: 59,491 62,029 64,687 67,456 70,351 73,375 76,535 79,836 83,285 86,889 90,656
PV 55,599 54,179 52,804 51,462 50,159 48,893 47,662 46,465 45,301 44,170 43,070
NPV 539,764
MAC (2) -174
(1) It is assumed that investment costs are covered by the airport, due to the lack of (investement-cost-)information 




MACC - (Landing&take -off CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 909,672 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 2,330,261
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
Table L&T1.1 - Continuous Descent Approaches - Assumptions
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 1.5%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Saving by Efficiency 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.55) suggest fuel savings betwee 1-2%,
Table L&T1.2 - Continuous Descent Approaches - Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D) (1): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 74,755 76,250 77,775 79,331 80,917 82,536 84,186 85,870 87,587 89,339 91,126
Benefit fuel sav.: 58,890 61,269 63,744 66,319 68,999 71,786 74,686 77,704 80,843 84,109 87,507
Benefit less CO2: 4,850 5,191 5,564 5,955 6,377 6,830 7,315 7,834 8,391 8,986 9,624
Profit bef. Tax: 63,740 66,460 69,308 72,274 75,376 78,616 82,001 85,538 89,234 93,095 97,131
income tax: 19,122 19,938 20,792 21,682 22,613 23,585 24,600 25,661 26,770 27,929 29,139
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 44,618 46,522 48,516 50,592 52,763 55,031 57,401 59,877 62,464 65,167 67,992
Net Cash Flow: 44,618 46,522 48,516 50,592 52,763 55,031 57,401 59,877 62,464 65,167 67,992
PV 41,699 40,634 39,603 38,596 37,619 36,670 35,746 34,849 33,976 33,127 32,303
NPV 404,823
MAC (2) -174
(1) Assumption that now investment cost occur
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved 




MACC - (Flight CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 106,128 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 271,864
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings: 0 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 0.5%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Saving by Efficiency 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.113)
Table Fl1.2 - Less Tankering - Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D) (1): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 8,721 8,896 9,074 9,255 9,440 9,629 9,822 10,018 10,219 10,423 10,631
Benefit fuel sav.: 7,436 7,754 8,086 8,432 8,794 9,172 9,567 9,979 10,411 10,861 11,332
Benefit less CO2: 566 606 649 695 744 797 853 914 979 1,048 1,123
Profit bef. Tax: 8,002 8,359 8,735 9,127 9,538 9,969 10,420 10,893 11,389 11,910 12,455
income tax: 2,401 2,508 2,621 2,738 2,861 2,991 3,126 3,268 3,417 3,573 3,736
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 5,602 5,851 6,115 6,389 6,677 6,978 7,294 7,625 7,973 8,337 8,718
Net Cash Flow: 5,602 5,851 6,115 6,389 6,677 6,978 7,294 7,625 7,973 8,337 8,718
PV 5,235 5,111 4,991 4,874 4,760 4,650 4,542 4,438 4,337 4,238 4,142
NPV 51,318
MAC (2) -189
(1) Assumption that now investment cost occur
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa




MACC - (Flight CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 545,803 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 1,398,157
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 0.9%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90% 0.90%
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.113),
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 44,853 45,750 46,665 47,598 48,550 49,521 50,512 51,522 52,552 53,603 54,676
Benefit fuel sav.: 35,334 36,761 38,246 39,792 41,399 43,072 44,812 46,622 48,506 50,465 52,504
Benefit less CO2: 2,910 3,114 3,338 3,573 3,826 4,098 4,389 4,701 5,034 5,392 5,775
Profit bef. Tax: 38,244 39,876 41,585 43,364 45,226 47,170 49,201 51,323 53,540 55,857 58,279
income tax: 11,473 11,963 12,475 13,009 13,568 14,151 14,760 15,397 16,062 16,757 17,484
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 26,771 27,913 29,109 30,355 31,658 33,019 34,441 35,926 37,478 39,100 40,795
Net Cash Flow: 26,771 27,913 29,109 30,355 31,658 33,019 34,441 35,926 37,478 39,100 40,795
PV 25,019 24,380 23,762 23,158 22,572 22,002 21,448 20,909 20,386 19,876 19,382
NPV 242,894
MAC (1) -174 
(1) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa
127,105
Table Fl2.1 - Reduce cabin dead-weight - Assumptions
54,580
Table Fl2.2 - Reduce cabin dead-weight - Calculation
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MACC - (Flight CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,819,344 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 4,660,522
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 3.0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00%
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.113),
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 149,510 152,500 155,550 158,661 161,834 165,071 168,372 171,740 175,175 178,678 182,252
Benefit fuel sav.: 117,779 122,538 127,488 132,639 137,997 143,572 149,373 155,407 161,686 168,218 175,014
Benefit less CO2: 9,701 10,382 11,128 11,909 12,755 13,660 14,630 15,669 16,781 17,973 19,249
add. Benefit (1): 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Profit bef. Tax: 128,480 133,919 139,616 145,548 151,752 158,233 165,003 172,076 179,467 187,191 195,263
income tax: 38,544 40,176 41,885 43,664 45,526 47,470 49,501 51,623 53,840 56,157 58,579
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 89,936 93,744 97,731 101,883 106,226 110,763 115,502 120,453 125,627 131,034 136,684
Net Cash Flow: 89,936 93,744 97,731 101,883 106,226 110,763 115,502 120,453 125,627 131,034 136,684
PV 84,052 81,879 79,778 77,726 75,738 73,806 71,929 70,105 68,333 66,611 64,938
NPV 814,895
MAC (1) -175
(1) Increased revenues - net revenues:incresed costs (e.g. Add. Passanger handling/services) are not considered explicitly - Assumption
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved pa
Table Fl3.1 - Load-factor maximisation - Assumptions
181,934
423,684
Table Fl3.2 - Load-factor maximisation - Calculation
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MACC - (Maintenance-CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 727,738 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) kL/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 1,864,209
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 1.2%
Costs in % of fuel savings (2) 21.4%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Cost (2) 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43% 21.43%
Saving by Efficiency 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20% 1.20%
(1) Kar et al. (2010, p.55)
(2) Pratt & Whitney Global Service Partners (2010, p.3) estimate from graph - as Percent from savings.
      It was ignored that the savings and costs for narrow and wide-body aircraft is different     





Table M1.2 - Engine washing- Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D) (1): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 59,804 61,000 62,220 63,464 64,734 66,028 67,349 68,696 70,070 71,471 72,901
Benefit fuel sav.: 47,112 49,015 50,995 53,056 55,199 57,429 59,749 62,163 64,674 67,287 70,006
Benefit less CO2: 3,880 4,153 4,451 4,764 5,102 5,464 5,852 6,268 6,713 7,189 7,700
add. Benefit (2):
variable cost: 
Labour: 10,095 10,503 10,928 11,369 11,828 12,306 12,803 13,321 13,859 14,419 15,001
Profit bef. Tax: 40,897 42,665 44,519 46,450 48,472 50,587 52,798 55,110 57,528 60,058 62,704
income tax: 12,269 12,799 13,356 13,935 14,542 15,176 15,839 16,533 17,258 18,017 18,811
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 28,628 29,865 31,163 32,515 33,931 35,411 36,958 38,577 40,270 42,040 43,893
Net Cash Flow: 28,628 29,865 31,163 32,515 33,931 35,411 36,958 38,577 40,270 42,040 43,893
PV 26,755 26,085 25,438 24,806 24,192 23,596 23,016 22,452 21,904 21,371 20,853
NPV 260,468
MAC (3) -140
(1) Assumption that now investment cost occur, e.g. Leasing 
(2) Savings in water consumption are mentioned but 1. not quantified & 2. excluded for this calculation
(3) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved 
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MACC - (Painting-CS)
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 1,212,896 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 3,107,015
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 2.0%
Cost (1) 1.0%
No of Planes by 2011: 215
No of Planes by 2018: 384
Average p.a. 24
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
No. of airplanes 263 287 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 481 505
Additional airplanes 215 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Cost (2) 1% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09%
Saving by Efficiency 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%
(1) Sumberg (2011)
Table P1.1 - Coat Airplanes With Ultra Thin Paint - Assumptions
(2) Sumberg (2011), it is assumed that each aircraft contributes equally to the cost savings and generates the same costs -which might be not realistic since paint for  





Table P1.2 - Coat Airplanes With Ultra Thin Paint - Calculation
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D) (1): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 99,673 101,667 103,700 105,774 107,890 110,047 112,248 114,493 116,783 119,119 121,501
Benefit fuel sav.: 78,520 81,692 84,992 88,426 91,998 95,715 99,582 103,605 107,791 112,145 116,676
Benefit less CO2: 6,467 6,921 7,418 7,939 8,503 9,107 9,753 10,446 11,188 11,982 12,833
variable cost:
Cost of painting 18,285 1,631 1,664 1,697 1,731 1,766 1,801 1,837 1,874 1,912 1,950
Profit bef. Tax: 66,702 86,981 90,747 94,668 98,770 103,056 107,534 112,214 117,104 122,216 127,559
income tax: 20,010 26,094 27,224 28,400 29,631 30,917 32,260 33,664 35,131 36,665 38,268
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 46,691 60,887 63,523 66,267 69,139 72,139 75,274 78,549 81,973 85,551 89,291
Net Cash Flow: 46,691 60,887 63,523 66,267 69,139 72,139 75,274 78,549 81,973 85,551 89,291
PV 43,637 53,181 51,853 50,555 49,295 48,069 46,877 45,717 44,588 43,490 42,422
NPV 519,683
MAC (2) -167 
(1) Assumption that now investment cost occur.
(2) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
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MACC - (Painting-CS)
Table P2.1 - Polishing - Assumptions
Discount rate: 7% Useful life of investment: 11
add. benefit - fuel saving: 121,290 depreciation: straight line
(kL fuel saved) t/pa
Income tax rate: 30%
add. benefit - less CO2-e: 310,701
(tons CO2-e saved) CO2-e/pa Add. benefit (operational):
(Inter-)national fuel savings 1 (0-national; 1 international)
Efficiency level 2012 (1): 0.2%
Cost (2): negligible 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Saving by Efficiency  (1) 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20%
(1) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.113), Kar et al. (2010, p.55) suggest increased efficiency of 0.3-0.8%
(2) Farries & Eyers (2008, p.34) cost would be around Pound 150 for increased maintenance.
in k$ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Investment (R&D): 0
Saving in fuel in kL: 9,967 10,167 10,370 10,577 10,789 11,005 11,225 11,449 11,678 11,912 12,150
Benefit fuel sav.: 7,852 8,169 8,499 8,843 9,200 9,571 9,958 10,360 10,779 11,215 11,668
Benefit less CO2: 647 692 742 794 850 911 975 1,045 1,119 1,198 1,283
Profit bef. Tax: 8,499 8,861 9,241 9,637 10,050 10,482 10,934 11,405 11,898 12,413 12,951
income tax: 2,550 2,658 2,772 2,891 3,015 3,145 3,280 3,422 3,569 3,724 3,885
R & D Tax-Credit:
Government Grants:
A/g Profit: 5,949 6,203 6,469 6,746 7,035 7,338 7,653 7,984 8,328 8,689 9,066
Net Cash Flow: 5,949 6,203 6,469 6,746 7,035 7,338 7,653 7,984 8,328 8,689 9,066
PV 5,560 5,418 5,280 5,146 5,016 4,889 4,766 4,647 4,530 4,417 4,307
NPV 53,976
MAC (1) -174 
(1) NPV divided by life-time and CO2-e saved
Table P2.2 -Polishing - Calculation
12,129
28,246
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